Dist. 33
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/1/d/33/q/bon-sent-I-d33-littera
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### DISTINCTION XXXIII.

#### Chapter I.

*Whether the properties of the persons are the persons themselves, or the divine *usia* [essence].*

After what has been said above, it must be considered more inwardly and subtly inquired into, whether the properties of the persons, by which the persons themselves are determined, are themselves the persons and are God — that is, the divine essence — or whether they are so [present] in the persons that they are not persons, and on this account neither divine essence. — That properties are in the persons, no one dares to deny, since authority openly proclaims that "in the persons there is property, and in the essence unity." Above also we have established by many testimonies of the Saints, that the per-

sons are distinguished and determined by their properties, and we have expressed the properties themselves — three, namely — by their proper terms. Since therefore the properties themselves have existed from eternity, by which the persons themselves are determined and differ; how would they be, if they were not in [the persons]; and how would they be in [the persons], and the persons themselves not be, without there being multiplicity there? Wherefore, just as we confess properties to be in the persons, so also we confess them to be persons — as we above, on the authority of Jerome, declared (and let it not be irksome to call back to mind), in his exposition of the faith speaking thus: "Avoiding the heresy of Sabellius, we distinguish three persons set forth under property. For we confess not only the names, but also the properties of the names — that is, the persons, or, as the Greeks express it, the *hypostases*, that is, the *subsistences*." — Behold, he plainly says that the persons are distinguished by their properties, and that the properties themselves are persons; whose words we here merely touch upon, since above we set them down at greater length.

And since we discussed above the simplicity of the deity, by the authorities of the Saints — namely, Augustine, Hilary, Isidore, and also Boethius — we plainly showed that God is altogether this which He has in Himself, except that the Father has the Son and is not the Son, and the Son has the Father and is not the Father; and that thus the being is in the nature of three, so that He who has [something] is what He has, and the whole, that is there, is one being, one life — which we do not now repeat, lest we bring weariness upon the reader. If therefore the properties are there, each of them is that in which it is, and the several are one and the same life. Let us therefore confess that the properties are in the three persons, and that they themselves are persons and the divine essence.

For that the property is also the divine nature, Hilary shows, saying that the nativity of the Son is nature. The same in the seventh book *On the Trinity* says: "The nature of both does not differ: the Father and the Son are one. The nativity of this sacrament therefore has [this property], that it embraces in itself both name and nature and power, since the nativity cannot but be that nature whence the Son is born." The same in the sixth: "The nativity is property, is truth." The same in the seventh says, "that the nativity of nature is to be understood as being in the nature of God." Above he also says, "that it is the property of the Father, that He is always Father, and the property of the Son, that He is always Son" — signifying that the property of the Father is the Father, and the property of the Son is the Son. — By these and many other authorities it seems plainly to be signified that the property of the Son is son, and so also God; and likewise the property of the Father and the property of the Holy Spirit.

But some deny this, saying that the properties are indeed in the persons, but are not the persons themselves; because they say that they are so in the persons or in the divine essence, that they are not within, as those things are which are said of God according to substance, such as goodness, justice, but are affixed extrinsically. And they undertake to prove this thus by reasons. For if, they say, the properties are persons, then the persons are not determined by them. — Against this we say that the persons also differ by themselves, as Jerome above, speaking of the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, says: "They are one in substance, but are distinguished by persons and by names." — But again they add: If the properties themselves are the divine essence, since the three persons do not differ in essence, then they do not differ in properties either. For how does the Father differ from the Son, in that He is the divine essence, when they are one in essence?

To these new doctrines and human inventions of theirs I respond with the word of Hilary: "Immense is what is required, and incomprehensible; it is beyond the meaning of speech, beyond the intention of the senses; it is not enunciated, not attained, not held; the nature of the thing itself consumes the meaning of words; an unsearchable light blinds the contemplation of the senses; what is contained by no end exceeds the capacity of the understanding. To me therefore there is a slip in the senses, there is stupor in the understanding, but in speech I shall now confess no longer infirmity, but silence; it is too dangerous concerning matters so great and so hidden to bring forth anything beyond the heavenly prescription, so that the discourse about God might be beyond the predefinition of God. The form of faith is certain. Nothing therefore must be added, but a manner must be set to audacity; whatever is sought beyond is not understood."

For the rest, the wickedness of the heretics, stirred up by the instinct of diabolical fraudulence, does not yet rest, but in so great a question of things adds: if paternity and filiation are in God, or in the divine essence, then the same thing is to itself Father and Son. For in whom paternity is, He is Father; and in whom filiation, He is Son. If therefore one and the same thing has in itself paternity and filiation, it both begets and is begotten; in saying which they are dragged into the Sabellian heresy, extending the Father into the Son, when they propose the same to themselves as Son and as Father. If however they should deny that paternity and filiation are in the one essence of God, how then do they say that He is God? — By these and other goads of arguments they make use of for the assertion of their opinion, that they may dissect the form of truth.

