Dist. 38, Art. 2, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/1/d/38/q/bon-sent-I-d38-a2-q1
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### Article II.
#### *On foreknowledge with respect to the account of necessity.*

Consequently there is a question concerning the second article, namely, on divine foreknowledge with respect to the account of necessity. And about this two things are asked. First it is asked whether divine foreknowledge imposes necessity on the foreknown. Second, whether divine foreknowledge has necessity in itself.

### Question I.
#### *Whether God's foreknowledge imposes necessity on things foreknown.*

That divine foreknowledge imposes necessity is shown thus.

1. Anselm in the book *On the Concordance of Foreknowledge and Free Choice*: "What God has foreknown, it is necessary that it be future."

2. Likewise, by reason thus: "From a major premise concerning the necessary and a minor premise concerning the *de inesse* (in-being), there is always concluded a proposition concerning the necessary," as the Philosopher says in the first book of the *Prior Analytics*. Let then such a syllogism be made: every foreknown thing is necessarily going to be — this is clear by Anselm — but this thing, whatever be pointed out, is foreknown: therefore it is necessarily going to be.

3. Likewise, everything that God foreknows is true; but as the Philosopher says in the first book of *On Interpretation*: "Everything that is, when it is, must necessarily be": therefore if it is now true, it is necessary that what is foreknown be now true. And the future is foreknown: therefore now it is necessary that it be future: therefore it will come about by necessity.

4. Likewise, the same thing is shown by [reduction to the] impossible: God foreknows something on the affirmative side; I ask therefore whether it could not be: if it could not, then it is necessary; if it could, then it can come about otherwise than as God foreknows: therefore divine foreknowledge is fallible and uncertain. And this is the argument of Augustine and also of Boethius in the fifth book of *On Consolation*: "If foreseen things can be turned otherwise than as they were foreseen, then there will no longer be a firm foreknowledge of the future."

5. Likewise, God foreknows that something will be future: either then it is possible for it not to be future, or it is impossible: if it is impossible for it not to be, therefore it is necessary that it be; but if it is possible, then since every possible is *ponibile* (capable of being posited), and when a false possible has been posited as in being, what follows is not impossible. Let it be posited, then, that this thing not be; and God has foreknown this thing to be: therefore God has foreknown a falsehood. But this is impossible: therefore one of the preceding [premises] is impossible.

**On the contrary:**

1. That it does not introduce necessity is shown by the authority of Augustine, taken from a likeness, in the book *On Free Choice*: "Just as my memory does not compel things to have happened that have already passed, so God's foreknowledge does not compel things to be done that are future."

2. Likewise, the same thing is shown by reason: let us understand that God foreknows nothing — therefore from this nothing accrues to free choice; therefore the positing of foreknowledge takes nothing from it: therefore, since free choice is of itself a cause of things in either direction and of contingents, divine foreknowledge does not take this away.

3. Likewise, as has been proved above, divine foreknowledge in many cases is either not the cause, or not the entire cause; but that which gives necessity to anything has the account of a cause, since from that which is comes being, and necessary being: since therefore divine foreknowledge is not the cause of many future things, such as evils, it imposes no necessity on things.

4. Likewise, divine foreknowledge foreknows things as they are going to come about, since it foreknows nothing but the true: therefore when it foreknows that someone will sin, since sin is only by the will, it foreknows that this person will do this through his will, and it foreknows that he could do otherwise. Therefore if everything that it foreknows is true, it is true that this man will do this through his will and will be able to do otherwise; and if this is contingent: therefore, since with divine foreknowledge there is contingency about things, there is therefore not necessity.

5. Likewise, the same is shown by reasonings leading to an impossible. If foreknowledge imposes necessity on things, then chance and fortune perish. The second impossible is that free choice and counsel perish. The third, that merit and demerit perish. The fourth, that praise and blame perish.

### Conclusion.

> *Divine foreknowledge does not impose necessity on things, but rather foreknows the very mode of contingency of contingent things.*

**I respond:** It must be said that there were three positions about this.

For some said that foreknowledge, since it is infallible, necessarily imposes necessity, and so they took away free choice and sin. And this position was heretical and iniquitous, because it destroys good morals.

Another position was that divine foreknowledge, if it existed, would impose necessity, and so all virtue and praise would perish. And because they loved the commonwealth, they took away foreknowledge from God, and from propositions about the future they took away truth. — And this was heretical and impious, because it derogates from the divine nobility.

The third position is the catholic one, which honors God and preserves good morals, and is therefore just, pious and true: namely, that divine foreknowledge exists, and yet it does not impose necessity on things. For it foreknows all things to be going to come about exactly as they are going to come about; and therefore, since many things are going to come about contingently, like those that are from free choice and from chance and fortune, just as it foreknows that these things will be future from these [causes], so it foreknows the mode of contingency according to which they are from these.

For the understanding of the objections it should be noted that necessity is twofold, namely *absolute* and *relative*. *Absolute necessity*, which is opposed to contingency, is called the necessity *of the consequent*. *Relative necessity* is called the necessity *of the consequence*; and this is not opposed to the contingent. For some contingent thing necessarily follows, as if he walks, it necessarily follows that he is moved.

**Replies to the affirmative arguments:**

*To 1.* It must be said, then, that in the foreknown there is no absolute necessity, but only [necessity] of the consequence, since it follows necessarily: God foreknows this, therefore this will be. And in this way is to be understood the authority of Anselm, and the like authorities, which are propounded with the mode of necessity; and so the first is clear.

*To 2.* As to what is objected secondly about the syllogism from a major *de necessario* and a minor *de inesse*; it must be said that, as is clear, and as the Philosopher expounds, this is to be understood of that proposition which is *de inesse simpliciter*, which is equivalent to the necessary; but the minor of this syllogism, namely, *this is foreknown*, is not *de inesse simpliciter*; for as will be clear below, it is not necessary.

*To 3.* As to what is objected concerning the foreknown, that it is true, and if it is true, it is now necessarily so; it must be said that the Philosopher makes this argument to show that in future things there is no truth; and it is sophistical. For when it is said: *everything that is, when it is, is necessarily*; it is understood of that which posits something in act about the supposit, in such a way that, since it has been posited, it is impossible for it not to be posited; but the true about the future posits nothing about the subject, since it is not true for the present, but only for the future: and therefore there is no necessity, neither absolutely, nor as-of-now, since it posits nothing as-of-now.

*To 4.* As to what is objected by [reduction to the] impossible, that if it could be otherwise, it could be deceived etc.; it must be said that falsity comes from a discord between the intellect and what is known, just as the power of being deceived comes from the power of discord. I say therefore, since the foreknown follows necessarily upon foreknowledge, that they cannot discord: and therefore [foreknowledge] is never deceived, nor can it be deceived.

*To 5.* As to what is objected, whether it could be otherwise; it must be said that it could be otherwise, because God could have foreknown otherwise; and when it is posited that it be otherwise, it is posited that he foreknows otherwise. When therefore it is inferred: it can be otherwise than it is: and God foreknew thus: therefore otherwise than God foreknows — the conclusion must be distinguished: because it can be understood divisively, and so it is true; and the sense is: God foreknows this can come about, and it is possible that it not come about; but if [taken] compositely, [it is] false; and the sense is: it is possible that what God foreknows in one way come about in another. And there is a fallacy of composition in that process, as here: *the running man can not-be-moved*: therefore it is possible that someone be running and not be moved; this does not follow. Likewise, when it is asked that something be posited: it is to be posited; but when it assumes: *God has foreknown this*; this is the opposite of what is being posited: and therefore it is to be denied.