Dist. 34, Art. 1, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/1/d/34/q/bon-sent-I-d34-a1-q1
----------------------------------------
### Article Unique.
#### *On the comparison of person to nature, and on appropriation and translation.*

### Question I.
#### *Whether in the divine the thing of the nature adds anything beyond the nature.*

So as to the first, it is asked whether addition is to be posited in the divine, that is, whether the *thing of the nature* adds anything beyond the nature. And that it does, appears in this way.

1. Hilary *On the Trinity*: "Nature is one thing, the thing of the nature is another"; but the understanding of nature is enclosed in the thing of the nature: therefore if it is something other, it is necessary that it be in the account of something added.

2. Likewise, Boethius *On the Two Natures and the One Person of Christ*: "Nature and person must be distinguished and separated by their proper accounts": but those whose definitions are diverse, are themselves diverse: since therefore nature falls in the definition of person, it is necessary that the diversity come from the account of something added; therefore etc. If you say that the definitions of nature and person are not diverse in the thing, but according to the mode of understanding; then it is concluded that that understanding is empty and vain, since in the thing nothing corresponds to it.

3. Likewise, this same point appears by reason, since the more something is found in many, the simpler it is: but essence or nature is in many, while person is in one only: therefore nature is simpler. But nothing is less simple than another except through some addition: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, the more something is of greater abstraction, the simpler it is; but nature is of greater abstraction than person, since with the properties abstracted away one can understand the nature, but not the person: therefore person adds something beyond the nature; therefore etc.

5. Likewise, this is a *per se* known principle: "Of no same and according to the same is affirmation and negation true [together]"; but something is truly affirmed of the person, as to be distinguished, which is denied of the nature, therefore not according to the same; therefore in the person there is something which is not in the nature, or vice versa. And if so, then one adds something beyond the other.

6. Likewise, this is a *per se* known principle: "Whatever things are the same as one and the same according to every kind of indifference, are also the same among themselves": since therefore the nature is one and the same, if the persons are altogether the same as the nature and add nothing, therefore the persons are the same among themselves; and thus the error of Sabellius returns, [or else] one person according to the thing is another, therefore etc.

**On the contrary:**

1. Augustine, *On the Trinity*, book seven: "It is not one thing for God *to be*, and another for [him] *to be a person*": therefore person adds nothing beyond *to be*, therefore nor beyond nature.

2. Likewise, in what is supremely simple there can be no addition; but the divine person, or thing of the nature, is supremely simple: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, whatever two so behave that whatever is in one is the other by essence, the one adds nothing over the rest; but whatever is in the person is deity: therefore etc. The major is manifest; the minor is clear thus: in the person there is nothing but substance and property, and that substance is deity, since it is God, and God [is so] not by anything other than himself — for then he would be [God] by participation — therefore by himself he is God and by deity he is God; and the substance, which is of the understanding of the person, is the very nature by essence, and likewise the property is the essence, as has been proved above. There remains therefore the first [point], that it adds nothing.

4. Likewise, if it adds, it either adds something other or the same. To add the same to itself is not intelligible. If something other, then either substantially other or accidentally other: not accidentally, since there is no accident in the divine; nor substantially, since then there would be diverse substances there. Therefore nature according to essence does not differ from person, and this is manifest.

5. Likewise, if it adds something, that thing is either material or formal: not material, since God is pure act; not formal, since formal is only with respect to material. Therefore since in God there is nothing material, nothing formal can be added: therefore in no way [can anything be added].

6. Likewise, if it adds something beyond the divine nature, [that thing] is either better than the divine nature, or equal, or less: not better, that is established; it is also established that not worse, since then it would be a creature; not equal, since nothing can be equated to the divine nature: therefore altogether nothing.

### Conclusion.

> *Person, or the thing of the nature, according to the thing adds nothing beyond the nature, yet differs from it according to reason, since the person has a relation to another, but the nature does not.*

**I respond:** It must be said that, when it is asked whether person or the thing of the nature adds anything beyond the nature, the response is that one can speak of addition in two ways: either as to the thing, or as to the understanding.

If as to the understanding, since the understanding of this name *person* or *hypostasis* or *thing of the nature* includes the understanding of the nature, and gives still further to understand something else; thus it must be said that necessarily there is composition and addition with respect to the understanding. And this is clear. For person is called *a supposit of rational nature distinguished by a property*. Behold, the understanding of person is composed out of several understandings; and there falls within it the understanding of nature: therefore it is constant that as to the understanding the person adds [something] beyond the nature. — But this understanding is not false, since it neither distinguishes the nature by that addition, nor composes the person. It does not distinguish the nature, since, even if it adds the property beyond the understanding of the nature, it does not add in the direct case [*in recto*], so that you understand the person to be the nature distinguished by a property; but it must be understood in the oblique case, [namely] that the person is a *supposit* of rational nature [that is] distinguished, or that which is a distinct hypostasis; and therefore it does not posit a distinction concerning the nature, nor does it understand the nature to be distinguished. — Again, it does not compose the person, nor does it impose on it anything which is not in it. And this is clear, because a sound and faithful understanding understands and believes the person to be most simple; it nonetheless understands it to be most perfect. Whence just as concerning the essence, on account of this, that it is most perfect, it understands all the conditions of nobility, and truly, since they are there; and yet, although it understands those conditions as many, namely power, wisdom, goodness, since it believes and knows all these to be one in God; the understanding is neither false nor vain, since it does not posit in God what is not [there], nor does it compose God: in this way the understanding stands with respect to the person. Whence it calls the person simple, since, although in it [the understanding] says nature to be [there] and truly nature, and supposit, which is truly a supposit, and property, which is truly a property: nevertheless it says all these to be one, and one to be the other. Therefore, the thing being most simple, there is truly addition and composition with respect to the understanding, without vanity and falsity.

