Dist. 33, Dubia
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/1/d/33/q/bon-sent-I-d33-dubia
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### DOUBTS CONCERNING THE TEXT OF THE MASTER.

#### DOUBT I.

In this part there are doubts concerning the text, and first concerning the response of the Master, which he sets down there: *By the new and human teachings of these men*. For he seems to respond insufficiently, because he does not solve the argument, but says that it is incomprehensible; and it seems that this evasion is none at all. For either the argument concludes necessarily, or sophistically: if necessarily, then since it proceeds from true [premises], the conclusion is true; if not necessarily, then it is sophistical; but a single sophism is not incomprehensible: and so it seems that he ill applies the authority of Hilary.

**I respond:** It must be said that to the argument it is easy to reply, because there is there a sophism according to accident: a property is the essence; and the essence is not distinguished: therefore neither is the property. But this the Master does not call incomprehensible, but dismisses as sophistical and unworthy of the discussion of greater minds. But that question of truth, which follows, is incomprehensible according to the state of the wayfarer: for if by complete identity essence is predicated of the properties and conversely, this is distinguished and that not; and this is for us incomprehensible. For because we see *through a glass*, we understand by a likeness drawn from creatures; and this has nothing under heaven like it, rather it is the property of God alone on account of the highest simplicity: therefore the Master says it is incomprehensible. — Nor is it like the case of genus and difference: for the genus is predicated of the difference, and the latter distinguishes and the former does not, because it is not predicated by identity. Therefore he too with Hilary says that it is incomprehensible, and describes the incomprehensibility with respect to a threefold power: with respect to the receptive, when he says *incomprehensible* etc.; with respect to the expressive, when he says *beyond the signification of speech*; with respect to the judicative, when he says *beyond the intention of the senses*. And the other things which follow are fitted to these three, as is plain to one who inspects.

#### DOUBT II.

Likewise it is asked concerning the response of the Master, which he makes there: *Resisting the audacity of these, etc.* For he says that the properties are in the hypostases and determine them; in the essence they are, but they do not determine it. For there seems to be opposition here, because every property is determinative of that in which it is, otherwise it is not in it: therefore if the properties do not determine the essence, they are not in the essence.

**I respond:** It must be said that the Master answers well, because this preposition *in* signifies different relations. For it is said in one way that the Father is *in* the Son, in another that paternity is *in* the Father. For the Father is said to be in the Son not as a distinctive property, but as a consubstantial person; paternity in the Father, as a distinctive property. So the Master means to say that properties are or are said to be in *essence* otherwise than in *person*. For in the essence they are said to be on account of identity, so that *in* says identity altogether; in the persons they are said to be as true properties in hypostases and determinations in things determined. In creatures, however, the one mode is not without the other, because a property is not altogether the same as that of which it is the property: and therefore in creatures a property is not said to be in something, except in that to which it inheres; not so in divine things.

#### DOUBT III.

Likewise it is asked concerning the other response of the Master, which he makes there: *I respond here also to you with Hilary, etc.* For what he says seems false, that the Archangels do not know the solution of this question. For since they are comprehenders, it is established that they know all things which are of the substance of glory: therefore they know the distinction of the persons and the unity and mode of the essence: therefore they see why the properties determine the hypostasis, not the essence. And again, if comprehension will be of those things of which we now hold by faith: therefore in the fatherland we shall know.

**I respond:** It must be said that, as Augustine says *On the Trinity*: "As a pit is said to be blind, not because it does not itself see, but because it does not show to others what it has"; so the Angels are said to be ignorant, and the Saints, on this account, that they do not reveal such things, but rather things [more] intelligible; and because such things have nothing like in creation, indeed [they are] more unlike: therefore they are said to be incomprehensible to us. And Hilary removes the threefold cognition which we have of divine things: one is through the revelation of the Angels, another through the illumination of the Prophets, the third through the preaching of the Apostles. And he says that the Angels do not hear, because they receive revelation from greater ones and do not express it to us. — The Master therefore answers well, by showing the insufficiency. For if it is asked, why the property is in the person as distinguishing, [but] not in the essence; the answer is that the person comports itself toward another and is referred and distinguished. And if this is answered, the question still remains, why the person is referred; and it is answered that there is one essence, three persons. If you seek something altogether like this, you will not find it; and therefore in the foundation of faith one must stand fast.

#### DOUBT IV.

It is to be noted concerning that solution of the Master which he sets down here: *But we say that these things are to be understood otherwise*, that those locutions which Augustine proposes, namely "The Father *is not* substance by that by which he is Father" and the like, are twofold, because the ablative imports a relation in the account of *form* or of *formal cause*, although in divine things the relation of cause does not truly fall as regards the thing, yet as regards the account of understanding [it does]. Therefore causality can fall under negation, so that there is a negation of causality; and then the locution is true, and in this sense Augustine takes [it], and the Master expounds [it]. For the sense is: *God is not by that by which Father*; because by paternity he is Father as by an account of speaking or of understanding; but paternity is not in this way the account of speaking, viz. for [his] very being God, or of understanding; and so the locution is true and makes nothing for the Porretan. Again, there can be a causality of negation; and then it is false, and the sense is: *God is not by that by which Father*, that is, with respect to that which is Father, he is not God; and in this sense the Porretan takes [it], and so it is a false understanding, and Augustine does not take it so.

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