Dist. 35, Art. 1, Q. 4
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/1/d/35/q/bon-sent-I-d35-a1-q4
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### Question IV.
#### *Whether the ideas are pluralized by comparison to the ideated, insofar as these differ in species or in individual.*

Fourthly it is asked whether the ideas are pluralized by comparison to the ideated according to the multitude of the ideated, as to the diversity of universals or of singulars. And that [they are pluralized as to the diversity] of singulars, appears thus:

1. Since through the ideas there is the ground of distinguishing, but God distinguishes not only universal from universal, but also singular from singular. But since he distinguishes universal from universal, therefore he has many ideas and accounts of many universals. Hence "by one account the horse is constituted, by another account the man is constituted": therefore etc.

2. Likewise, the truest cognition of a thing is according to the totality of the thing; but a singular adds something beyond the universal: therefore since God knows the whole, he has not only the idea of the universal, but also of what is superadded, namely of the singular; and likewise of another singular. Therefore if the things added are diverse according to reason or according to the ideal multitude, the point is clear, etc.

3. Likewise, God predestines some among men, and reprobates others; but he predestines by one account, and reprobates by another account: therefore according to another account and idea they are foreknown and predestined in God. But this is an individual or numerical diversity: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, idea is multiplied in the divine by reason of respect and relation to the ideated; therefore, with one [relatum] multiplied, the other also is multiplied: since therefore man, who is ideated, is multiplied in diverse individuals according to the thing, the idea will be multiplied with respect to those [individuals] according to reason.

**On the contrary:**

1. Augustine, *to Nebridius*: "I say that, as far as concerns man, there is there an account of the man only, not of mine or of yours": therefore the multiplication or distinction of the ideas is taken only according to the diversity of the universals.

2. Likewise, a created artisan produces many things through one idea: therefore since this is of nobility, God through one idea — in thing and in reason — produces many things diverse in number.

3. Likewise, the singular as singular is more composite than the universal: therefore if there is in God an idea of the singular as singular, then one idea is simpler than another; but this is unfitting: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, the singular is more proper than the universal: if therefore in God there is an idea of the universal as universal, and of the singular as singular, then one idea is common, the other proper. But the common is prior and simpler than the proper: therefore one idea is prior and simpler than another: therefore in God there is to be posited an essential order and composition: therefore etc.

### Conclusion.

> *The ideas are pluralized not only according to the multitude of universals, but also of singulars.*

**I respond:** It must be said that the idea in God, according to the thing, is the divine truth; according to the mode of understanding, it is the likeness of the known. But this likeness is the expressive ground of cognizing not only the universal, but also the singular, although it itself is neither universal nor singular, just as neither is God. And therefore it is not only the likeness of the universal as universal, but also of the singular as singular, and therefore, since the likeness is of both, [the idea] is multiplied not only according to the multitude of the universals, but also of the singulars. And this is what Augustine says *to Nebridius*: "I say that, as far as regards the making of man, there is an account of the man only, but as regards the round of time, the various accounts of men live in that sincerity."

**To the arguments:**

1. And from this is clear the solution to that saying of Augustine, since Augustine says that, although of the universal as universal there is one idea, yet of singulars as singulars there are several. Hence in the same place he says, "that if anyone wishes to make an angle, it suffices to have the account of an angle. But if anyone wishes to paint a quadrangle, it is necessary that he have the account of four angles."

2. *To that therefore which is objected*, that a created artisan produces many things through one idea; it must be said that he does this through the application of [the idea] to diverse matters. Hence if he has only one idea, it is impossible to understand that according to it he should know diverse things by a single regard; but God by a single regard knows the singulars as diverse, in such a way that [he knows them] according to the whole and according to their proper differences and properties; therefore the case is not similar.

3. 4. *To that which is objected* concerning composition and priority, it must be said that neither according to the thing nor according to reason is it necessary that the idea have the properties of the ideated. For the likeness of the spiritual is corporeal, and the likeness of the composite is simple, even in creatures; therefore it is not necessary that one idea be simpler or prior to another. The likeness, however, according to the mode of understanding, has the property of the ideated as to distinction, both on account of the correlation — since it is necessary that, with one of the correlatives multiplied, the other also be multiplied, at least according to reason, where the relation is according to reason — and also, because that likeness is the ground of expressing and distinguishing; and therefore, although the property of distinction be received [into the idea], it is not necessary nevertheless concerning the others.