Dist. 35, Art. 1, Q. 5
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/1/d/35/q/bon-sent-I-d35-a1-q5
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### Question V.
#### *Whether the ideas in God are finite or infinite in number.*

Fifthly it is asked, whether in God a multitude of ideas is to be posited according to a finite number, or an infinite. And that [it is] according to an infinite number, [thus] it appears.

1. Augustine, *On the City of God*, book eleven: "There is one wisdom, in which are infinite treasures of all intelligible things."

2. Likewise, Augustine in book six *On the Trinity* says, that "the Son is the art full of all the accounts of living things"; but it is established that that art is infinite: therefore it is not filled except with infinite [accounts], therefore the accounts there are infinite.

3. Likewise, it appears by reason, since it is established that God knows all the species of number, therefore all have ideas in God; but the species of number are infinite: therefore etc. If you say that they are infinite species as far as we are concerned, not according to the thing; on the contrary: let it be supposed that all species of number are in reality; this supposed, it follows of necessity that infinite [things] are in act simply: therefore if there are ideas in God in act of all species of number, [the conclusion] is clear, etc.

4. Likewise, God can produce infinite [things]; but he can produce nothing of which he does not have cognition and idea: therefore he has ideas of infinite [things]. But of more [things] there are more ideas: therefore of infinite [things] there are infinite [ideas].

5. Likewise, beyond all finite [things] more can be thought up, since beyond every finite [thing] something greater can be thought up; but neither God nor man has [the power] to think more than those things which God knows, since then God's knowledge would not be supreme: and if so, since he knows through ideas, [the conclusion] is clear etc.

**On the contrary:**

1. Augustine, *On the City of God*, book twelve: "Whatever is known is bounded by the comprehension of the knower"; but it is established that the accounts of knowing are known: therefore they are bounded. But whatever things are bounded, are finite: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, the multitude of ideas is according to the multitude of things-ideated; but it is established that all things other than God are of necessity finite in act: therefore likewise also the ideas.

3. Likewise, where there is infinity, there is confusion and disorder; but in the eternal exemplar no confusion or disorder falls: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, to posit infinity in act in a creature is to posit imperfection, whence every created thing is finite by that by which it is perfect; but every condition of imperfection is to be banished from God: therefore etc.

### Conclusion.

> *The divine ideas are not in a finite number, but in an infinite [one].*

**I respond:** It must be said that, as is said in the Psalm, of the divine wisdom there is no number, and through this neither [is there a number] of the accounts by which the divine wisdom knows; and since they have no number, they are not numerable: therefore they are not in a finite number, but in an infinite [one]. And the reasons and authorities adduced for this must be conceded.

**To the arguments to the opposite:**

1. *To that which is objected*, that everything knowable is finite, therefore etc.; it must be said that everything knowable by comprehension is finite to him who comprehends; but the eternal accounts are known by comprehension by God alone, therefore they are finite to God alone. But just as it does not follow: this is equated to the infinite, therefore it is finite; rather, there is there something simply [infinite], and the opposite rather follows: therefore it is not finite; so also is it to be judged in the proposition. But those accounts are not comprehensible by any finite intellect; therefore that is clear.

2. *To that which is objected*, that the multitude of ideas is from the multitude of things-ideated; it must be said that, as has been said, it does not come from the multitude of things-ideated insofar as [they are] created, but insofar as [they are] connoted. But the idea does not connote the thing-ideated according to actual existence, but only according to potency. And since God can make infinite [things], although he never makes [anything] except finite [things], therefore the ideas or accounts of knowing are in God infinite, since they are not only of beings or of future things, but of all things possible to God. For God can [do] nothing which he does not actually know.

3. *To that which is objected*, that infinity posits confusion; it must be said that one can posit infinity according to real diversity; and so it deprives [the thing] of both distinction and order, if it be posited in act. But the multitude of ideas is not of diverse things, but expresses the immensity of divine truth in expressing and knowing all that is possible to God, and this indeed according to thing and act is one: therefore there is no confusion.

4. *To that which is objected*, that infinity in a creature is of imperfection; it must be said that, although it be of imperfection in a creature, yet it is not [of imperfection] in the Creator, since one can understand infinity by defect and by excess. Infinity by defect can be in a creature, as in matter, and this is of imperfection; but this is in no way in the Creator. But infinity by excess cannot simply be in a creature, since it has being which is created and composite and limited; but God has none of these, and therefore he has infinity, and this [infinity] is of supreme perfection.