Dist. 36, Dubia
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/1/d/36/q/bon-sent-I-d36-dubia
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### DOUBTS CONCERNING THE TEXT OF THE MASTER.

#### DOUBT I.

In this part there are doubts concerning the text, and first concerning this solution of the Master, by which he says that the cognition of God is his essence, yet not all things which are in his cognition are in his essence. For he seems to speak ill, since this argument seems to be necessary: if any two are altogether the same; if anything is in the one, [it is] also in the other. If you say that they differ on the side of their connotata: it seems false, since God's foreknowledge does not connote. — Or if you say that foreknowledge connotes; it is objected concerning this name *God*, that it does not connote, and yet all things are said to be in God: therefore by parity of reasoning [they are] also in his essence. — Furthermore, against the Master there seems to be the word of Anselm in the *Monologion*, that «a creature in the Creator is a creating essence»: therefore it seems that they truly are in God's essence.

**I respond:** It must be said that this preposition *in* sometimes connotes inherence, as if one say *an accident in a subject*: sometimes it notes identity, as if one say *the ideas of things are in God*, since they are God, not from God; sometimes it notes causality, as if one say *creatures are in God himself*: and this preposition *in* can be said according to the four genera of causes, but in God it is said only according to three. — Therefore, since *cause* says a respect to the creature according to the account of understanding, this preposition *in*, insofar as it says causality, is added only to terms saying a respect to the creature. And since the name of *substance* or *nature* or *essence* does not say a respect, therefore if it be said: *creatures are in God's substance*, this preposition *in* either notes identity or inherence, both of which are false: and therefore such locutions are not received; and in that argument there is a sophism according to accident. Therefore the Master says that [the argument] is invalid; for although they be the same in reality, they yet differ in the mode of signifying and of understanding.

To that which is objected, that *God* does not say a respect; it must be said that this is false, because [the name] is imposed from the act which he has toward the creature, as Damascene says; whence it is well said: *God of creatures.*

To that which is objected, that *a creature in the Creator is a creating essence*; it must be said that for a creature to be in the Creator is for the idea or likeness of it to be with God; and Anselm wishes to say that that likeness is a creating essence, not that that creature is the essence. Whence it is rightly to be conceded that the ideas of things are in the divine essence, because *in* notes identity, and truly so; but this cannot be said of the creature according to the being which it has in its proper genus.

#### DOUBT II.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says, that *those things are understood to be in God which are from him and through him etc.* For he seems to speak ill, because since such things are only [as] present, therefore in God there are only those things which presently exist; which is manifestly false and against Augustine, who says that things are in God from eternity. If you say that he takes *to be in God* as in [a cause] conserving, because thus the Apostle takes [it] in the aforementioned authority: *From him and through him and in him*; then [this] makes nothing to the proposition, because the Master takes *to be in*, according to which things are said to be in God eternally. — If you say that things are actually from God or through God in time, but habitually from eternity; then I ask, why are they actually in God from eternity and not from God or through God?

**I respond:** It must be said that *to be from* God or through God can be taken either according to aptitude, or according to act, or according to habit. If according to act; then the aforesaid authority is not to be understood precisely [as meaning] that those alone are in God which are from God or through God, because God knows many things which are in God, which yet are not from him nor through him, nor will be. It can again be taken according to habit; and so still it is not to be understood precisely, because God knows and can do many things which he will not do; and yet they are in him, nor will they ever be from him nor through him. It can again be understood according to aptitude; and then it has truth precisely, because nothing is in God unless it be apt to be from God and through him; and so it is valid for the proposition, and so the Master understands [it]; and through this evils are excluded, because God cannot do evils, nor can evils be from him nor through him.

As for what is asked, why things are not said eternally to be *from* God etc.; it must be said that there is no parallel, because the other prepositions signify by the mode of becoming and motion and act, but this preposition *in* by the mode of rest. And since God did not make [things] except in time, nor was actually a cause causing except in time, although habitually from eternity; therefore things are said rather to be in God eternally than from God.

