Dist. 37, Part 1, Art. 3, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/1/d/37/q/bon-sent-I-d37-p1-a3-q1
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### Article III.
#### *In what manner God is in things.*

In the third place, principally, inquiry is made concerning the third article, namely in what manner God is in things. And concerning this two questions are asked.

First it is asked, whether God is in all things equally or uniformly.

Second it is asked, in what modes, and in what manner God is in things.

### Question I.
#### *Whether God is equally in all things.*

That, however, he is [in them] uniformly, appears thus:

1. Because, as the Philosopher says, "the first cause stands in one mode toward all things, although all things do not stand in one mode toward it"; but all things are in God uniformly, since they are life and creative essence: therefore much more strongly is God in all things equally and uniformly.

2. Likewise, what is whole everywhere is [there] equally and uniformly; but since God is most simple, he is whole everywhere: therefore he is equally and uniformly in all things.

3. Likewise, to each thing, matter and form are inmost; but form is not united to matter except by mediation of appetite, and appetite has its origin from essence; but this could not be except through God's presence: therefore God is more inmost to every thing than its form. But form is in the highest degree inmost to each thing: therefore God is, at the limit, inmost to anything whatever. But what has being at the limit is [there] uniformly: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, this is shown through the impossible: for, if God is not equally in things, then since he is more inmostly in one than in another, therefore in some he is not in the highest degree inmostly: therefore there is something intrinsic in the thing in which God is not: therefore God is not the inmost which is. But this is impossible: therefore so is the first [thesis].

**On the contrary:**

1. "Everything which is received in something is there according to the mode of the receiver, and not of the received"; but creatures are not equally capable of God: therefore God is not equally in them.

2. Likewise, as intellect stands toward the first light, so being toward the first essence, and the living toward the first life; but a greater intellect more participates the divine light: therefore a more perfect being, and a more perfect living, [more participates] the divine essence and life: therefore God is more perfectly in one than in another.

3. Likewise, the existence of God in things is the conservation of things; but not all things are equally conserved: therefore he is not equally in all.

4. Likewise, since God is everywhere, he is said to dwell only in the just; but this would not be so, if he were equally and uniformly in all: therefore etc.

### Conclusion.

> *God is uniformly in things, insofar as effects are not connoted; but insofar as God gives more to one creature than to another, he is more said to be in one than in another.*

**I respond:** For the understanding of what has been said it must be noted that "to be in things" can be understood of God in two ways:

in one way, so that it is the same as to be present to each thing, not connoting an effect; and thus he is uniformly in all things, since he is inmost to each thing and most highly present and whole in any thing whatever. In another way, it can connote an effect, just as the artificer is said to be in the artifact through the connotation of the effect and through the impression of his likeness; and thus, since he gives more to one creature than to another, he is more in one than in another. — And this can be in three ways: either extensively, with respect to those which have a more lasting being, as more in an incorruptible body than in a sensible soul; or intensively, with respect to those which have a more noble being, as in a sensible soul [more] than in an incorruptible body; or in both ways, as in the rational soul [more] than in a corruptible body.

With these things seen, the objections to either side are clear. For they proceed by these two ways, as appears, except the first two on each side.

For what is objected, that God stands uniformly toward all things; if uniformity is understood on the side of the divine being, it is true; if, however, it is understood on the side of the effect, it is false. For God, existing uniformly and stably, moves other things and produces many and varied effects, and by effecting diverse [things] in things brings it about that things do not stand uniformly toward him. Therefore since, when God is said to be in things, in one mode an effect is connoted, in another not; therefore in one mode it is conceded that he is [there] uniformly, in another that he is not. Similarly conversely, when it is said that all things are in God, in one mode an effect can be connoted, as appears in predestination and reprobation, and so it is not uniformly; in another mode an effect is not connoted, and so [it is] uniformly.

What is objected again on the opposite side, that everything which is received is [received] according to the mode of the receiver; it must be said that this is true where the received depends on the receiver, as a species [depends] on the cognitive power; in the case under consideration, however, it is not so. Hence the divine essence, existing in a thing, does not take on the mode of the thing; and so that [point] is plain.