Dist. 35, Dubia
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/1/d/35/q/bon-sent-I-d35-dubia
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### DOUBTS CONCERNING THE TEXT OF THE MASTER.

#### DOUBT I.

In this part there are doubts concerning the text, and first concerning what the Master says in the first chapter: *Of these, however, certain ones demand a special treatment.* For either these demand a special treatment because they are difficult, or because they are appropriated. If because they are difficult; but other things also are difficult, such as simplicity, truth, and immutability. If because they are appropriated; but similarly so are unity and equality.

**I respond:** It must be said that these demand a special treatment from a threefold cause: both because they are difficult; both because many things concerning them are determined in Scripture; and also because they say a respect to the creature, and according to these conditions the account of cause in the divine nature is attended to. Therefore, because [the Master] had to make a transition to the creatures, that is, to creation, and for this there is required beforehand in the cause *to-be-able*, *to-know*, and *to-will*, which make a cause to be perfect: therefore he placed this treatment in the middle, between the treatment on the Trinity and the treatment on the universe of things. But because such things hold themselves more with God, and so hold themselves that they are God; therefore this treatment is placed in the first book.

#### DOUBT II.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says: *Henceforth there must be treatment of knowledge and will and power.* For he seems to order [them] ill, because power precedes knowledge and will: therefore he orders ill in proposing and ill in carrying out.

**I respond:** It must be said that there is a twofold way of speaking of these: either in their generality, or as they concur unto one effect. If in their generality, so since knowledge is with respect to goods and evils to be done, it is prior in the account of understanding than power; and power, since it is with respect to things to-be-done and not-to-be-done, is prior to will, which is with respect only to goods to-be-done. But if we speak of these as they concur unto one effect; then power, insofar as it is *able*, is first, insofar as it is *executing*, is last: for first is *to-be-able*, then *to-know*, and after that *to-will*, and lastly is *to-do*, which is of power itself. And as regards this act the Master places power here in the last place; but in execution he considers the order according to greater and lesser generality.

#### DOUBT III.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says, that *the divine knowledge is allotted diverse names*, namely *knowledge*, *foreknowledge* or *forevision*, *disposition*, *predestination*, *providence*. It is asked how these names are distinguished; and it seems that he enumerates insufficiently, because in divine matters it is to be posited not only predestination but also reprobation.

**I respond:** It must be said that names of this kind are distinguished thus: divine knowing can be considered in itself, or in comparison to creatures. If in itself: either insofar as it says purely a knowing in the manner of speculation, or insofar as it says speculation joined to affection. In the first way it is *knowledge*, in the second way it is *wisdom*. Or thus: either it says simple knowing, or [knowing] through the most noble account. In the first way knowledge, in the second way wisdom. — But if it be considered in comparison to things, this can be twofold: either it connotes the event, and so *foreknowledge*; or the effect, and this twofold: either in conserving or governing, and so *providence*; or in effecting, and this twofold: either as regards the good of nature and so *disposition*; or as regards the superadded good, and so *predestination*, or as regards its privation, and so *reprobation*. But because the privation of grace is not an effect but a defect, therefore reprobation is not numbered here, but is contained under the name of foreknowledge, and [the latter] appropriates it to itself.

Hence the division can be formed thus: the knowing of God either is in itself, or in comparison: if in itself, either through the most noble account, and so wisdom; or through whatever account, and so it is knowledge. If in comparison: either of events, and so foreknowledge; or of events and effects, and this either in governing, and so it is providence; or in effecting, and so, if it is with respect to any nature whatsoever, it is disposition; if with respect to the rational, so predestination; or of events and effects and defects, and so reprobation, which is named foreknowledge.

#### DOUBT IV.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says, that *creator is so said relatively, that nevertheless it does not signify the essence.* For he seems to say a falsehood: for *creation* signifies the mode of an action, not of a relation, therefore *creator* similarly; therefore it is not said according to relation on the side of the mode, nor on the side of the thing; that is established: therefore in no way [is it relative]. Likewise, he seems to say a falsehood when he says that it does not signify the essence, because *creation* signifies something: either therefore the created or the uncreated. If the created: therefore it is not said of God; if the uncreated: therefore since it does not signify a person, it signifies the essence.

