Dist. 39, Art. 2, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/1/d/39/q/bon-sent-I-d39-a2-q1
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### Article II.
#### *On the mode of divine cognition.*

Consequently there is a question about the second article, namely, on the mode of divine cognition. And concerning this three things are asked.

First, it is asked whether God knows himself and other things uniformly.

Second, whether he knows mutable things immutably.

Third, whether he knows all things presentially.

### Question I.
#### *Whether God knows himself and other things in the same way.*

That he knows himself and other things in the same way, that is, uniformly, is shown thus.

1. The knowledge of God is his essence, and his to-know is his to-be; therefore the mode of knowing also is the mode of being; but there is one essential mode of being in God: therefore there is also one mode of knowing.

2. Likewise, God knows himself by himself and not by another, and he knows other things by himself and not by another; therefore he knows himself and other things by one and the same *ratio*; but the mode of knowing is taken according to the *ratio* of knowing: therefore if there is the same *ratio* of knowing himself and other things, [there is] also the same mode, and so on.

3. Likewise, this same thing seems [to follow] *per impossibile*, because if he knows himself in another way [and] creatures in another way: therefore when he knows himself and creatures, he is varied in knowing; therefore in God there is transmutation and the shadow of vicissitude.

4. Likewise, if [he knows] in another way, then I ask: either that mode is the Creator, or a creature. Not a creature, since the cognition and the mode of knowing is eternal; if [it is] the Creator, [it expresses] either something personal, or something essential. Not something personal, since every cognition is common to the three; therefore it expresses something essential: therefore if [there is] one mode and another, then [there is] one essence and another; but this is impossible: therefore also the first [is impossible].

**On the contrary:**

1. God, by knowing things other than himself, knows through an idea, but he does not know himself through an idea: therefore if to know through an idea expresses the mode of cognition, and he does not know himself through an idea, it is plain that [he knows himself] in another mode of knowing; and so on.

2. Likewise, in the cognition by which God knows himself, the knower and the known and the *ratio* of knowing are the same; but in the cognition by which he knows the creature, the *ratio* of knowing is not the same as the known: therefore not the same mode.

3. Likewise, nothing is common to the Creator and the creature according to the *ratio* of being, therefore neither according to the *ratio* of knowing: since therefore the being of the creature is other than that of the Creator, and another mode of being [obtains]: therefore [the creature] is known by another cognition and in another mode than the Creator. If therefore [the creature] is known by God in another mode, and to know the creature and to know God are the same [act], then God knows himself and other things in another mode.

4. Likewise, every cognition in which the known is more noble, more present, and more intelligible is a more noble cognition, namely as regards the thing and the mode. As regards the thing, since [it is] of a more noble thing; as regards the mode, since [it is] of a more present thing. But in the cognition by which God knows himself, the known is more noble, more present, and more intelligible than in the cognition of the creature: therefore [it is] a more noble cognition as regards the thing and the mode.

### Conclusion.

> *By one cognition and in the same way God knows himself and the things other than himself.*

**I respond:** It must be said that there is a certain cognition which is caused and takes its origin from the knowable: and this one, since it is caused by and depends on the knowable, is varied according to the requirement of the knowable as regards thing and mode. There is also another cognition which according to the thing is the same as the knower and is neither caused nor depends on the knowable: and this one receives identity as regards thing and mode from the side of the knower, not from the side of the known.

Since therefore divine cognition does not depend on things and is not caused [by them], but is the same as God, and God is keeping himself in the same essence and in the same mode: therefore by one cognition and in the same way God knows himself and the things other than himself, since [he is] in no way varied or diversified through himself.

For the understanding of the objections, however, it must be noted that with respect to the knower the cognition is compared in the same way and is in the same way, since according to that comparison it has being; and so the first arguments proceed, showing that he knows himself and other things in the same way. With respect to the known, although it is in the same way, yet it is compared in another way: for to God [it is compared] according to the *ratio* of identity, to the creature according to the *ratio* of diversity and of causality, and therefore to the creature according to the *ratio* of being-an-idea-[for], but to God by no means; and this the arguments adduced for the second part prove, that it is compared in another way, and in this way it must be conceded. If therefore one infers that it is in another way, the argument is not valid, since the cognition of God does not receive its mode of being or nobility from the known.

**To the arguments on the opposite side:**

*To 1. 2.* And so the two objects [of the cognition] — concerning idea and diversity — are made plain.

*To 3.* To that which is objected in the third [argument], that nothing is common to the Creator and the creature; it must be said that [this] is true of community according to the same comparison; but according to one and another [comparison] nothing prohibits that something be a truth of the creature and a likeness of God, and likewise that something be a truth of God and a likeness of the creature. And since the *ratio* of knowing is taken according to either mode, the cognition can be common.

*To 4.* To that which is objected last, it must be said that [it] holds when the cognition is caused by the known; but it does not hold when it is not caused, as in [the present] case.