Dist. 38
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/1/d/38/q/bon-sent-I-d38-littera
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### DISTINCTION XXXVIII.

#### Chapter I.

*Whether the science or foreknowledge of God is the cause of things, or conversely.*

Now therefore, returning to our subject, let us press on with what was begun. It has been said above that God's foreknowledge concerns only future things, but all of them — both good and evil; whereas [His] science or wisdom [concerns] not only past, but also present and future things, and not only temporal but also eternal — since God knows Himself. Here arises a question not to be passed over, namely whether the science or foreknowledge [of God] is the *cause* of things, or whether things are the cause of God's science or foreknowledge. For God's foreknowledge seems to be the cause of those things which are subject to it, and to make a necessity for them of coming to pass — because no future things would have been, had God not foreknown them, nor can they fail to come to pass, since God has foreknown them. Now if it is impossible for them not to come to pass, because they have been foreknown, it seems then that the very foreknowledge by which they are foreknown is the cause of their coming to pass. But it is impossible for them not to come to pass, since they have been foreknown — because if they were not to come to pass, although they have been foreknown, God's foreknowledge would be deceived. But God's foreknowledge cannot be deceived. It is impossible therefore for them not to come to pass, since they have been foreknown. Thus then foreknowledge seems to be the cause of those things which have been foreknown. The same too is said of [God's] science: namely that, because God knows certain things, therefore they are. To which opinion Augustine seems to bear witness in the fifteenth book *On the Trinity*, saying thus: « These things God did not come to know from any [point in] time; but all future temporal things — and in them too what and when we were going to ask of Him, and whom and concerning what matters He would or would not hearken — He foreknew, without [any] beginning, beforehand. All creatures, however, both spiritual and corporeal, He knows not because they are, but they are because He knows; for He was not ignorant of what He was going to create: because therefore He knew, He created — not because He created, He knew; nor did He know things created otherwise than [He knew them as] to be created. For nothing has accrued to His wisdom from them, but, with them existing as it was fitting and when it was fitting, [His wisdom] remained as it was ». Whence in Ecclesiasticus: *Before they were created, all things are known to Him; so also after they are completed*. — Behold, by these words Augustine seems to suggest that God's science or foreknowledge is the cause of those things which are made, when he says they *are* because God *knows*. The same [Augustine] also in the sixth book seems to say: « When, he says, times pass away and follow, [yet] nothing passes away or follows for God's science,

in which He knows all things which He has made through it. For these things which have been created are not known by God because they have been made, but rather they have been made because they are immutably known by Him ». — And here too he seems to signify that God's science is the cause of those things which are made, saying that God did not know them because they have been made, but they were made because God knows them. And therefore God's science or foreknowledge seems to be the cause of those things which He knows.

But if this is so, then [God's science] is the Cause of all evils too, since all evils are known and foreknown by God — which is far from the truth. For if God's science or foreknowledge were the cause of evils, surely God would be the author of evils, which is utterly false. Therefore God's science or foreknowledge is not the cause of all things which are subject to it.

Nor again are future things the cause of God's foreknowledge: for although they would not be future, were they not foreknown by God, yet they are not foreknown for the reason that they are future. For if this were so, then there would exist a cause of that which is eternal, [a cause] foreign to it and diverse from it; and the Creator's foreknowledge would depend on creatures, and the created would be the cause of the uncreated. Origen, however, on the Epistle to the Romans says: « Not for the reason that something will be, does God know it as future; but because it is future, therefore it is known by God, before it comes to be ». This seems to run contrary to the foregoing words of Augustine. For here it seems to be signified that future things are the cause of foreknowledge; but there, that foreknowledge is the cause of future things.

Wishing therefore to remove from our midst this apparent contradiction, we say that future things are by no means the cause of God's foreknowledge or science, nor are they foreknown or known *because* they are future or accomplished; thus expounding what Origen says — namely that *because it is future, therefore it is known by God before it comes to be* — that is, what is future is known by God before it comes to be, and would not be known if it were not future, so that nothing is here noted as cause except a *sine qua non* without which it would not happen. So too we say that the science or foreknowledge of God is not the cause of those things which are made, except such [a cause] without which they are not made — provided we refer *science* to bare cognition only. But if under the name of *science* there is included also good-pleasure and disposition, then [science] can rightly be called the cause of those things which God does. For in these two ways, as has been laid down above, is God's cognition or science taken: namely either for bare cognition, or for cognition together with good-pleasure. In this latter way perhaps Augustine took [it] when saying: *They are because He knows* — that is, because it pleased the One knowing, and because the One knowing has disposed [it]. And this sense is supported by [the fact] that there Augustine treats only of good things — namely of creatures and of those things which God does — all of which He knows not by science alone but also by good-pleasure and disposition. Thus then there God's cognition is taken so as to signify not only knowledge but also God's good-pleasure.