But if we speak from the side of the thing, thus it must be said that, since addition from the side of the thing posits composition, and the divine person is most simple, it is altogether impossible that there be any addition there, and so according to the thing the thing of the nature adds nothing beyond the nature.

But then it seems unintelligible that the person be distinct according to the thing, and the nature not, and yet there be no addition and no difference according to the thing between the person and the nature. And to understand this in any way at all, since this is above the powers of the human understanding, it must be noted, as Richard wishes, that there is a distinction by quality, and a distinction by origin. The distinction by quality is in creatures, nor can it be without addition, since this distinction takes its rise from the addition of matter to form. The distinction by quality is so called when one is distinguished from another by absolute properties, as is clear, when one is white, and another black. The distinction by origin is when one produces, and another is produced. And just as the distinction by quality is a true distinction and according to the thing, so the distinction by true origin is a true distinction. For just as one cannot be at the same time white and black, so one and the same cannot produce itself.

Therefore since in the divine there is understood to be a true origin, therefore there is understood to be there a true distinction. — Again, when I understand the Father to produce, I understand him to produce by himself; just as when I understand the divine substance to act, I understand it to act by itself, by parity of reason also the Son to be produced by himself: therefore production adds nothing. — Likewise it does not posit any composition with respect to the Son. Therefore since where there is true origin, there is true distinction, and origin is understood to be there without addition; the distinction also is understood to be there without addition.

But although person, or the thing of the nature, does not stand to nature by addition, nevertheless it differs according to reason; otherwise it would not be intelligible that the person be plurified, the nature being unique. The difference according to reason is, that the essence does not arise from an essence, nor stand to another essence; but the person well arises from a person and stands to it. — If you ask the reason for this, I respond, that the unity and nobility of the divine being does not admit a plurification with respect to the essence, as with respect to the person; and the reason of this has been said above, in the ninth distinction. Since therefore the mode of standing-to-another and of arising-from-another does not posit composition in the person according to the thing, but a real distinction from another person: therefore that mode, compared to the essence or to the person whose [mode] it is, is mode only; but compared to that to which it is, since it makes a distinction according to the thing, it is truly a thing; and so in one way it makes [them] differ in reality, in another way in reason. Hence it is that, although one person is not another, yet the thing of the nature is the nature. It is clear therefore that these are compossible: that the person be simple and add nothing beyond the nature, nor differ except in reason; and yet that this — namely the nature — be communicable, that — namely the person — incommunicable; this be distinct, that be undistinct.

The reasons proving that the person, or thing of the nature, adds nothing whatever according to the thing beyond the nature must therefore be conceded.

**To the arguments:**

1. 2. *To that which is objected*, that the thing of the nature is one thing, the nature another, and likewise that person and nature have another account: it can be said that Boethius and Hilary speak — in creatures. But if we understand [the matter] in God, then we shall say that there is a diversity of reason, which is founded not on something absolute, but on something relative, which introduces no composition. For the essence is not referred [to another], but the person is referred and arises, nor however is it composite, since it itself is its own respect.

3. *To that which is objected*, that what is found in many is simpler; it must be said that to be found in many is twofold: either so that one of those can sometimes be where the other is not, as man is in many men, and thus the proposition has truth; or so in many, that one is not without the other, and thus it is in the persons — for one is not without another — and thus it does not have truth. For just as the nature is always and everywhere, so also the person; and thus it is clear that it adds nothing by which it might be straitened.

4. *To that which is objected*, that it is of greater abstraction etc.; it must be said that this has truth where that from which one abstracts makes some composition with that which is abstracted; but it is not so in God.

5. *To that which is objected*, that affirmation and negation are not at the same time true of the same; it must be said that any difference of reason, however small, suffices for affirmation and negation. Whence the proposition must be understood of the same in thing and in reason; and the person in some way differs from the nature, although not by a real addition.

6. *To that which is objected*, that whatever things are the same as one and the same are also the same among themselves etc.; it must be said that this fails where there is a coming-together of several as in something common, as of differentiae in a genus. It also fails where several things are distinguished by their origins, as the rays of various stars are united in one point of air, and yet are distinguished from one another. Since therefore the divine persons come together in nature as in one common [thing], and besides are distinguished from one another by origin; therefore it is clear that [the rule] does not hold. — It can however be said that the rule is everywhere true, if it be soundly understood. On account of which it must be noted that some things are absolute, some relative. But diversity in relatives comes not only from the side of the subject, but also of the term; in these the rule does not hold, unless it be understood with reference to the same. Since therefore the persons are referred by their properties, although they are one in nature, since nevertheless they are not [referred] to one [thing], therefore it does not follow that they are the same. And so that is clear.