Resisting their audacity and providing for their ignorance, we shall dare to say something on this. Paternity and filiation are not said to be altogether in such a way in the divine substance, as in the very *hypostases*, in which they are so [present] that they determine them, as John Damascene says: "They are *characteristic idioms*, that is, *determinative properties* of *hypostasis*, and not of nature; for they determine *hypostasis*, and not nature." And therefore, although paternity and filiation are in the divine essence, since they do not determine it, on that account it cannot be said that the divine essence both begets and is begotten, or that one and the same thing is there Father and Son. For property in this way determines the person, that by this property the *hypostasis* is generating, and the other *hypostasis* is generated; and so it is not the same that begets and is begotten, but the one [begets] the other.

#### Chapter II.

*How the properties can be in the nature of God, without determining it.*

But perhaps you will ask, since these properties cannot be in the persons without determining them, how they can be in the divine essence in such a way that they do not determine it. — I answer you here too with Hilary: "I do not know, I do not seek, and I shall console myself nevertheless: the Archangels do not know, the Angels have not heard, the ages do not hold, the Prophet did not perceive, the Apostle did not ask, the Son Himself did not declare. Let the grief of complaints therefore cease; let not man think that he can attain by his own understanding the sacrament of generation. Yet the Father and the Son are to be understood absolutely," and the Holy Spirit. "In this end the understanding of the words stands fast: the Son is from the Father, who is the only-begotten of the unbegotten, offspring from a parent, living from the living, not by a nature of deity that is one thing and another, because both are one." "Believing this, begin, run on, persist; even though I know I shall not arrive, yet I shall rejoice that I am making progress. For he who piously pursues infinite things, even if he does not attain, yet at some time profits by going forward. But do not insert yourself into that secret and inscrutable mystery of an unimaginable nativity, do not immerse yourself, presuming to comprehend the height of understanding; rather, understand that incomprehensible things exist." By these and many others it is plainly shown that we are in no wise permitted to scrutinize the majesty, to set law upon power, to circumscribe a measure upon the infinite.

Yet they still do not desist, agitated by the spirit of impatience, but they strive to fortify their opinion even by the authorities of the Saints, by which they wish to show that the property by which the Father is Father, and the property by which the Son is Son, are not God — bringing forward to this end the words of Augustine on that passage of the Psalm: *And it is not substance*, [Augustine] speaking thus: "God is a certain substance. Whence in the catholic faith we are also so built up, as to say that the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are of one substance. What is *of one substance*? Whatever the Father is, [namely] that He is God, this the Son is, this the Holy Spirit is. But when He is Father, He is not that which He is. For the Father is not said with reference to Himself, but with reference to the Son; but with reference to Himself He is called God. By that therefore by which, or with which, He is God, He is substance. And because the Son is of the same substance, beyond doubt the Son also is God. But that He is Father, since it is not the name of substance but is referred to the Son, we do not say that the Son is Father in the same way as we say that the Son is God." — From these words they say it is signified that the property of the Father, or the property of the Son, is not God or the divine essence. For when he says: *In that He is God, He is substance, but [in that] He is Father, He is not substance*; openly, they say, he shows that that is substance by which He is God; but that by which He is Father is not substance. Likewise when he says: *Father is not that which He is*, he shows that He is not Father in that He is substance. For he did not simply say: *Father is not that which He is*, but said: *when He is Father, He is not that which He is*, signifying that that by which He is Father is not that by which He is, that is, the essence. They, expounding these things in this way, make their inventions appear true to the simple and the unwary. — But we say that these things are to be understood otherwise. For when he says: *In that He is God, He is substance; but [in that] He is Father, He is not substance*, he wished this to be understood: that He is God by essence, and substance by deity. For He is substance in that by which He is God, and conversely, whose is that deity which is substance, and substance which is deity; but *that He is Father, He is not substance* — that is: not by that by which He is Father, by that, is He substance, since He is Father by the property of generation, by which He is not substance. Yet [Augustine] did not deny that the property itself is substance. So also that is to be understood which he says: *When He is Father, He is not that which He is* — that is, He is not Father by that by which, or with which, He Himself is, that is, [by] essence, but [by] notion.

Likewise they vehemently insist on those words of Augustine set down above, namely: *The Word, according as it is wisdom and essence, is this which the Father is; according as it is Word, is not this which the Father is*. If, they say, the Word is not this which the Father is, according as it is Word, then that, which is Word, is not that which the Father is: therefore the property by which it is Word, is not that which the Father is — therefore it is not the divine essence. — To which we say that, although according as it is Word it is not this which the Father is, that property nevertheless, by which it is Word, is that which the Father is — that is, the divine essence — but it is not the *hypostasis* of the Father.

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