Dist. 33, Art. 1, Q. 4
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/1/d/33/q/bon-sent-I-d33-a1-q4
----------------------------------------
### Question IV.
#### *Whether the same property can be predicated denominatively of itself.*

In the fourth place there is inquiry concerning the comparison of the same property to itself. The question, then, is whether the same property or notion is predicated of itself denominatively. And that it is so, seems to be the case:

1. By a *parallel*, since essential adjectives denominate abstracts, as *greatness is great* and *goodness is good*: therefore by parity of reason *generation generates* and *spiration spirates*.

2. Likewise, since in the *primaries* there is a stopping-point, they are denominated by themselves — whence *unity is itself one* — therefore since the personal properties have nothing prior to them, but rather are themselves primary, then they denominate themselves.

3. Likewise, an indefinite affirmative is equivalent to a particular, therefore it converts simpliciter; but this is granted: *the generator is paternity* or *generation*: therefore *generation is generator*.

4. Likewise, if this is not granted: *paternity is* *generator*, either this is on account of an incompatibility on the side of the thing, or on the side of the mode: not on the side of the thing, since it is the same thing; not on the side of the mode, since the same property and relation is involved: therefore in no way is there an incompatibility there: therefore the locution is simpliciter true.

**On the contrary:**

1. Just as it is proper to a property to distinguish, so it is proper to a person to produce another; but this is false: *the person distinguishes*, since it does not distinguish but rather is distinguished: therefore this also is false: *the property generates*.

2. Likewise, "everything that is referred is something, except that which is said relatively"; but a property is nothing but a relation: therefore a property is not referred. But *to generate* is *to be referred*: therefore the property does not generate.

3. Likewise, a property involves origin and relation: therefore if it is reflected upon itself and denominates itself, then there will be an origin of an origin and a relation of a relation; which the Philosopher and every reasoning [holds] for an absurdity.

4. Likewise, when it is said: *generation generates*, the verb is construed either by reason of the *supposit*, or by reason of the *form*: not [by reason] of the *form*, since a relation does not act; nor by reason of the *supposit*, since when the notion is supposed [as subject] no person is supposed — for something pertains to the person which does not pertain to the notion, as has been shown above — therefore the locution is simpliciter false.

### Conclusion.

> *No property can denominate itself.*

**I respond:** It must be said that the foresaid locutions are false; for no notion denominates itself.

And the reason for this is that the denomination of a notion involves an emanation as an act, and involves also a *relation*. And since production properly belongs to a supposit, not to a form, likewise *relation* is of something as of a supposit; therefore every such denomination concerns a supposit. It is not so with the essential properties — or as it is with the primaries, such as *one* and *true* — but rather they regard the form; therefore they denominate themselves. Because this is not [the case] in adjectives of this notional kind, the locutions cannot be true by reason of the *form*. Nor can they be true by reason of the *supposit*, since a notion does not supposit a person, since several notions are in the same person. Yet essence supposits substance, since there is one essence and one substance, and therefore this is true: *the Godhead creates*, since *Godhead* supposits *God*; but this is false: *paternity generates*, since it does not supposit *the Father*.

**Replies to the arguments:**

*To 1 and 2.* What is objected concerning the essential conditions and the primaries is plain that it is not similar, by the reason already stated. — Yet there can nonetheless be assigned another reason, namely that a relation reflected upon an absolute comes to rest there, in such a way that the absolute gives the foundation to the relation, and the relation gives the completion. But when a relation is reflected upon itself, since each one bespeaks a comparison to another, the one cannot give the foundation, nor the other the completion;

and therefore it cannot be reflected. But in simple primaries, of which kind is truth, since either they do not involve a relation, or, if they do, they involve a relation which commonly regards substance and its properties, such as *to be from God*, therefore they are reflected upon themselves; not so in the case at hand, since production regards a person.

*To 3.* As to what is objected, that this is true: *the generator is paternity*; it must be said that *generator* is taken as subject by reason of the hypostasis, and so a predication by identity is signified; but when it is predicated, it is taken by reason of the form, therefore the manner of taking is changed; therefore the inference does not follow. If, however, it were understood to be predicated by reason of the supposit, it would be true; for then the sense would be: *paternity is the one who generates*; but then it does not follow, *generation generates*; rather, there is an accidental fallacy there.

*To 4.* As to what is objected, that there is no incompatibility there; it must be said that there is an incompatibility there on the side of the mode of understanding. For a notion does not denominate anything but a supposit, whence such a mode does not befit a notion. Whence just as this is false: *whiteness is white*, so it must be understood in the case at hand.

### Scholion.

**I.** It is established that the same notion can be predicated of itself by identity, that is, in the abstract, whence it can be said: *paternity is active generation*. The question is only whether this can also occur in the concrete, or *denominatively*, e.g. by saying: *generation is generator* or *generates*. By Richard of Mediavilla and others the same question is proposed in these words: "Whether personal adjectives are predicated of properties." The principal grounds of the false opinion are arguments 1 and 2 *ad oppositum*, which conclude from a parity, namely, that essential adjectives denominate abstracts; and also that the primary intentions, that is the transcendentals, such as *one*, *true*, *good*, are predicated denominatively of themselves. That this parity does not hold is proved in the body and in the replies to 1 and 2. The opinion of the Seraphic Doctor is approved and more fully explained by Richard of Mediavilla (here, a. 3, q. 2) in these words: "Although *generation* and *to generate* signify the same thing, yet in a different manner: because *to generate* signifies an act and after the manner of an act, but *generation* not so, but after the manner of a certain form. And since acts belong to supposits (although through forms), and not properly to the forms themselves as agents, but as principles by which the supposits act: therefore, although this is to be granted: *the Father generates*, this nonetheless is not to be granted: *Paternity generates*." — That the primary (transcendental) intentions reflect upon themselves, that is, are predicated of themselves, has already been said above at d. 3, p. I, dub. 3, and d. 17, p. I, q. 2, ad 4.

**II.** St. Thomas, here q. 1, a. 1; *S.* I, q. 40, a. 1, ad 3. — Bl. Albert, here a. 8. — Giles of Rome, here 2. *princ.* q. 1. — Denis the Carthusian, here q. 2.

---