Dist. 32, Dubia
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/1/d/32/q/bon-sent-I-d32-dubia
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### DOUBTS CONCERNING THE TEXT OF THE MASTER.

#### DOUBT I.

In this part there are doubts concerning the text, and first concerning Augustine's argument, which is set down in the text: *If the Father is wise by a begotten wisdom, which he begot, and this — to be — is the same for him as to be wise, then he is begotten wisdom.* For that argument seems not to hold, because this does not hold: *to be is for the Father the same as to operate; but he operates through the Son: therefore he is through the Son.* Therefore likewise that argument does not hold. If you say that it is not similar, because *to operate* connotes an effect: it is objected that *to be* is for the Father the same as *to be the Father*; but nevertheless this argument does not hold: *the Father is God by deity, therefore by deity he is Father*: therefore similarly this argument does not hold: *he is wise by begotten wisdom, therefore he is begotten wisdom*.

**I respond:** It must be said that Augustine's argument is necessary: since *to be wise* and *to be* in divine things do not differ in mode of speaking on the side of the thing, but only on our side. It is not so, however, with *to be* and *to operate*, since, although *to operate* with respect to its principal signification is the same as *to be*, nevertheless with respect to what is connoted it differs, and can be extraneous, and so there can be an accident there. Yet *to be God* and *to be the Father*, although they do not differ as to essence or mode of being, nevertheless differ as to the mode of comporting [oneself], which truly exists in divine things, namely *absolute* and *comparative*; and therefore paternity does not pass over into substance, as wisdom does; therefore it has another mode of being said, which can be extraneous in respect of some attribute. Therefore in that case there is an accident, but not in Augustine's argument.

#### DOUBT II.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says, that the Father is not wise by *begotten* wisdom, but *unbegotten* wisdom. For he seems to speak ill, because, just as eternity is appropriated to the Father, so wisdom to the Son; but eternity ought not to be called *unbegotten*, as Anselm says in the book *On the Incarnation of the Word*: therefore neither can nor ought wisdom to be called *unbegotten*. Likewise, if it can be said *unbegotten wisdom*, by parity of reasoning it can be said *proceeding wisdom*; and so it seems that wisdom is appropriable to the Holy Spirit, just as also to the Son.

Alongside this it is asked, why is it not said *power from power*, as *wisdom from wisdom*?

**I respond:** It must be said that *wisdom* is among the middle nouns, which are apt to supposit for the person. And therefore, just as one says *God from God*, and *God begotten* and *unbegotten*, so also is *wisdom* said; not, however, so properly, because it is in some way an abstract noun. Yet *wisdom from wisdom* is said more [properly] than *eternity from eternity*, because *eternity* signifies in greater abstraction than *wisdom*, and therefore abstracts more from the account of origin. According to this, also, it is to be conceded that one can say *proceeding wisdom*, though still less properly. Nor does that argument hold; for although wisdom is not appropriable to the Holy Spirit, yet by an added determination it can be drawn over [to him].

To that — why is *power from power* not said? — it must be said that it is not so properly said as *wisdom from wisdom*. For wisdom is appropriated to the Son, who is from another and from another has all that he has, therefore he has wisdom also from him: thus *begotten wisdom* by its appropriation presupposes *unbegotten wisdom*. But power is appropriated to the Father, who is not from another; therefore *power from power*, or *begotten power*, is not said in this way.

#### DOUBT III.

Likewise it is asked concerning what Augustine says in the book *Retractations* and which is set down in the text: *I treated this question better in the book On the Trinity.* For he seems not to speak rightly, because, since the comparative presupposes in each of its extremes the thing of its positive, if there [it is] *better*, then in both [places] *well*: therefore if there he says that the Father is wise by the wisdom which he begot, it seems that he speaks truly.

**I respond:** It must be said that the comparison is misused, since in the book *On the Trinity* he says the contrary of this, and therefore if there [he speaks] well, it is established that here [he speaks] ill. Yet inasmuch as he said certain true things in the book *Of the Eighty-three Questions* about this question, [he did] therefore not entirely ill, but in some way well, in some way ill: and therefore he says *better* there, hinting that something is there said ill. For he who supports one of two opposites, by consequence destroys the other.

#### DOUBT IV.

Likewise it is asked concerning this response of the Master, that begotten wisdom is wise *by unbegotten wisdom*. For it seems not to be good, because it does not seem to answer the question. For it is not asked whether the begotten wisdom or the Son is *from* the Father, but this is asked: whether the Son is wise by unbegotten wisdom.

