Dist. 31, Part 2, Art. 2, Q. 3
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/1/d/31/q/bon-sent-I-d31-p2-a2-q3
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### Question III. *By what reason unity is appropriated to the Father, equality to the Son, concord to the Holy Spirit.*

Third, it is asked concerning the reason for the appropriation of the three aforesaid names.

1. And first concerning unity. And that it is not appropriable, it seems, since *one and being are convertible*; therefore [also] unity and essence; but essence is appropriable to none [of the persons]: therefore neither is unity.

2. Likewise, if it is appropriated, since the Holy Spirit is the unity of both, as Augustine says, it seems that it ought to be appropriated to the person of the Holy Spirit.

3. Likewise, [the same] is objected concerning equality, which is appropriated to the Son. For nothing is more indifferent in equal things than equality itself; but what is indifferent is not appropriable: therefore neither is equality appropriable.

4. Likewise, if it is appropriated, it ought to be appropriated to the Father, since equality is nothing other than the *one* or unity in quantity; but unity is appropriated to the Father: therefore equality also.

5. Likewise, [the same] is objected concerning concord, which is appropriated to the Holy Spirit. For if concord reduces many to unity, it seems rather to make of what is proper [something] common than of what is common [something] proper: therefore, if to appropriate is to make of what is common [something] proper, concord is appropriable to none.

6. Likewise, it seems that it ought to be appropriated to the Son, since the Son is *our peace, who has made both one*, [as is said] in [the letter] to the Ephesians, [chapter] two. Likewise, [in the letter] to the Colossians, [chapter] one: *Making peace through the blood of his cross, whether the things on earth or the things in heaven.*

7. Likewise, [the contrary] is objected against the reasoning of Augustine: "All things equal on account of the Son etc."; therefore the Father is equal on account of the Son: therefore he has something from the Son, which is false. Likewise I ask: which cause does he mean by *on account of [propter]* — the efficient, or the final? Whichever of these he should mean, since the whole Trinity is the efficient [cause] and end of every thing, both unity, equality, and concord is on account of the Father, similarly on account of the Son: therefore there is no reason for appropriating.

### Conclusion.

> *To unfold the order of the persons, unity is appropriated to the Father, equality to the Son, concord to the Holy Spirit.*

**I respond:** It must be understood that, just as the appropriation of Hilary was for unfolding the origin of the persons, so this [other appropriation] is for unfolding [their] order.

Since therefore the person of the Father is first, before whom is no other, and which is not from another; therefore unity is appropriated to him, which is first in number, and before which there is nothing in number.

**To the arguments:**

*1. 2.* From this is plain the response to the first two [arguments], since unity is here taken according to that account by which it expresses primacy, not the indivision of essence — since thus it is convertible with being — nor conformity of will — since thus it is appropriated to the Holy Spirit. But [it is appropriated to the Father] as first.

Likewise, since the person of the Son according to the account of intellection is second and perfectly expressing the Father, and this makes equality: therefore equality, by reason of order, is first found in the Son. For then [equality] is first understood, when the Son is understood to be born.

*3. 4.* And from this the objection is plain. For that equality is appropriated [to the Son], this is not by reason of unity, but by reason of the first and perfect association. For equality is then first understood, when association is understood; and this is first understood in the Son, who is the second person.

Likewise, the person of the Holy Spirit according to the account of intellection is third; and concord posits two [things] that can be in concord, and also one that brings them into concord: therefore concord first begins where the third person is first understood to arise.

*5. 6.* And so is plain that [point], that concord is appropriated to someone not because it makes of what is common [something] proper, but because it connects distinct [persons], and this according to the account of its emanation; which does not belong to the Son by reason of emanation, but by reason of mediation, since [he is] *the mediator of God and of men*. From these things all the objections are plain.

*7.* But to that which is asked last: "all things are one on account of the Father, all things equal on account of the Son"; it must be said that, if *all things* be distributed for created things, then *on account of [propter]* expresses the formal exemplar cause according to reality and appropriation, since every equality has its exemplar in the equality of the Son, and so of the others. But if it be distributed for created and uncreated [things], then *on account of* expresses the formal exemplar cause according to the account of intellection [as] appropriated; since our intellect does not understand equality in the Father except on account of this, that he has the Son expressing through all things his nature and power: similarly of the others. And then *on account of* does not express the cause of exemplarity according to reality, but according to the account of intellection. And thus it is not noted that the Father has something from the Son, but that our intellect knows something of the Father by this, that it knows the Son.