Dist. 34, Dubia
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/1/d/34/q/bon-sent-I-d34-dubia
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### DOUBTS CONCERNING THE TEXT OF THE MASTER.

#### DOUBT I.

In this part there are doubts concerning the text, and first concerning what the Master says: *On occasion of this saying the aforesaid heretics etc.* For it seems that the Master ill-judges those heretics who said that *nature* is not predicated of the persons. Because Damascene seems to say the same thing as those said, when he says: "It is not [permitted] to predicate *deity* of the hypostasis": therefore since *deity* says the nature, this is plain etc.

**I respond:** It must be said that the word of Damascene, taken simply, generates a sinister understanding, and one who would so understand it as it sounds would be a heretic. But Damascene himself understands it with a precision, namely that *deity* is not predicated of one hypostasis alone, but rather of all.

#### DOUBT II.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says: *that in [the term] "Spirit of God" the Father is sometimes signified*, as that of Isaiah 61: *The Spirit of the Lord is upon me etc.* For he seems to speak ill, because Jerome says there in the Gloss that this is to be understood of that Spirit of whom is said in Isaiah 11: *The Spirit of the Lord shall rest upon him etc.*; and it is established that there it is taken for the person of the Holy Spirit. Likewise, this seems [shown] by another authority, because another evangelist, Luke 11, says: *If by the finger of God I cast out demons*, and the Gloss expounds *finger* for the Holy Spirit, who is the third person in the Trinity.

**I respond:** It must be said that these reasons do not conclude contraries, because one Scripture can be expounded in many ways. For in that authority, in which is said in Isaiah 61: *The Spirit of the Lord is upon me etc.*, it is treating of the mission of the Son; and since the Son can be understood as sent according to the divine nature, and so it is understood, properly speaking, of one sent by the Father alone; therefore *Spirit of the Lord* there stands for the Father. But if it be understood of the mission according to the human nature, so it is understood of the Holy Spirit, inasmuch as he is the third person in the Trinity. — Similarly is to be understood of the following authority, which can be understood in either way, but nevertheless *spirit* is taken in one way and another.

#### DOUBT III.

Likewise it is asked concerning what Hilary says, that *the nature of Christ and of God differs in something, lest it be the same, if it can be granted that the spirit which is of God should not also be of Christ*. For thus he seems to speak ill, because this argument does not hold: The Son is son of the Father and not of the Holy Spirit, therefore the nature of the Father and of the Holy Spirit differs: therefore since *spirit* says a person, that argument is not valid, which Hilary makes.

**I respond:** It can be said that Hilary speaks of the spirit insofar as it names the nature; and so his word does not have a counter-instance. Nevertheless, if it be understood of the spirit insofar as it is said personally, it still holds the truth. For since the Word cannot be without spirit, then the Father and his Word would have two spirits, and so they would not be of one nature. — Moreover, if the Spirit of the Father were not [the Spirit] of the Son, he would not arise from Christ, and if he did not proceed from him, he would not be distinguished originally, therefore essentially; but the Spirit of God and God are one essentially: therefore it would have to follow that *Spirit* and *God* would essentially differ from the Son, or be distinguished [from him].

#### DOUBT IV.

Likewise it is asked concerning what the Master says, that the word of Hilary: *Nature is not the same as the thing of nature*, is to be understood only in creatures. That solution seems not to be fitting, because Hilary speaks of the Spirit of God, insofar as he signifies *nature* and *the thing of nature*; whereas if there is no difference, [the Master] should give it no force, as it seems; but if [the Master] does give force in *spirit*, insofar as it signifies *nature* and *the thing of nature*, therefore the distinction seems to be made between such things.

**I respond:** It must be said that when Hilary says: *nature is one thing, the thing of nature another*, either it is understood of an otherness on the side of the thing, as those heretics understood; and so it holds the truth only in creatures. In another way it can mean an otherness or difference according to reason; and so it holds the truth in divine things, and so Hilary understands it, and Augustine says that "to be Father is one thing, to be God another": not, I say, another according to the thing, but another according to the account of signifying and of understanding and of comporting.

