Dist. 37, Part 2, Art. 1, Q. 2
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/1/d/37/q/bon-sent-I-d37-p2-a1-q2
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### Question II.
#### *Whether God is mutable according to place.*

Secondly it is asked whether God is mutable according to place. And that he is not, is seen thus.

1. The Master in the *littera* says, taking [it] from Augustine *On Genesis*: "God is in every time, and in every place, yet he is not moved through places or times."

2. Likewise, it is shown by reason, since "motion is an imperfect act"; but in God there is no imperfection: therefore neither change according to place.

3. Likewise, through every motion something is acquired; but God can acquire no place, since he is everywhere: therefore it is impossible that God be changed according to place.

4. Likewise, rest is a more noble disposition than motion; but what is more noble must be attributed to God: therefore it is impossible that God be changed according to place, since he always rests.

**On the contrary:**

1. Augustine *to Orosius*: "God moves himself without time and place": therefore it seems that God is moved; but the most perfect of motions is motion according to place: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, Isidore: "Although God is non-local, yet locally he walks in the Saints": therefore at least he seems to be changed *per accidens*.

3. Likewise, this is seen by reason, since "when we are moved, those things which are in us are moved." This the Philosopher says, and he says it on account of forms, which are not in one [place] determinately: therefore if God is in us, God is moved in us at least *per accidens*.

4. Likewise, although God as to existence by essence does not determine a place, nevertheless as to habitation he is definitely in some [things], in such a way that not in others: therefore at least according to this mode he is mutable.

### Conclusion.

> *God is changed according to place neither* per se *nor* per accidens.

**I respond:** It must be said that, as the Master says in the *littera*, God is in no way changed according to place; and this is true, since he is changed neither *per se* nor *per accidens*, and this is on account of [his] highest immensity, by which he is present to all and absent from none. And if he begin to be in a thing, or cease, this is only according to a change of the thing, not according to a change of him: as for example, if a crystal be understood to be created in the air [already] illuminated, the ray begins to be in it, and when the crystal is removed, [the ray] ceases to be, no change having been made in the ray.

*To 1 and 2.* To that which is objected, that God moves himself; it must be said that Augustine does not say simply that he moves himself, but *without time and place*. And since every motion according to Augustine is comprehended under change according to time and according to place, therefore to say this is just as much as to say: he moves himself without motion, and so he does not truly move himself, nor is a contradiction implied. But since in motion there are two [things], namely what is act and what is variation or imperfection, Augustine wishes to say that he moves himself without motion, since he is always in act, but not in imperfect act, but rather in perfect [act]. — What Isidore says is to be understood

metaphorically, or causally, since he makes the Saints to walk, that is, through faith from virtue to virtue.

*To 3.* To that which is objected, that "when we are moved" etc., it must be said that this does not have truth except in those things which are in others through dependence and definition. Hence because the ray is in the air, but does not depend on the air, therefore it is not moved when the air is moved; and because the soul is in the hand, nor is it defined by the hand, therefore it is not moved when the hand is moved. But God does not depend on things nor is defined [by them], therefore he is not moved at the motion of things.

*To 4.* To that which is objected concerning the habitation of God, it must be said that he is definitely in some [things] not by reason of [his] immensity, but by reason of the influence of grace; and therefore God himself is not determined, but only the effect. Hence it is, that he is moved neither *per se* nor *per accidens* nor can be moved, since he depends on nothing and cannot depend [on anything], is defined by nothing nor can be defined; and it is not only not possible, but also not intelligible.

But someone will object thus: let us understand a body to go forth from a place, with nothing entering, then a vacuum remains: either therefore God is there, or not: if so, then he is in that which is nothing, which is foolish to say; if he is not, and previously was there, therefore he seems to have been changed at least *per accidens*: therefore it seems that God goes out with the thing and enters with another thing, since if only the thing went out, God would not go out. — To this I respond, that if by the impossible it be supposed that the place is emptied, then there is understood to remain a privative capacity of place; capacity is something, and in it God is; but privation is nothing, and in it God cannot be: therefore it is not in that wherein God ceases to be that he remains after the withdrawal of the body; but when the thing is deprived [of being], its comparison to God is taken away. For what is nothing, has no comparison.

But when the thing is moved, it does not let go of God, nor does it approach to God, nor does God come with the thing: since he is in the thing in such a way that he is the same outside the thing; therefore neither does the thing let go of him nor find [him] anew. And this is intelligible, if anyone can understand, that God is simple, and infinite and immense. For because he is immense, he is so within, that [he is] without; because [he is] simple, according to one and the same [thing] he is within and without: therefore neither is he let go, nor is anything else acquired in the thing; nor is there a passing from him to him, when he is let go, so that he should be found in one place and another.