Dist. 37, Part 1, Art. 3, Q. 2
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/1/d/37/q/bon-sent-I-d37-p1-a3-q2
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### Question II.
#### *In what modes God is said to be in things.*

Secondly it is asked, in what modes, and in what manner, God is in things. And the Master assigns in two ways the modes of God's existing in things. And one mode he takes from Augustine on the presence of God to Dardanus, who says that "God is in all creatures in one way, in the saints in another way, in Christ in another way. In individual creatures by nature, in the saints by indwelling grace, in Christ by union." Another mode he takes from Gregory, who says on the fifth [chapter] of Canticles, that "God is in things in three ways, namely potentially, presentially, and essentially." Therefore it is asked concerning the distinction, sufficiency, and order of these modes.

1. And it is objected against the assignation of Augustine: for either those modes are taken with respect to the divine substance, or with respect to the creature, or with respect to the effects. If with respect to the effects, since they are innumerable, the modes of being are innumerable. If with respect to the creature receiving, since the receiver is only twofold, namely nature and will, it seems that there are only two modes, namely by nature, and by grace. If with respect to the substance of God, since no diversity falls in it, there will be only one mode.

2. Likewise, just as grace is an effect superadded to nature, so [is] miraculous operation: therefore just as in those having grace God is otherwise than in those not having [it], so also in a thing in which he works miraculously, as in the ass of Balaam, he will be in another mode of being.

3. Likewise, just as gratum-faciens grace is above nature, so [also] gratuitously-given grace, such as prophecy, and likewise also punishment and glory: therefore since these differ in genus and species, diverse modes of being ought to be distinguished accordingly: therefore the Master does not distinguish sufficiently.

4. Likewise, it is objected against the assignation of Gregory: for either that assignation is according to effects, or [according to] the conditions and properties of God. If according to effects, then since the essence connotes no effect, it ought not to be posited. If according to the conditions of God; but there is not only the potency of God, but also wisdom and will: therefore it seems that he assigns insufficiently.

5. Likewise, there seems to be a reversal in the order. For according to the thing and the account of understanding, essence precedes potency, and potency [precedes] presence: therefore he orders badly.

6. Likewise, there seems to be a heaping-up of words, since in God potency, essence, and presence are the same: therefore the distinction is asked for.

### Conclusion.

> *Each assignation of the modes of God's being in things is fitting, both that of Augustine and that of Gregory: for the former regards the diversity of the modes of being in things, the latter the conditions of the same modes.*

**I respond:** It must be said that the assignation of Augustine regards the diversity of the modes of God's being in things, but the assignation of Gregory regards the conditions of the modes of being. For wherever God is, whether by nature or by grace, he is essentially, potentially, presentially.

But the diversity of the modes of being is taken according to the diversity of effects, and not just any [diversity], but only a three-membered one. For there is a certain effect according to which a thing is compared to God by way of going-out (*exeuntis*); and all these are contained under the mode of nature, in an extended sense of the name. There is another by way of returning (*redeuntis*); and this is the effect of grace inchoate, or consummated, or of glory, and as to this is the second mode of being. There is another effect, according to which the creature is compared to God as arriving (*perveniens*), and this is the effect of union, in which creature and Creator are united in unity of person, as the God-man. Therefore since there are three modes of effects, according to which the creature is compared to God in diverse ways, therefore he is said to be in things in only three modes.

And the first — which is attended to with respect to *going-out* — is likened to a straight line; the second, with respect to *return*, to a reflected line; the third, with respect to *perfection*, is likened to a circle. And the first mode indeed is similar to a line; the second, because it includes the first, is similar to a surface; the third, because [it includes] both, is similar to solidity. And therefore the Apostle most aptly says to the Colossians, second [chapter], that *in Christ the whole divinity dwells corporeally*: for he is [there] most perfectly, since he is after the manner of a circle, which is a perfect nature, and after the manner of altitude, which is a perfect quantity. From these the sufficiency and the distinction, and the solution of the objections, is clear.

But the assignation of blessed Gregory is taken with respect to the conditions of the modes of being. For in these three [terms] blessed Gregory circumlocutes the perfection of the modes of God's existing in all [things] in which he is, in this way. For something is in something according to *the indistance of presentiality*, as the contained in the container, as water in a vessel; something according to *the influence of power*, as the mover in the mobile; something according to *the existence of intimacy*, as that which is containing within, as the soul in the body. And everything that is perfectly in a thing must necessarily be [there] as to this threefold condition; and in this mode is God. And therefore he is said to be potentially, presentially, and essentially, since [he is] according to the indistance of presentiality, according to the influence of power, according to the existence of intimacy.

And thus the distinction, sufficiency, and order are clear, since according to the account of understanding these conditions are related by addition, and therefore blessed Gregory orders well, first *presentially* etc.

Some however have wished to distinguish such conditions according to substance, power, and operation. But although the mode of existing essentially answers to substance, and potentially to power, nevertheless presentially does not answer to operation; for someone is present to someone, even if he does not operate.

Some take [them] according to the genera of causes. But neither does that seem fitting, since to subsist essentially does not connote a genus of causality.

Some [take them] according to the trinity of the vestige, namely mode, species, and order; but essence precedes all these according to the account of understanding.