Dist. 31, Part 2, Dubia
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/1/d/31/q/bon-sent-I-d31-p2-dubia
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### DOUBTS CONCERNING THE TEXT OF THE MASTER.

#### DOUBT I.

In this part there are doubts concerning the text, and first concerning the placement of this part: for since the Master treats of *appropriation* in the thirty-fourth distinction, and of the *appropriated [names]* from the thirty-fifth distinction to the end, it seems that he places the treatise on *appropriated [names]* badly here.

**I respond:** It must be said that for a twofold cause the Master places the treatise on appropriated [names] here. One *[Reason 1]* is that he had been treating of names which signify a relation according to common relation, according to which appropriation is observed, such as *like* and *equal*; and so this part is incidentally introduced here. Another *[Reason 2]* reason is that the appropriated [names] serve to make manifest the proper [names]; and therefore immediately after the treatise on the proper [names], he treated of the appropriated [names], and especially insofar as they serve to manifest the proper ones. Therefore he treats here of those that do not signify a relation to creatures; below, however, he treats of those appropriated [names] which do signify a relation to creatures: and thus the distinction of this part from that one is plain. Whence the three appropriations of Hilary make manifest to us the *emanation* of the persons, while the three appropriations of Augustine make manifest to us the *order* of the persons, if anyone considers them.

#### DOUBT II.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says, that [the Son] *is a certain art of the omnipotent and wise* etc. For he seems to speak ill, since each one, when the art is not understood, is sluggish: therefore if the Son is the art of the Father, when the Son's being is not understood, the Father is sluggish: therefore it seems that the Father has rationally to operate from his Son.

**I respond:** It must be said that emphasis must be placed on the wording, because he does not say that he is *art* simply, but that he is *a certain art*, because he is not the art *by which* the Father knows, but [the art] *where* he knows; he is not the Father's art *by which* the Father is wise, but [the art] which is *from* the wise Father, through which the Father works all things, since he produced all things through the Son. And it should be noted *[What art is]* that, since *art* includes the intention of power and wisdom, and likewise also *the Word*; nevertheless they differ, because the Word signifies emanation and respect, and so it is *proper*, while *art* is *appropriated*.

#### DOUBT III.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says, that the Holy Spirit *with a vast bounty pours forth upon the other creatures*; therefore according to this it seems that the Holy Spirit is given to all.

**I respond:** It must be said that the Holy Spirit is not said to be *given* by reason of any effect whatever, but properly by reason of him who causes the Holy Spirit to be possessed and so to indwell in someone as in a temple. And because the rational creature alone is capable of this, and only the just receive him; therefore it is plain that to those alone is the Holy Spirit given. The Holy Spirit is, however, said to pour forth upon the other creatures, not because the act of creating is attributed to him, but because the act of conserving is attributed to him.

#### DOUBT IV.

Likewise it is asked concerning Hilary's account, which is set down in the gloss: *An image is of that thing of which it is the image, an undifferentiated species*. First, that account seems not to be convertible, because the whole seems to fit the Holy Spirit. — Likewise, *species* is taken either essentially or personally. If essentially: then the same sense is the one that is *undifferentiated species*, which is also so if one were to say *undifferentiated essence*; but this fits the Father, not only the Son. And again, *essence* is not said as *of* something. If it stands for *person*: then the same sense is *undifferentiated species*, which is so when one says *undifferentiated person*, but this is false.

Likewise, against the second account it is objected, which is as such: *An image is a likeness imagined unto the equating of a thing to a thing, and undivided*. For it seems false, because frequently an image is not equated to that of which it is the image. — Likewise, if it is *unto the equating of a thing*, then it seems to be equality, not likeness. — Likewise, it seems false to say *undistinguished likeness*, since every image and likeness is distinguished from that of which it is the image.

Likewise, since of one thing there is one definition, it is asked, how are these accounts assigned differently?

**I respond:** It must be said that here is defined the *uncreated* image *[To the first question]*, insofar as it belongs to the Son alone, and so it always signifies a relation to the Father; and in the first account the genitive is set down as in the account of *principle*, in the second it is set down as in the account of *term*: since the image must be compared to the Father not only as to one to whom or unto whom it leads, but also as to one *from whom* it emanates. And thus the distinction and order of these accounts is plain.

And the first account contains three conditions. By *[By the first account]* the first, the Son is noted as being *from another* — when it is said *image of that thing of which it is the image* — and through the genitive, and the verb, which is passive. By the second is noted that it is according to an expressed mode of emanating, namely by the fact that it is called *species*, which includes a perfect likeness of cognition.

Through the third is noted that it is *undifferentiated* according to substance, namely by the fact that it is *undifferentiated*. And by the first condition it differs both from essence and from the Father, by the second from the Holy Spirit, by the third from the created image.

And by this it is plain that *species*, although in itself essential, is here taken as drawn over to the person; and *undifferentiated* does not signify indistinction in this name *species*, but in substance. And thus the objections against the first account are plain.

This being seen, the second account is similarly plain, which is given by comparison to the Father himself as to the *term* *[To the second account]*. And this is plain when it is said *unto the equating of a thing* to a thing, that is, of the person of the Son to the person of the Father, and by this the person of the Father is excluded; by what is said *imagined*, the person of the Holy Spirit is excluded; by what is said *undivided*, the created image itself is excluded, and *undivided* does not signify personal indifference, but only essential.

To that, then, which is objected concerning equality *[Equating not [present] in the created image]*, it must be said that this is not necessary in the case of the created image. And again, since *image* by reason of its very name signifies *quality in quantity*, therefore the first is called a likeness *unto the equating of a thing*, that is, a likeness according to which a thing is equated to a thing.

