Dist. 37, Part 1, Art. 2, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/1/d/37/q/bon-sent-I-d37-p1-a2-q1
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### Article II.
#### *To be everywhere is proper to God.*

Consequently, with regard to the second article, it is asked whether to be everywhere is proper to God. And because *proper* is what belongs to one alone and always, two questions are accordingly asked here. First, whether to be everywhere belongs to God alone. Second, whether it belongs to him always or from eternity.

### Question I.
#### *Whether to be everywhere belongs to God alone.*

That, however, it belongs to God alone is shown thus.

1. Augustine in the book *On the Symbol*: «To be everywhere is to be God»; but to be God belongs to no creature, indeed this is most properly God's own: therefore to be everywhere belongs to no creature.

2. Likewise, Ambrose in the book *On the Holy Spirit*: «Since every creature is circumscribed by certain limits of its own nature, to be everywhere and in all things is proper to divinity and dominion».

3. Likewise, this same thing appears by reason: because every creature, existing per se and in itself, is *this something*; but every *this something* is singular, and every singular is *here and now*, and nothing of such a nature is to be everywhere: therefore to be everywhere belongs to God alone.

4. Likewise, this condition by which God is everywhere belongs to God by reason of his immensity; but immensity is a property of God alone, which can belong to no creature: therefore neither can being everywhere.

**On the contrary:**

1. It is objected concerning the universal, since the universal is always and everywhere, and yet is not God. — If you say that it is everywhere with respect to its singulars and not simply; then it is objected that there is some universal whose singulars are everywhere, and it is impossible for anything to come about which is not its singular or in a singular, as this universal *substance*: therefore it is everywhere.

2. Likewise, it is objected concerning *number*, which is in all beings, and nothing can come about in which there is no number; and besides, in all beings there is one number: therefore since number is not God, to be everywhere is not proper to God alone. — If you say that it is not there as a whole, but according to part and part; it is objected concerning the *voice*, which is whole in the ears of various people and whole in the whole air: suppose that the voice were so great that it were heard throughout the whole world, then it would be everywhere whole and one. *Proof*: because if many, since the parts of the air are infinite, and the voice is in any given part: then there would actually be infinite voices; which is impossible.

3. Likewise, it is objected concerning the soul, which is whole in any given

part of the animal, as has been shown above: suppose then that there came to be a giant animal as great as the whole world, then the soul would be everywhere: therefore that it is not so, this is on account of the defect of the body, and not its own. — If you say that it is in many things as in one place, whence one soul is never except in one body; it is objected concerning the body of Christ, which is whole and entire in different distinct altars.

4. Likewise, it is objected by reason. For since it is of the nature of a singular to be here and now, nevertheless to some God grants always-being, as to the Angels: therefore by parity of reasoning he will grant to some to be everywhere.

5. Likewise, if any two are inseparably united, wherever the one is, the other is also; but the human and the divine nature in Christ are inseparably united: therefore where the divine is, the human also is. But the divine nature is everywhere: therefore the human also, and so on.

### Conclusion.

> *To God alone properly and singularly does it belong to be everywhere.*

**I respond:** It must be said that to be everywhere, as the Saints say, belongs to God alone properly and singularly, in such a way that it belongs to no other, nor can it be understood to belong, if rightly understood. — For God is said to be everywhere in such a way that on the side of God identity and totality are understood, and on the side of place plurality and universality. By the condition of *identity*, the universal is excluded, which, although it is in all singulars, is so according to one supposit and another, and thus numbered. By the condition of *totality*, number is excluded; for although number is everywhere, it is so according to one part and another. By the condition of *plurality* on the side of place, the created spirit is excluded, which, although it is in many parts of the body, is nevertheless not in all except as united. By the condition of *universality*, the body of Christ under the Sacrament is excluded, which, although it is in many, is yet not in all nor can be, because this belongs to it only under the Sacrament.

**To the arguments on the opposite side:**

*To 1, 2, 3.* And thus the first instances are clear. As for what is objected concerning the voice, it is to be understood that the generation of sensibles in the medium is by diffusion, whence the voice is not numbered, just as light is not, except according to the numbering of the recipient — whence as many ears as there are, so many voices, since the voice in the air was multipliable, and not multiplied — and so it is clear that it is neither whole everywhere before numbering, just as diffused light is not, nor the same after numbering. And therefore the example concerning the existence of voice is not very similar to God.

*To 4.* As for what is objected, that God grants sempiternity; it must be said that both being everywhere and being always import a certain infinity; and the infinity of sempiternity is the infinity of duration, which is according to *potency*; and this is not repugnant to the creature, because it does not impede the duration of the creature from being finite in act and infinite in potency; and therefore to every duration of the creature it is necessary that something be added. But to be everywhere expresses immensity in *act*, because it imports a simultaneity of places: and this is repugnant to the creature, and therefore cannot be wholly communicated to it. Yet it is communicated according to the possibility of the creature, according as it participates more and less in the nature of spirituality. For nothing is wholly spiritual except God alone, as Augustine says *On the Morals of the Church*: «God alone is incorporeal, because he fills all things». Now of creatures, some are spiritual by *abstraction*, as the universal and number; and these can be in many on account of their commonness to many, and so according to their being multiplied. Some are spiritual by *separation* from corporeal matter, as souls; and these are in many, yet not multiplied. And some are spiritual by *union*, as the body of Christ is the food of spiritual nature, although it is a true body, and so is, as it were, a mean between the soul and God, and therefore inasmuch as it is food it has more of the nature of spirituality; and therefore it is in many, as there are many places, yet not in all, because the account of feeding does not extend to all. And so it is clear why it is in many under the Sacrament.

*To 5.* What is objected concerning things inseparably united must be solved by *interemption*, when the one exceeds the other, as is clear in genus and species. As for what is objected, that by union man is God; it must be said that this is understood by *communication of idioms*; and likewise to be everywhere belongs by communication of idioms.