Dist. 31, Part 2, Art. 2, Q. 2
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/1/d/31/q/bon-sent-I-d31-p2-a2-q2
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### Question II. *Whether one creature can be said simply to be one with another.*

Second, it is asked whether one creature can be said to be one with another; and that it can be, is shown in this way.

1. The Apostle, in the first [letter] to the Corinthians, [chapter] three: *He who plants and he who waters are one*; but Paul was one planting, and Apollos another watering: therefore from this it appears that one creature can be said to be one with another.

2. Likewise, Augustine says, and the Master sets down in [his] text, that those things are rightly said to be one which agree in nature and will; but one creature has this with another: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, the Lord, [in] Matthew nineteen: *And so they are now not two, but one flesh*; this he said of husband and wife; but if they are, and are not two, therefore they are one: therefore husband with wife can be said to be one, and so etc.

4. Likewise, from the unity of the material principle there comes unity simply, which is unity in number; but the body is the material principle in man — and he who adheres to a harlot is made one body, as is said in the first [letter] to the Corinthians, [chapter] six — therefore one simply, and so etc.

**On the contrary:**

1. *The same*, said simply, stands for the same thing in number: therefore *one*, said simply, stands for one in number; but two creatures are not one in number, however much they agree: therefore they ought not to be said to be one.

2. Likewise, if certain things are said to be one on account of an agreement in nature, then, since man and ass agree in nature, they are one; which is not granted. If you should say that conformity of will is further required, — since, then, sinful men agree both in nature and in will, they ought therefore to be said to be one: which, since they are not so said, conformity of nature and of will therefore does not suffice.

3. Likewise, if a man, by union with a harlot, is made one, since every unity is from the first unity, this unity will be from the first unity; but such a unity is detestable: therefore the first unity makes a detestable unity, therefore it is itself blameworthy.

### Conclusion.

> *Those things which retain conformity of nature, of will, and of operation can fittingly be said simply to be one; yet, with any one of these conditions failing, they are said to be one only in a qualified sense.*

**I respond:** It must be said that two distinct creatures cannot have unity except by conformity; yet not every conformity makes [things] said to be one simply, but [only] that which is conformity simply, not in a qualified sense. For full conformity, however, a threefold conformity is required, namely in nature, in will, and in operation; and when those three concur in some two [things], then those two are said to be one: as Paul and Apollos were conformed in nature, since each was a man; in will likewise, since each desired the salvation of the faithful; in action likewise, since each exerted himself to procure it, the one by planting and the other by watering, and each action conformed [to the other], since each was through the preaching of the divine word. For the divine word, first cast forth, is the seed; thereafter it receives the watering of rain. — But if there is conformity in nature alone, they ought not to be said to be one except in a qualified sense, namely with a diminishing qualification, as one in genus or species. If [conformity is] in will alone, then they are *one spirit*, which expresses love. If [they are] one in nature and in will, then [they are] one body and one soul. If [they are] one in nature and in action, they can be said to be one with a qualification, as the fornicator with the harlot can be said to be one body; yet they cannot be said to be one simply, as husband and wife [can]. Nor are evil men one in the same way as good men, since they disagree in the things willed as principally intended. For every evil man seeks his own good and not the common [good].

From these things the points inquired into are clear. For it is to be granted that some two things are said to be one simply, if they have conformity, as has been said, as the first reasons prove.

**To the arguments on the opposite side:**

*1.* But to that which is objected fourthly, it must be said that it does not conclude, since the fornicator and the harlot are not said to be one body by reason of corporeal substance, but by reason of the carnal act, in which they are united: and therefore it does not follow that they ought to be said to be one simply.

*2.* To that which is objected concerning [being] one in number, it must be said that unity is twofold, namely [the unity] of indivision and [the unity] of conformity. The unity of indivision is regarded in [being] one in number, and this unity is [unity] simply; but the unity of conformity is not in [being] one in number, but in those things to which it happens to be conformed to others, as has been said.

*3.* To that which is objected, if on account of conformity in nature [some things] are said to be one etc.; it must be said: on account of conformity in nature and in will; and [conformity] in nature, not only insofar as it is the essence of the thing, but [in nature] from which [the essence] sprouts forth a sprout, that is, insofar as [the nature] is the principle of operation; thus it is clear that man and ass are not said to be one. It is also clear that evil men are not said to be one, since although

they agree in the proximate end and in the work, they nevertheless differ in the remote [end], since each seeks what is his own. The just, however, [are] on the contrary; for if at some time their wills should disagree in the proximate end, they agree in the remote [end].

*4.* To that which is objected, that the unity of the harlot is in no way from God; it must be said that, just as in sin there is the substance of the action — and this is from God — and the deformity — and this is not from God: so it is to be understood in such a unity.