Dist. 31, Part 2, Art. 2, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/1/d/31/q/bon-sent-I-d31-p2-a2-q1
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### Article II. *On the appropriation of Augustine.*

Next there is the principal question concerning the appropriation of Augustine, which is: "In the Father, unity; in the Son, equality; in the Holy Spirit, the concord of unity and equality." And concerning these, three further matters are inquired into.

First, it is asked whether God can be said to be one with a creature.

Second, whether a creature can be said to be one with [another] creature.

Third, concerning the account of the appropriation of those three.

### Question I. *Whether God can be said to be one with a creature.*

That God can be said to be one with a creature is shown:

1. By the authority of the Apostle, in the first [letter] to the Corinthians, [chapter] six: *He who adheres to God is one spirit.* If [he is] one spirit: therefore one being and one thing; and if this: therefore one.

2. Likewise, the man who adheres to God is one spirit: either, then, created or uncreated; not created, since God is not a creature: therefore one uncreated [spirit]. But the uncreated Spirit is altogether one: therefore the man adhering to God is simply one with God.

3. Likewise, the middle is more united to the extreme than extreme to extreme; but the Holy Spirit is the middle uniting just men, and just men, united through him, are one — John seventeen: *That they may be one, as we also are one* — therefore the just man with the Holy Spirit can be said to be one.

4. Likewise, the member is more united to the head than member to member: therefore, since the members of Christ are one in Christ, much more strongly is the member one with the head. But Christ is head not only according to humanity, but also according to divinity: therefore etc.

**On the contrary:**

1. From that word which is said in John ten: *I and the Father are one*, the holy [doctors] attack the Arian heresy, and especially Augustine, concluding from this that Arius errs, who says that the Son has

another nature. If, then, Augustine's reasoning is good, *one* expresses unity in nature; but in this manner the Creator is not one with a creature: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, this is shown by another reason, since those things which are most distant are least one; but the Creator and the creature are most distant: therefore they cannot be said simply to be one.

3. Likewise, if they are one, therefore some [unity is] one; but if they are some one [thing], therefore God and the creature have something in common; and if this, they are univocally [predicated] in something. Therefore, since the univocal is simpler than those things which are univocally [predicated] in it, something is simpler than God.

4. Likewise, if God and the creature are one — since he is infinitely distant from each one — by what reason is he said to be one with one [creature], rather than with any [creature]? But whatever things are the same as one and the same thing are the same as one another: therefore according to this all things are one.

### Conclusion.

> *God cannot be said simply to be one with a creature; but with a certain qualification, as* one spirit*, this manner of speaking is rightly employed.*

**I respond:** It must be said that, just as Augustine says, for some things to be one, conformity of will does not suffice, but it is necessary that an agreement in nature be presupposed. Since therefore God and the creature differ supremely in nature, on that account they ought not to be said to be one, as the reasons adduced for this prove.

But since the just man is conformed by charity to the divine will and adheres to it more than to anything else, he is rightly said to be one [with God] with a qualification, namely *one spirit*. For *spirit* is said [to be] will and love, whence *he who adheres to God is one spirit*, since he is of one and conformed will.

**To the arguments:**

*1.* To that which is objected: *he is one spirit, therefore one thing*; it must be said that there is here a fallacy of *secundum quid* and *simpliciter*. For *one* is drawn off from its [proper] account by [the addition of] the [word] *spirit*, and there expresses unity not by indivision or unity of nature, but by conformity of will.

*2.* To that which is objected: *either one spirit created or uncreated* etc.; it must be said: neither created nor uncreated. For *spirit* does not stand there for substance, but for the act of will; and *one* implies nothing but the conformity of human affection to the divine will or to divine love, since love transforms the lover into the beloved.

*3.* To that which is objected, that the Spirit is the uniting middle; it must be said that he unites with respect to the will, but not with respect to conformity of nature; and they are not said to be one by reason of conformity of will alone. Therefore [the argument] does not hold, since the bond of the Spirit is not the whole cause why they are one.

*4.* To that which is objected, that the members of Christ are one; it can be said that the members of Christ are not said to be one simply, but one body; and thus also Christ is one with [his] members, but this is by reason of the humanity assumed.