Dist. 31, Part 1, Dubia
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/1/d/31/q/bon-sent-I-d31-p1-dubia
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### Doubts concerning the text of the Master.

#### DOUBT I.

In this part there are doubts concerning the text, and first there is a doubt concerning the place of this part, because since above, in the nineteenth distinction, equality has already been treated, the Master here seems to repeat superfluously.

**I respond:** It must be said that equality and likeness can be spoken of in two ways, namely on the side of the thing, or on the side of the name. And in the first way they are treated in what precedes; in the second way, here.

#### DOUBT II.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says, that *nothing is like itself*. For this seems false, because someone differs from himself, as Socrates as an old man from himself as a boy: therefore by parity of reasoning something can be like itself. — Likewise, Christ as man is like himself, because no one is blessed unless he be made like to God; but Christ is in the highest degree made like to God: therefore etc.

**I respond:** It must be said that, just as *difference* sometimes denotes an otherness of supposit from supposit, as when it is said: Peter is other than Paul; sometimes an otherness in nature, as when it is said: Christ, insofar as he is man, differs from himself, [insofar as he is] God; sometimes an otherness of state from state, as Peter as an old man differs from himself as a boy — in this way is *likeness* to be understood. When therefore "like" expresses a likeness of supposit to supposit, the same thing cannot be like itself; but when it expresses a likeness of *nature* to *nature*, or of state to state, the same thing can be like itself, because these come together in the same person; and so the Master understands it.

#### DOUBT III.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says, that *the equality of Father and Son is not a relation or a notion*, because he had just said before that "like" and "equal" are relative: therefore likeness is a relation.

**I respond:** It must be said that the Master understands [it] of a notion which is a *property of a person*, not of relation commonly understood. — Or it must be said otherwise, that the word of the Master is to be understood causally, as is clear from what precedes, since equality does not consist in personal properties, but rather in essential ones, which have been shown above.

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