But evils God knows and foreknows before they come to be — yet by bare cognition only, not by good-pleasure. For God foreknows and even foretells things which He Himself is not going to do, just as He foreknew and foretold the unbelief of the Jews, but did not bring [it] about. Nor for the reason that He foreknew [it] did He compel them to the sin of unbelief; nor would He have foreknown or foretold their evils, had they not been about to have them. Whence Augustine on John: « God, he says, foreknowing future things, foretold through the Prophet the unbelief of the Jews, but did not make [them so]; nor would He have foreknown their evils, had they not [been going to] have them. For He does not for that reason compel anyone to sin, because He has foreknown the future sins of men: for He foreknew their sins, not His own. And therefore if those things which He foreknew of them are not theirs, then He did not truly foreknow [them]. But because His foreknowledge cannot be deceived, without doubt it is not someone else but they themselves who sin, whom God has foreknown to be sinners. And therefore if they had wished to do not evil but good, they would not be foreseen as about to do evil by Him who knows what each is going to do ». — By these words it is openly shown — if we attend diligently — that the foreknowledge of God is not the cause of the evils which He foreknows, since He does not foreknow them as one about to do [them], nor as His own, but as those of the men who are going to do or have them. He has therefore foreknown those [evils] by mere cognition only, not by good-pleasure of authority. Whence it is given to be understood that God conversely foreknows good things as His own, as things which He is going to do — so that in foreknowing them there is at the same time His cognition and the good-pleasure of [His] authority.

#### Chapter II.

*Whether the foreknowledge of God can be deceived.*

To that, however, which has been said above — namely that God's foreknowledge cannot be deceived — it is wont to be objected by certain [persons] thus: God foreknew that this man would read, or some such thing; but it can be that this [man] does not read; therefore it can be otherwise than God foreknew; therefore God's foreknowledge can be deceived. — Which [objection] is utterly false. Something can indeed *not* come to pass, and yet [the same thing] is foreknown to come to pass; nor for that reason however can God's foreknowledge be deceived — since if that [thing] were not to come to pass, neither would it have been foreknown by God to come to pass.

But still they press the question, saying: either it can be made otherwise than God has foreknown, or not otherwise; if not otherwise, then all things come to pass necessarily; if however otherwise, then God's foreknowledge can be deceived or changed. But [you say:] *it can be made otherwise* — because it can be made otherwise than [actually] is made; but it is so made as it has been foreknown; *therefore* it can be made otherwise than has been foreknown. — To which we say that this manner of speech makes the meaning manifold, namely: *it can be made otherwise than God has foreknown*, and the like — as: *it is possible for that not to be which God has foreknown*; and: *it is impossible for that not to be which God has foreknown*; and: *it is impossible that all things which are made should not have been foreknown*, and the like. For these can be understood conjunctively, so that the condition is implicit, and disjunctively. For if you understand thus — *it cannot be made otherwise than God has foreknown*, that is, both [things] cannot be at once, namely that God should have foreknown [it] to be made [in one way], and [yet] [that] it should be made otherwise — you understand truly. But if you understand by disjunction, so as to say *this cannot come to pass otherwise than it comes to pass, and in the way in which God has foreknown [it] as future*, [it is] false. For this can come to pass otherwise than it comes to pass, and yet God has foreknown [it] as future in this way. Similarly also the other determination, namely: *it is impossible for that not to come to pass which God has foreknown*, or: *since God has foreknown it* — if conjunctively, you understand [it], you say truly; if disjunctively, falsely. So too that: *it is impossible for everything that comes to pass not to have been foreknown*, that is, both [things] cannot be at once, namely that something should come to pass and not have been foreknown — this sense is true. But if you say *God could not not have foreknown everything that comes to pass*, [it is] false. For He could have brought it about that it should not come to pass, and so [it] would not have been foreknown.

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