Dist. 34, Art. 1, Q. 4
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/1/d/34/q/bon-sent-I-d34-a1-q4
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### Question IV.
#### *Whether translation [i.e. metaphorical transfer of names] is to be posited in divine matters.*

Fourthly and lastly it is asked, whether in the divine there is to be posited a translation [transfer]. And that there is, appears thus:

1. From Ambrose in the book *On the Trinity*: "There are names which are said of God by translation [metaphorically] and by likeness."

2. Likewise, Dionysius in the book *On the Divine Names*: "The theologians praise God as unnameable from every name"; but this cannot be except through translation: therefore in the divine a translation is to be posited.

3. Likewise, this appears by reason, since sacred Scripture says that God is wrathful and grieves; but this cannot be said properly: therefore it is necessary that it be said by translation. But among all the things which can be named, grief and wrath are most distant from God: therefore if these can be transferred [to God], so can all other names.

4. Likewise, by those things through which one can understand a thing, one can also signify it, and by those things through which one can signify, one can also name; but through all created things one can understand God: therefore [one can] also [name him].

**On the contrary:**

1. "All who transfer, transfer according to some likeness"; but there is no likeness of God to a creature, since there is supreme distance: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, likeness is a relation of equiparancy: therefore if on account of likeness the names of creatures can be transferred to the Creator, by parity of reason also the converse. But those [divine names] are not transferred [to creatures]: therefore neither these.

3. Likewise, likeness is the ground of translation: therefore the names of things more like God ought more to be transferred to God; but such are the names of the Angels: therefore those are transferred. — It is therefore asked, which names ought to be transferred, and which not.

### Conclusion.

> *Translation is to be posited in the divine on account of a twofold reason.*

**I respond:** It must be said that the reason or end of translation is twofold: one, I say, is the praise of God, the other, the leading-by-the-hand of our intellect. — On account of the praise of God a translation is necessary. For since God is greatly praiseworthy, lest on account of the poverty of vocabulary praise should chance to cease, sacred Scripture taught that the names of creatures be transferred to God, and this in indefinite number, so that, just as every creature praises God, so God may be praised from every name of a creature, and he who cannot be praised by one name as super-excelling every name, may be praised from every name. — The other reason is the leading-by-the-hand of our intellect. For since through creatures we come to knowing the Creator, and, for the most part, almost all creatures have noble properties, which are the ground for understanding God — as a lion [signifies] fortitude, a lamb meekness, a rock solidity, a serpent prudence, and the like — therefore it was fitting that many names be transferred to God.

Since therefore the end imposes necessity on those things which are ordered to the end, since the translation is to the praise of God; therefore names importing deformity ought not to be transferred, like devil, toad, fox, since they are transferred more to vituperation than to praise. — Again, since translation is for the sake of our instruction, and likeness beginning from what is more known is the way of knowing; therefore translation is from creatures as from things more known to the Creator, but not vice versa. And since great likeness is the mother of falsity, therefore names too similar are not transferred, such as the names of the Angels, lest perhaps an Angel be believed to be God. — From this it is clear that translation is in the divine, and as regards the multiformity of names by reason of which God is said to be all-nameable; and all [the objections] are clear except the first.

For what is objected, that there is no likeness because there is the greatest distance; it must be said that there is not a likeness through participation of one nature, but there is nevertheless a likeness according to analogy and habitude [relation], and this in comparison to effects. But of this more has been treated elsewhere.