**I respond:** It must be said that the Master answers well, though in few words, in which he hints at this distinction: that someone's being wise by something is twofold: either thus, that the ablative is taken formally, and so the Son is wise by begotten wisdom and the Father by unbegotten wisdom; or thus, that it is taken originally, and so, since begotten wisdom is *from* unbegotten wisdom, the Son is wise by unbegotten wisdom. But because the ablative is for the most part construed in the account of form, therefore the Master, speaking cautiously, said that the Son, who is begotten wisdom, is wise *from* unbegotten wisdom, so that the verb might not have any cavil; and therefore he answers well.

#### DOUBT V.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says, that *each is one wisdom, and yet the Father alone is unbegotten wisdom.* For he seems to say two opposites, because these two properties contract wisdom, and since they are distinct properties, they distinguish [it] — and this is plain, because *the Father alone is unbegotten wisdom* — but if wisdom is distinguished, then there is one and another wisdom, therefore not one. Likewise, he seems to say what is false, when he says that *the Father alone is unbegotten wisdom*. For *wisdom* is said either essentially or personally: if personally, then there is not one wisdom which is begotten and unbegotten, since the Father and the Son are not one person; if however essentially, then the Father is not the only one [who is] unbegotten wisdom.

**I respond:** It must be said that in this name *wisdom* two things are to be considered, namely the *significate* and the *supposit*. And as to the significate it says *essence*; but the supposit is *person*. And those determinations *begotten* and *unbegotten* do not regard the significate, but the supposit, and so they distinguish the supposit, while unity remains in the significate or form; and begotten and unbegotten wisdom is one and another, namely [one and another] *person*, but it is not one and another wisdom, just as it is not one and another essence. And therefore the Master sets down a good example in this term *God*, which signifies the essence and supposits for the person. — When therefore it is asked whether it is said essentially or personally, it must be said that as to the significate it is said essentially, but as to the supposit it is said personally; and so there is no controversy.

#### DOUBT VI.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says, that *the Son does not act of himself*, since the Father is shown to remain in him; but the Son likewise remains in the Father: therefore by parity of reasoning the Father does not act of himself. Likewise, he seems to say what is false when he says: *He would be infirm, were he not to act of himself unless God himself were to act*, because, according to this, since every creature acts from God, then [every creature] would seem to be an infirm agent, nor in this would the Son seem to differ from others.

**I respond:** It must be said that Hilary intends to show two things from the words of the Lord in John, and shows those two by reduction to impossibility. For the Lord himself says in John 14: *The words that I speak to you, I do not speak from myself; the Father remaining in me, he himself does the works.* From this therefore he argues that the Son does not act of himself, but with the Father remaining in him, not only as consubstantial but as principle; for the Son does not so remain in the Father, but only as consubstantial. — There is another authority of the Lord, John 8, where he says: *He who sent me has not left me alone, because the things that are pleasing to him I always do.* If he himself always acts together with the Father, then therefore he acts through himself. — These two he proves by reduction to impossibility: because every power is from the first power, which first resides in the Father: therefore if the Son cannot [act] from God, he is simply impotent or infirm, because the infirm has the power of failing of himself, not from God. Likewise if the Son does not act through himself, he does not act through a power proper and connatural to himself: therefore the power of the Father and of the Son is different. For *of himself* and *not of himself* makes no distinction in nature, but only in person, because it expresses the account of principle or origin. But *through himself* and *not through himself* — because *through himself* is said in opposition to *through accident*, or in opposition to *through another* — posits diversity in nature; and therefore the Son acts through himself, although not of himself.

#### DOUBT VII.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says, that there is only one wisdom of the Father, but it is not said in one mode. For he seems to speak ill, because *wisdom* is always [predicated] essentially: therefore he says what is false when he says: *not said in one mode*.

**I respond:** The Master does not mean that *wisdom* is said in many ways, but that the *wisdom of the Father* [is]: because the genitive can be construed in the account of origin, and so the Son is called the wisdom of the Father, or the begotten wisdom itself [is called] the wisdom of the Father, because it is from the Father; or it can be understood in the account of subject, so that it is called the wisdom of the Father as the whiteness of Peter [is so called], and in this way begotten wisdom is not said to be of the Father but of the Son. Because therefore the passive account, imported by this adjective *begotten*, is not one in the person of the Father and of the Son, the locution is false by reason of the determination, not by reason of that which is wisdom: because the wisdom of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit is one and the same, and that is the wisdom of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit.

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