Dist. 39, Dubia
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/1/d/39/q/bon-sent-I-d39-dubia
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### DOUBTS CONCERNING THE TEXT OF THE MASTER.

#### DOUBT I.

In this part there are doubts concerning the text, and first concerning what Augustine says: *The Father and the Son know each other, but this one by being born, that one by begetting.* For he seems to speak ill, because *to know* is something essential in divine things: therefore if [the Son] knows by being born, since *to be born* states a personal property, a personal property would be the account of an essential reality, which is neither soundly nor truly said.

**I respond:** Some wished to say that the knowing of God, when referred to creatures, or [taken] thus that one person knows himself, is said *essentially*; but inasmuch as one person knows another, it states a respect of person to person and is said *notionally*. — But this is not fittingly said, because, as has been laid down in the preceding, *wisdom* and *to be wise* are said only essentially.

And therefore it must be said that that ablative does not only state cause or the account of saying [it], but the account of *concomitance*. For *gerunds*, as Priscian says, have to be expounded by *si* (if), or by *dum* (while), or by *quia* (because); and in the first mode they state agreement, in the second concomitance, and in the third cause.

#### DOUBT II.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says: *And all things which are in their wisdom and in their essence, each of them sees at once.* But above, in the thirty-sixth distinction, it was said that creatures are in God's cognition, but not in God's essence: therefore there is a contradiction.

**I respond:** It must be said that in the divine knowledge there are *knowables*, but in the divine essence there are *attributes*, such as power, wisdom and goodness. And Augustine wishes to say that the Father and the Son together see all knowables, both created and to be created, and all the attributes of the essence. Hence the text must be read divisively: *all things which are in their knowledge*, namely created [things], each one knows at once; likewise *all things which are in their essence*, namely the attributes, they know at once or each one knows. And therefore he does not wish to say that creatures are in the divine essence.

#### DOUBT III.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says, that *the knowledge of God is only of those things which are or have been or will be.* For this seems false, because God knows everything that he can do; but he can do what never was nor is nor will be: therefore the knowledge of God is of something which never was or is or will be. And furthermore, it is of infinites, as Augustine wills [in] *On the City of God* eleven, not only of those things which are or have been or will be.

**I respond:** It must be said that the Master is speaking of the *knowledge of vision* (*scientia visionis*), which is only of those things of which there was foresight from eternity; but he objects from the *knowledge of intelligence* (*scientia intelligentiae*), which connotes the existence of nothing; which is plain. For God understands everything which he can [understand], and so the objection does not run rightly.

#### DOUBT IV.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says, that *he cannot begin to know or foreknow* etc. For he seems to speak ill, because nothing is known except [what is] true: therefore before it is true, it is not known: therefore if something begins to be true, something begins to be known by God: therefore God can begin to know something. — Likewise, creation is the divine essence, and yet by reason of the connoted [term] God can begin to create something: therefore likewise also to know something.

**I respond:** *To know* is said in two ways. In one way *to know* is the same as to have cognition of something; and thus it does not connote the actual existence of the known, and thus God cannot begin to know anything, that is, to begin to have cognition of something. In another way *to know* is the same as *to be acquainted that something is true*, and this is then first known to be true, when it begins to be; and thus God begins to know, and likewise ceases to foreknow, not by reason of the principal signified, which is *knowledge*, but by reason of the connoted [term], which is the truth of the thing known.

#### DOUBT V.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says: *Nor can he newly or in time will anything, and yet he can will what he never willed.* For he seems here to say two contradictorily opposed things, since that is *new* which previously was not and now is: therefore if he could will what he previously did not will, it seems that he begins to will.

**I respond:** It must be said that when I say *God wills this*, I say two things: both the act of the divine will, and further the ordering of the effect itself to that act. And the first is indeed necessary and ever-abiding, nor can it begin nor cease. For the divine will is always in its act, such that it can neither lack that act nor have another; but the ordering of some effect to that act is the ordering of a future thing, which is not yet, and therefore it can be and not be, can be ordered and not ordered. When therefore it is said: *God can will what he never willed, and yet not in time*; the sense is that that effect could be ordered to the divine willing; and since the ordering of the effect is the ordering of a future thing, and what is once future was always future, and what is once ordered was always ordered to it. When therefore it is said that God can will something, it is the same as to say that something could be future or have an order to the divine will, which yet does not have [such] order; but if it had, it would have had it from eternity, and therefore it does not begin from time. And so the Master's example is good, if God's willing imports an order to the willed in the character of *future*; but inasmuch as it imports concomitance in the character of *present*, God can in time will this to be, or to approve this today, not because the act begins, but because the connoted [term] begins.

#### DOUBT VI.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says, that *he has special care for rational [creatures]*; since this seems to be against what is said in Wisdom 6: *His care is equal for all.*

**I respond:** It must be said that *equally* does not there exclude the order of the divine distribution, but excludes respect of persons. And he distributes [his care] to all there only as regards human beings, yet for great and small, poor and rich; and thus he has equally care for all, because he so wills the salvation of the poor as of the rich.

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