Dist. 36, Art. 3, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/1/d/36/q/bon-sent-I-d36-a3-q1
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### Article III. *On the number, that is, the generality, of the existence which things have in God.*

In the third place there is the question concerning the third article, namely concerning the generality of the existence of things in God; and concerning this two [questions] are asked. First it is asked, whether evils are in God. Secondly, whether imperfect [things] are in God, insofar as they are such.

### Question I.
#### *Whether evils are [in God].*

That, however, evils are not in God, appears [thus].

1. Augustine, *On Free Choice [of the Will]*: "To the extent that things are rightly censured, the censurer of them sees the art in which they are made, so as to censure in them that which he does not see in the art." If therefore they are censured as to malice, that is, insofar as they are evil; and in this mode they are not seen in God: therefore in this mode they are not in God.

2. Likewise, "everything which is in God is from him and through him," as Augustine and the Master in the *Lombard text* say; but evils never are from God, nor through God: therefore neither in God.

3. Likewise, everything which is in God is either as in a producing principle, or as in an expressing exemplar, or as in a conserving end; but it is settled that God is not a principle producing evils, nor even conserving [them]. Likewise, [he] is not an exemplar expressing [them], since the account of an exemplar is taken according to assimilation; but of God to evil there is no assimilation: therefore evils are in no way in God.

4. Likewise, by however much something is better, by so much the more does it stand at a distance from evil; but God is the best, than whom nothing better can be thought: therefore [God] differs by so great a distance as none greater can be thought. But that which has neither the truth of malice nor a likeness of it stands more distant from evil than that which has at least a likeness; and that in which evil is in no way [stands more distant] than that in which it is in some way: therefore etc.

**On the contrary:**

1. Everything which is known by someone who is his own knowing is in him as in a knower; but God knows evils, since he punishes them and reprobates [them], and God is his own knowing: therefore evils are in God. The minor is clear; the major likewise, since everything known is in the knowing: if therefore the knowing and the knower are the same, therefore if [something] is in the knowing, [it is] also in the knower.

2. Likewise, everything which is known in something is in that in which it is known; but evils are known in God: therefore they are in God. Proof of the minor: evils are known by God — this is settled — either inside himself or outside: not outside, this is settled, since the divine glance does not go outside, for then he would need another for knowing. And again, the angels know evils in God. Hence Augustine, *On Genesis according to the Letter*: The angels see in him our goods, which please them, and our evils, which displease them.

3. Likewise, everything which is known in something, and not by accident, is in some way in it as in an exemplar; but evils are known by God, and not by accident, since [God] knows nothing by accident, but all things by themselves: therefore evils are in God.

4. Likewise, everything which is known by someone not by privation is known by likeness and idea; but in God knowing through privation does not fall, since no privation can be in that exemplar, since it is pure act: therefore if he knows evils, he does not know [them] by privation, but by likeness. But likeness is the idea in God: therefore evils have an idea in God.

### Conclusion.

> *God knows evils; nevertheless they are not in God, nor have they an idea in him, but are known through the idea of the goods of which they are privations.*

**I respond:** It must be said that evils are known by God, yet they do not exist in God insofar as they are evils, since thus we are speaking in the proposition. — They are known, I say, because just as "a straight thing is the judge of itself and of what is oblique," so the supreme truth and light and act is the ground of knowing not only truth and light and act, but also obliquity, darkness, and privation. Hence light by itself knows darkness.

Evils, however, are not in God, since those things are said to be in God toward which God cooperates according to some kind of cause, and most of all according to the kind of formal and exemplar cause; but evil does not have God as a cause, nor as

an exemplar, since evil by reason of malice states only *privation*, but an exemplar, insofar as such, states *assimilation*. Therefore since privation, insofar as such, is assimilable to nothing, hence it is that neither evil nor falsity has an idea in God; but its opposite is assimilable. Hence, since by one and the same [thing] God knows the good and the evil opposed to it, he knows the good according to the account of assimilation; and therefore the good is in God as in an exemplar and as known by itself and after the manner of position. But evil, since it is known by God, does not have in him an idea, and therefore is not in God, although it is in God's knowing: since, although it is known by God, it is not known through an idea of itself, but of the good of which it is the privation. And therefore it is said to be known *by accident* and *by privation*.

1. Therefore to that which is objected, that evil is in God's knowing, and the knowing is God: therefore etc.; it must be said that here there is a fallacy according to accident. For although the knowing of God is the same thing as God, yet it connotes something else, like power and wisdom. Hence just as it does not follow: *it is in God's notice, therefore also in [his] power*, but rather it is there as accidental and consequent; so also in the proposition.

2. To that which is objected, that evil is known in God, therefore it is in God; it must be said that this also does not follow: for *to be in God* states more than *to be known by God* or *in God*. For when something is said to be known by God, by this is understood that God is the ground of knowing it; but when it is added that this is *in God*, it is signified that God is the ground of knowing as exemplar and through assimilation; and therefore it is there as consequent.

3. To that which is objected, that he knows evils not by accident etc.; it must be said that to be known by accident is twofold: either on the part of the knower, or of the known. In God no knowing by accident falls on the part of the knower, since he knows all things by himself; nevertheless it does fall on the part of the known, since [he] knows something by its likeness, as the good, [and] something by the likeness of its opposite; and thus it is there by accident, not in running through, but in assimilating. For when God knows evil, he is not understood to be assimilated to it, but to its opposite.

4. Similarly the [reply] concerning privation must be solved: since to know by privation is twofold: either thus, that there be privation in the knowing power, as someone knows silence and darkness through the ear and the eye, and thus it posits imperfection; or thus, that there be privation in the known, not in the knower, as light would know darkness, if it had a cognitive power, and sound silence: and thus God knows, since he is pure act and light and truth.