#### DOUBT III.

Likewise it is asked concerning that reasoning of the Master, by which he says that evils are not in God, because God does not know them by approbation. For he seems to speak ill, because approbation regards the will; but *to be in God* regards exemplarity from eternity: therefore the knowledge of approbation makes nothing to this. — Likewise, the Master seems insufficient in the division of the divine cognition, because just as goods are known by the knowledge of approbation, so evils [are known] by the knowledge of reprobation. — Likewise, approbation either adds something over knowledge simply, or not; if not: therefore there is not [reason] in God to distinguish knowledge and the knowledge of approbation. Likewise, if it adds nothing, therefore just as those things are in God which he knows by approving, so also those which he knows simply [are in God]. If it adds something: therefore it seems that the divine knowledge is composite. If you say that it adds [something] according to the intellect — but our intellect does not make things to be in God: therefore neither does the knowledge of approbation.

**I respond:** It must be said that approbation, over cognition according to the intellect, adds the good-pleasure of the will; but this good-pleasure connotes goodness in him with respect to whom it is; because nothing pleases God except the good, and every good as such is like to God. If therefore the idea says the account of knowing according to assimilation, all things which God knows by the knowledge of approbation are in him.

But it is to be noted that approbation can connote goodness in act; and so it is not precisely true that everything which is in God is known by the knowledge of approbation. It can again connote goodness in potency, as the exemplar connotes the entity of a thing, not because it is, but because God can make it; and so nothing is in God except what he knows by the knowledge of approbation, because thus he knows every good which is or which he can do, and of that he has the exemplar; and therefore that alone is in God.

Therefore as for what he objects, that the will does not make [things] to be in God; it must be said that this is not because [it is] the will in act, but because God can do nothing which he does not approve as good; whence approbation rather says here a judgment of reason than an affection of the will.

As for what he asks, whether [approbation] adds [something]; it must be said that it does add — on the side of our intellect and on the side of the connotatum, on the side of God himself it does not. But reprobation does not add in this way; and therefore the Master does not place the knowledge of reprobation as a member [of the division].

#### DOUBT IV.

Likewise it is asked concerning what Ambrose says: *All these have the same force, namely from him and through him and in him*. For it is objected, that if they have the same force, therefore there seems to be here an inculcation of words. — Likewise, either *to be in him* is taken as in an exemplar, or as in a conserving cause. If as in an exemplar, it is established that it is one thing to be *in him* and another to be *from him*, as has been previously shown. If as in a conserving [cause], still it is one thing to be produced, another to be conserved. — Likewise, if they have the same force; just as *from him* is appropriated to the Father, so it can be appropriated to the Son, and similarly for the Father it will [be possible] to appropriate *in him*.

**I respond:** It must be said that there is [a way of] speaking concerning those three circumlocutions either as regards what they signify, or as regards the order which they connote. If we speak as regards what they signify, then all things are said to be *from God*, as from a first principle not moved by another; all things are said to be *through God*, as through a most-sufficient principle which does all things through itself; all things are said to be *in God*, as in an infinite principle, which cannot make anything outside itself, but all things its power encompasses. And in these three circumlocutions it is signified that God is a principle first and most-sufficient and most-infinite. And because all these things in God are one and agree to the three [persons], therefore as regards the signified Ambrose says that they have the same force; nor yet is there an inculcation, because the same things are imported in different ways according to the account of understanding. — But if we speak as regards the order which the relations of the prepositions connote, then they are appropriated to the three [persons]: because *from him* says the account of *first*, and *through him* says the account of *middle*, and *in him* says the account of *last* or *quietative*. And therefore *from him* is appropriated to the person of the Father, who is first in the Trinity; *through him* is appropriated to the Son, who is the middle person; and *in him* to the Holy Spirit, who is the third person. From these the objections are plain.

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