Dist. 37, Part 2, Art. 1, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/1/d/37/q/bon-sent-I-d37-p2-a1-q1
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### Article I.
#### *On the incircumscriptibility of God.*

### Question I.
#### *Whether God is in a place.*

Concerning the first one proceeds thus. That God is *localis* [in a place / spatially located] is shown in this manner.

1. To be in a place and to be located [*esse locatum*] are convertible; but God is in a place, as has been proved in the preceding: therefore God is something located. But to be located is to be *locale* [in-place-able]: therefore God is *localis*.

2. Likewise, what is in only one place is *locale*: therefore if all places can [contain] more than one [can], and that which has being in the whole more savors the nature of a thing than that which has [being] in a part, then much more is that *locale* which is in every place. But God is in every place, since he is everywhere; therefore he seems most of all to be *localis*.

3. Likewise, God is everywhere; therefore he is here *a toto* [from-the-whole]: but what is here, is in a determinate place, and what is in a determinate place is *locale*: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, God is in some determinate place either, then, according to the whole, or according to a part. If according to a part: then he has part and part, which is unfitting. If according to the whole; but what is in something according to the whole is comprehended by it, and what is comprehended by some determinate place is *locale*; therefore God is *localis*.

**On the contrary:**

1. The Master in the *littera*: "He is not *localis*, since he is in no way circumscribed by place."

2. Likewise, by reason it is proved thus: nothing is called temporal, except what is exceeded by time — for temporal things in time are corruptible — therefore nothing is called *locale*, except what is exceeded by place; but God is not exceeded by place: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, place is an accident, therefore it does not denominate that, except [the thing] to which it is compared as an accident; but to God it cannot be compared as an accident: therefore it does not denominate God: therefore God is not *localis*.

4. Likewise, place is a continuous divisible quantity. The point, however, is the indivisible principle of quantity; therefore the point agrees more with God than place does, as regards [its] properties; but God is not called *punctalis* [point-like] except improperly and falsely: therefore he ought not be called *localis*.

### Conclusion.

> *Although God is in some manner in a place, nevertheless he is in no way called* localis.

**I respond:** It must be said that *locale* is so called which follows the laws of place, just as *temporale* [is so called] which follows the laws of time. The laws of place, however, are with regard to the act of containing, measuring, preserving, terminating, according to which place stands to the located by the manner of imparting, and the located stands to the place by the manner of receiving. And since God is so present to a place that he receives nothing at all from it, but only supplies its indigence and gives to the place the power of containing and to the located the power of filling; hence it is, that God is in no way to be called *localis*, as the Master says in the *littera*. And the reasonings adduced for this are to be conceded.

**To the arguments for the affirmative side:**

*To 1.* To that which is objected, that to be in a place and to be located are convertible; it must be said that they are convertible by reason of the matter [in question] regarding the body itself, but not by reason of the force of the term. For this determination *in loco*, in order that the speech may have truth, neither requires nor posits anything except presentiality and non-distance; but *esse locatum* posits a circuit and containment, *esse locale* posits a fittingness for the properties of place and some indigence. And therefore this is conceded: *God is in a place*; yet it has something of impropriety, because the preposition *in* seems to import an enveloping containment. But this is more improper: *God is located*. And further this is more improper still: *God is* localis; and therefore it is not to be received, but to be expounded.

*To 2.* To that which is objected, that what is in one place is *locale*; it must be said that this is so, because the place exceeds the located thing itself, whence it determines and defines it; but when [something] is in all [places], it itself exceeds all places. And therefore over this all places cannot prevail as much as one place can over that which is in one place only. And therefore God is not to be called *localis*.

*To 3.* To that which is objected, that God is here etc.; it must be said that *here* can be taken in two ways: either demonstratively only, or demonstratively and discretively. If only demonstratively, then it is true that God is here, since one cannot point to a place to which God is not present. But if discretively, it is false to be here; and it does not follow from the first [proposition], and in this sense his reason proceeds.

*To 4.* To that which is asked: either God is according to the whole etc.; it must be said that in God there are at once simplicity and infinity. When therefore there is applied to God a name importing totality, it can be applied in two ways: either by reason of simplicity, and so it is signified by the noun, as if one says: *totus Deus* ["the whole God"]. And since God in every place is simple, and any [place] is capable of the divine simplicity; therefore by reason of simplicity God is whole in any place. Again, totality can be applied by reason of infinity, and this is done through an adverb, as if one says: *Deus est totaliter in loco hoc* ["God is wholly in this place"] or *secundum totum* ["according to the whole"]; and so, since the divine infinity is included by no place, God is in no [place] *according to the whole*.

When therefore it is asked: either according to a part, or according to the whole; it must be said that he does not divide by immediates, because God is neither according to a part, since simple, nor according to the whole, since infinite. And therefore he is to be called whole in any place, yet not wholly; and therefore he is in a place, yet not *localiter* [place-wise].