Dist. 37, Part 2, Art. 1, Q. 3
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/1/d/37/q/bon-sent-I-d37-p2-a1-q3
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### Question III.
#### *Whether God is separable from every place or [is] outside every place.*

In the third place it is asked whether God is separable from every place, or is outside every place. And that he is not, it seems:

1. Because outside every place there is nothing; therefore if God is outside every place, then he is nothing or in nothing.

2. Likewise, that which is *outside* is an adverb of place: therefore if God is outside every place, he is in a place and beyond every place; but this is false and unintelligible: therefore God can neither in reality nor in understanding be separated from every place.

3. Likewise, when it is said: *God is outside the world*, *outside* either stands for something, or for nothing: if for nothing, then a chimaera is outside the world;

if for something, then either for a created or an uncreated [thing]: not for a created [thing]; that is established: therefore for an uncreated [thing]: therefore to be outside the world is to be in God. But all things are in God: therefore all things are outside the world.

4. Likewise, in nothing is God, which is not in him: but nothing which is outside the world is in God: therefore God is not outside the world.

**On the contrary:**

1. That a place can be separated from God according to the understanding, seems [so], because it is possible according to the understanding for a place to be deprived of every located thing and to remain empty; but the void is privation, and God is in nothing which is not in him; but privation is not in God: therefore neither is God in privation, therefore neither in the void, and thus he is separable from place.

2. Likewise, that God should be separated from place in reality seems [so], because, just as God's eternity stands to all time, so [his] immensity [stands] to every place; but God's eternity was before all time: therefore God's immensity was outside every place. But what is outside something is separated from it: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, if God is only in created places, since these are of finite dimension, and what commensurates itself with the finite is definable and finite: therefore God would be finite.

4. Likewise, God is so good that one cannot be thought greater, therefore so great and immense that none greater than he can be thought; but a line greater than the whole world can be thought, if it is understood to extend beyond the circumference of the heaven: therefore if God is there, God is outside, or [he] is not the greatest.

5. Likewise, an Angel can be outside the world; but [it can]not [be] outside God: therefore God is outside the world.

### Conclusion.

> *God cannot be separated from every place according to distance, neither in reality nor in understanding, but according to independence he is separated from place both in reality and in understanding.*

**I respond:** It must be said that something is separated from another in two ways: either according to distance, or according to independence. In the first way, two things which are in the same place are separated when one is moved far from the other. And in this way it is impossible to be, or to be understood, [that] God is separated from every place. For that separation includes a distance of space, and this of necessity includes a place; and thus two opposites are implied, namely that God is in a place, and is distant from every place. But if we speak of separation by independence, then it must be said that God is in reality and in understanding separated from place, since in himself he is wholly independent of place, just as before the production of place. But place, on the contrary, is not separable from God either in reality or in understanding, as the reasons brought to this point prove.

*To 1, 2.* Likewise, when it is asked whether God is outside every place, it must be said that *outside* in one way denotes situation and position; and in this way it is impossible, just as it is impossible, if *before* denotes time, that he be before time. In another way *before* and *outside* denote excess and superexcellence of the divine eternity and immensity in respect of time and place; and in this way it must be conceded that God is before time and outside every place. Nor does it follow from this that he is separated from place, but that the highest immensity superexcels every place and is not constrained to it. And this Gregory means [when he says] that God is outside all things, not excluded, since he is not distant; and within all things, not included, since he is not constrained, because in himself the [Being] is wholly immense, in such a way that outside himself nothing can be or be thought, or rather nothing can be thought so immense as God is in himself.

*To 3.* From this what follows is clear: that what is not outside [him] is not on account of his limitation, but on account of the defect of place.

*To 4.* To that which is objected concerning the line, it must be said that as soon as something is understood [to be] outside the world, from this it is given to understand that God is there, just as if a new world were understood to be made, without doubt God would be in it. Yet it does not follow that he is there, since that [which is supposed] is nothing.

*To 5.* Likewise, if an Angel be made outside the world; God is then outside, not according to his own motion, but [the motion] of the Angel. But perhaps it is more of fiction than of truth, that an Angel should go forth outside the universe, as will appear. Nevertheless, that which must be thought, the divine being, cannot be thought to have a term [as in duration]; just as in duration [it cannot be thought to have a term], so neither can it be thought, nor ought it to have, a term in existence and presentiality; and as it cannot be thought to have an interruption in duration, so neither in presentiality. This understanding must be held; let one nonetheless take care how one imagines [it] and expresses [it] through speech.