#### DOUBT V.

Likewise it is asked concerning that response of the Master, that *one is not to say "the person of one God,"* because *nothing in the Trinity is created, or serving, or subject*. For he seems to speak ill, because the genitive does not by its own account import subjection or dominion: therefore the reason does not seem sufficient. If you say that this comes on the side of the term, this is nothing, because the term of itself does not import a respect of dominion.

Likewise it is asked, why the noun *essentia* does not import super-excellence in the genitive, as does this noun *Deus*? — Likewise, why is it not said: *Three persons of the essence*, as [it is said] *of one essence*?

**I respond:** It must be said that, for the genitive truly and properly to be construed, it is necessary that some relation according to the thing be imported, either according to the mode of understanding. Now the genitive imports a relation of the principiated to the principle, or conversely, as of the possessor to the possessed, or of the form to the informed, or of the specifying to the specified. But it does not import the relation of form except with an abstract term, which signifies in the manner of a form; and since form holds itself in the manner of an expressing and declaration: therefore such a construction is not allowed except with the genitive of an abstract noun [accompanied by] another determinant. Hence it is fittingly said: *a woman of distinguished form*, but it is nothing said: *a woman of form*. Therefore it is well said: *three persons of one essence*, not however: *three persons of essence*. — But *Deus* is not an abstract noun, therefore it is not construed with the genitive except either in the relation of subject, as *form of God*; or in the relation of specifying, as *person of God*, just as *creature of salt*; or in the relation of principle, as *creature of God*. And since, when it is said: *three persons of one God*, no relation is properly imported except the relation of principle or of possessor; hence it is, that since in that sense it is a false locution, it is not to be received. — Another reason is this, that a locution which is in the force of declaring the essence is convertible, so that, when it is said: *a woman of distinguished form*, it can be said: *distinguished form of a woman*. Therefore if it were said: *three persons of one God*, it would be said: *one God of three persons*; and that understanding is not sound, as is seen: for so it could be understood, just as is said: *one God of three men*.

#### DOUBT VI.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says, that in these three the highest good consists, namely in power, wisdom, goodness. For he seems to speak ill, because the highest good specifies *good*: therefore if goodness is distinguished against power and wisdom, by parity of reasoning [so is] the highest good. Likewise, it does not seem to be in these three, because the highest good is aggregative of all goods and collective: therefore not only of these three.

**I respond:** It must be said that *good* in one way is distinguished against power and wisdom, in another way not. For if it is taken for goodness of moral life, so it consists in the will and is distinguished against the other two. But if *good* is taken commonly, so it embraces all things. For there is good of nature, and this [pertains] to power; and good of grace, and this either perfects the intellect, and so is knowledge, or the affection, and so is goodness: and these three [the term] *good* embraces in its universality, and *the highest* in its integrity. Since therefore every good is reducible to these, therefore the highest good consists in these three.

#### DOUBT VII.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says, that Scripture appropriates power to the Father, lest he seem less powerful. This seems rather to have to be said of the Son, [namely] that [he was] less powerful, since he suffered and died: therefore power should rather be appropriated to him.

**I respond:** It must be said that, because on account of the passion he was seen to have committed folly and to have had impotence — on account of which the preaching of the cross was to the Jews a scandal, and to the Greeks for folly — the Apostle himself, the eminent doctor, appropriates to Christ not only wisdom but also virtue, so as to exclude infirmity from divinity: and he preferred to appropriate to him *virtue* rather than *power*, because *virtue* says ultimate power and the highest of power, as the Philosopher will have it, that "virtue is the utmost of power"; therefore he preferred to appropriate to him *virtue*. Nor is it unfitting, from diverse considerations, that the same be appropriated now to one, now to another, since it equally belongs to the three. Hence to the Father we attribute power, lest he seem impotent on account of [his] antiquity; to the Son virtue, lest he seem impotent or weakened on account of the assumed infirmity. Nevertheless force must be put on [the distinction between] power and virtue, as was said in the thirty-second distinction.

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