Dist. 4, Art. 1, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/1/d/4/q/bon-sent-I-d4-a1-q1
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### Sole Article.
### Question I. *Whether this expression should be conceded: God begot God.*

Concerning the first [point], that this expression — God begot God — should be conceded:

1. It seems so, by what is said in the Creed: *God from God*; but this is only by generation: therefore God is generated from God: therefore this expression should be conceded: God begot God.

2. Likewise, generation is with respect to a like in nature, whence "man generates man"; whence if in divine matters there is generation, a like in nature is produced: therefore, since the Father is God, He generates only God: therefore this is true: God generates God.

3. Likewise, whatever the Son has, He has either from Himself or from another; but He has the deity, and not from Himself, since [if so] He would be unbegotten: therefore He has it from another; but He has it only through generation, and He has the deity only from one having the deity, and the one having the deity is God: therefore etc.

**On the contrary:**

1. The name *God* signifies essence or substance, since it is a substantial term; but this is not conceded, rather it is false: the essence generates the essence: therefore likewise this also: God begot God.

2. Likewise, the name *God* either supposits for every person, or determinately for some [one]. If determinately for some [one]: then its signification is restricted by something, and there is no other [source] from which [it could be restricted] except from this verb *begot* or *generates*. But the rule is that a term placed in the predicate does not restrict a term on the side of the subject by reason of its signification: therefore it stands for every person. Therefore the expression does not seem true insofar as it is taken for the person of the Son: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, this term *God*, so far as it is in itself, supposits equally well for the Son as for the Father: therefore, since it belongs to the Son not to generate, just as it belongs to the Father to generate, if this is true: God generates, for the Father, then by the same reasoning this also: God does not generate, for the Son; if therefore the latter is not conceded, neither [should] the first [be conceded].

4. Likewise, contradictorily opposed [statements] are true of anything under disjunction, since of anything [there is] either affirmation or negation: therefore if God begot God, [He begot] either God who is the Father, or God who is not the Father. If God who is the Father, then the begotten is the begetter; if God who is not the Father — but what is implied may simply be inferred, as if it be said: "the man who is not running, is disputing": therefore the man is not running: so likewise, if He begot God who is not the Father, [then] God is not the Father; but if He is not the Father, He does not generate: therefore etc.

> **Conclusion.** It is rightly said: God to have begotten God, which is proved by four rules.

**I respond:** It must be said that the foregoing expression, the unity of the essence being preserved, is received both by the masters and by the saints. For the understanding of which, four rules are to be noted.

*The first* is that an abstract noun is imposed on the form and from the form, as *whiteness* is imposed on whiteness itself and from the form of whiteness; but a concrete noun is imposed from the form, but not on the form, but on the supposit: as *white* is imposed from the form of whiteness, but not on the form, but on the supposit, namely on some white thing, on a man or a swan.

*The second* rule is that a term having a multitude of supposits, taken without distribution, stands for that for which it renders the expression true, as when it is said: "man runs," the expression is true for the runner, if there be someone running.

*The third* rule is that for a term having a non-multipliable form, it makes no difference to place the negation before or after. Whence it makes no difference to say: "Peter is not running," and "not Peter is running."

*The fourth* rule is this: that the relative refers the antecedent under the same mode of suppositing under which the antecedent preceded the relative itself, unless it makes a simple relation.

1. From the first rule, the response to the first [argument] is clear. For since this term *God* is concrete, although it is imposed from the essential form, namely the deity, nevertheless it is imposed on the person or supposit, just as *white* is imposed from whiteness on a white thing; and therefore it supposits and renders the expression true for a person, not for a form. But this name *essence* or *deity* is abstract, and therefore is imposed on the form and from the form, like *whiteness*, and therefore it signifies and supposits the essence. And therefore this is false: the essence generates the essence, because generation is not of a form, but of a supposit; but this is true: God begot God, [taken] for a person.

2. From the second rule, the response to the second [argument] is clear. For although the signification of the term is not narrowed, nevertheless it stands for that for which the expression is true, as "man runs" [stands] for Peter or for John, if for him the expression is true; and yet it is not [thereby] restricted to him. And this is clear, because if distribution be added, it will confound that term [to stand] for all; but if it were restricted, it would not confound except for those to whom the restriction would extend. Whence it is one thing for a term to be restricted to one, and another thing to render the expression true for one.

3. From the third rule, the solution to the third is clear. For although this is true for the Father: God generates God, nevertheless this: God does not generate God, is not true for the Son. For since this term *God* names a non-multipliable form, it makes no difference to place the negation before or after it; and therefore, since the negation placed before altogether removes the predicate from the subject, so also the negation placed after totally removes the predicate from this term *God*, when it is said: God does not generate, because it removes [the predicate] from any supposit. And therefore it has another mode of suppositing in the affirmative than in the negative, because in the affirmative the expression was true for the Father; in the negative, however, there cannot be truth, because the negation totally removes that predicate.

4. From the fourth rule, the fourth is clear. For since the relative entirely has the supposition of the antecedent, and this term *God* in the predicate supposits for God begotten, the relative refers for that. And so the sense is: God begot God, who [God] begotten is the Father, or is not the Father; and this is true for the negative [reading], nor is it permitted to infer: therefore God is not the Father; because the supposition is changed, indeed there is here a *figure of speech*.