**I respond:** It must be said that for something to be said relatively is twofold: either because it signifies a relation, like the nouns which are in the predicament of relation; or because it has a respect annexed: thus, since every action says a respect to the patient or thing-done, and the patient to the agent, so it is said relatively, and so the Master understands [it] of this name *creator*; and rightly so. Now the other thing he says, that it does not signify the essence; he says on this account, that although it be imposed upon the divine essence — and therefore is said of the essence alone, according to all — yet concerning that from which it is imposed there was a controversy. For some wished to say that the names of the six [last] genera do not predicate something in God, but co-predicate. Hence action does not seem to say something in the agent, but from the agent. And to this seems to consort the reasoning that action and passion seem to be the same. And again to this seems to consort the word of Boethius *On the Trinity*, that «the other genera of things are predicated neither of the Creator nor of creatures.» — That opinion was sufficiently probable, and of this opinion was the Master; and therefore he says that foreknowledge by reason of knowledge imports the essence, but creator only relation.

Yet today this is not commonly held. For we say that God is his action, as for instance creation. And since the essence is divine action, and this name *creator* is imposed from action; therefore it is imposed not only upon the essence but also from the essence, but signifies it in relation. Nor does Boethius intend to say that such things are not predicated, but that they are not predicated absolutely. — If however we wish to sustain the Master according to the common opinion, we shall say that the Master does not wish to say that creation does not import the divine essence, but that, as much as from the force of the word, it does not say the essence absolutely, but in the manner of relation, that is, under a relative appellation. But foreknowledge says two things: both knowledge and a precession. By reason of knowledge it says the absolute essence, whence the knowledge remains, the thing itself not remaining. It is not so concerning creation; for there is not creation unless there be also a creature. And according to this the word of the Master does not have any cavil.

#### DOUBT V.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says: *If no things were going to be, there would yet be in God the same knowledge.* For he seems to speak ill, because our knowledge posits the things, and when it does not posit, it is not knowledge but opinion or some other less-noble acceptation: therefore since it pertains to the nobility of knowledge to posit the thing, it seems much more strongly that the divine knowledge, which is most noble, would posit.

**I respond:** To this it must be said briefly that there is a knowledge by which I have a cognition of a thing, and there is a knowledge by which I know that the thing is. The first knowledge neither in us nor in God posits the existence of the thing in its proper genus, neither of the present nor of the future; which is plain, because the artisan has the cognition of building a house, which he will never build. But the second knowledge posits the thing both in God and in us; but in us, because it depends, in God, because it connotes. And as regards the first mode the Master speaks, [namely] that the same knowledge would be, but not with respect to the same, and with respect to as many, with respect to as many as it is now, as regards the second mode.

#### DOUBT VI.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says, that *all things are present to God, not only those which are, but also those which have passed away.* How is this to be understood? For either it is understood of presence according to truth, or of presence according to cognition. In the first way it is false: it is established that antichrist is not present to God according to truth. If according to cognition, [it follows] because [God] has cognition of past and future things; but thus has one soul: therefore similarly all things are present to it.

**I respond:** It must be said that not all things are said to be present to God according to the truth of the existence of things, but according to cognition, because in act he knows the present, the past, and the future; and around the act of his cognition there is always presentiality, so that there is no succession of God's cognition in the *now*, which embraces every succession without change: and therefore all things are present to him from this twofold cause. But although the creature has cognition of past things, yet because its cognition passes into the past and a new cognition is generated from the existence of the thing: therefore it is not said that all things are present to the creature, as it is said that all present things are to God. And therefore memory is not posited in God, since memory looks to the past, not only as regards the thing, but also insofar as the act itself of that cognition passes into the past; but foreknowledge does not say the account or act of knowledge as future; and therefore it is fittingly posited in God.

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