#### DOUBT V.

Likewise it is asked concerning the difference of these three which he attributes, namely *species, nature*, and *essence*, how these are distinguished.

**I respond:** It must be said that the substantial and completive form of each thing is called *species, nature*, and *essence*, and this *[Species, nature, and essence in relation to one another]* according to a threefold consideration. For it can be considered in itself, and so it is called *essence*; it can be considered in comparison to its own operation, and so it is called *nature*; it can again be considered in comparison to our cognition, and so it is called *species*. The image of the Author has *species*, because it is his likeness; it has *nature*, because [it is] a likeness begotten or imagined naturally; *essence* truly, because [it is] a likeness undivided, namely through substance.

#### DOUBT VI.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says: *If anyone should call the Son unbegotten and without beginning*. For it seems that Hilary does not say well, that one who says two unbegottens says two gods; because *unbegottenness* in divine things is not a property of the essence, but of the person: therefore it does not follow, if there are two unbegottens, that there are two essences, but [only] that there are two persons. — Likewise, *unbegottenness* signifies the privation of that which is begotten, whence *unbegotten* is worth as much as *non-son*; but it does not follow: there are two sons in divine things, therefore two gods: therefore by parity of reasoning it does not follow, there are two unbegottens, therefore two gods.

**I respond:** It must be said that *unbegotten*, as *[Hilary's reasoning is defended]* was said above, denies or negates *being from another*, and from this it places fontal fullness in him who is called *unbegotten*; and from each side it is concluded that, if there be two unbegottens, there are two gods. For it follows: there are two, of whom each is not from another, therefore they are not distinguished by origin: therefore it is necessary that they be distinguished by substance. Likewise, if there are two, in each of whom there is fontal fullness: therefore each can be the principle of the Trinity and is «the principle of the whole deity», as is said of the Father. But if the principles are distinct, then so also are the things principled: therefore if each is the principle of the whole deity, and there are two, then there are two deities. Although, then, *unbegotten* is not a property of the substance, but of the person, since it is, however, [a property] of the first person, and in a single person there cannot be more than one unbegottenness: therefore of necessity it posits a diversity of gods.

#### DOUBT VII.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says: *For the Son is the head of all*. For he seems to speak ill, because either he is called *head* by reason of the deity, or by reason of conformity in nature. If by reason of the deity, by the same reason the Holy Spirit can be called *head*. Likewise, if by reason of the deity, then God cannot be called the head of the Son, because the head surpasses and holds majority of nobility, which the Father does not have with respect to the Son. If you say that *head* does not signify nobility or surpassing-eminence; the objection is brought from the following text where it is said: «in this gradation all things are referred back»; but it is established that between Father and Son by reason of the deity there is no *gradation*: therefore it cannot be taken by reason of the deity. — If by reason of conformity, since the Son does not have conformity in nature with all things, but only with men, he will not be the head of all.

**I respond:** It must be said that *head*, according as it is properly taken, conveys the account of *influence* and of *conformity of nature*: and thus Christ is called the head of the whole Church; but Hilary takes [it] in a more extended way, insofar as *head* signifies *original principle*. And since God the Father is the principle of the Son, and the Son the principle of all things, in such wise that the Son is produced and produces, therefore he is *head*, and *has* a head. But the Father, since he does not have a head, being unbegotten, is the head of all: and therefore he is called *fontal principle*, from whom all things [proceed] and unto whom all things are led back through the Son. And in this leading-back there is *gradation*, comparing creatures to the Son; but further, comparing the Son to the Father, there is no *gradation*, but *order* and *origin*. And therefore Hilary does not say *by these gradations*, but *by this gradation*. — As to what is objected concerning the Holy Spirit, it must be said that the Holy Spirit himself, since he proceeds from the Son, through the Son together with the others is led back to the Father: and on this account the leading-back is appropriated to the Son.

#### DOUBT VIII.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says: *That [they may be] three by substance, but one by consonance*, because this confession of faith seems not to be fitting, because of three concordant men this can be said, that they are three by substance, but one by consonance.

Likewise it is asked concerning Hilary's account, by which he says that one ought to say *by consonance* on account of the Holy Spirit, namely because, the Holy Spirit having been named, it fits to predicate unity of consonance rather than of essence. For this seems false, since the Holy Spirit is of the same essence with the Father, just as the Son [is].

**I respond:** It must be said that Hilary intends to show the catholic confession of the Fathers when they said that «they are three by substance, by consonance one». For the holy Fathers, wishing to dash the Sabellian heresy — which would dash, that is, evacuate the truth of the Father and the Son by mere naming, which it said was there, but not the reality — confessed plurality so expressly that they confessed essential unity less expressly; nevertheless they did not depart from the truth, since by *three things* are understood, that is, three hypostases; by *substance* truly is understood not *ousia*, but *person*: and therefore on this side they spoke truly. — On the side of consonance similarly they spoke truly and irreprehensibly. For just as by the name *Father* and *Son* the unity of nature is intimated, since the Son is connatural to the Father, so by the *Holy Spirit*, who is love, is given to be understood the unity of consonance. And therefore the wording incurred no calumny, and on this account they said it: and this is what Hilary wishes to say when he says, *rather of consonance than of essence*; not because both are not true, but because this [way of speaking] is more express and incurs less calumny. Yet there still follows this, that if the Father and the Son produce the Spirit one from themselves, by reason of which there is unity *by consonance* there, it is necessary that they have unity *in essence*.

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