Dist. 4, Art. 1, Q. 2
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/1/d/4/q/bon-sent-I-d4-a1-q2
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### Question II. *Whether this expression can be admitted: God generates another God.*

Secondly it is asked whether the unity of the essence admits this: *God generates another God.* And that it does not, seems [to be the case].

1. Anselm, *On the Procession of the Holy Spirit*: "When we say *God from God*, we do not understand another God, but the same one from himself."

2. Likewise, if he generated another God; but where there is one and another, there are two: therefore if he generated another, there are two gods.

3. Likewise, *alius* (another) signifies otherness in general: therefore since the general is specified through what is adjoined, this name *Deus* (God) specifies it; but if it specifies, it specifies by reason of the form: therefore otherness is marked in the form: therefore such an expression is not to be admitted, since there is no otherness there in the form.

**On the contrary:**

1. Generation imports distinction; but distinction [imports] some otherness: therefore so does generation; therefore if this is true: *God generated God*, then this consequently: *God is distinguished from God*, or *he generated another God*. If you say that it does not follow, because to generate imports distinction as a mode, but to be distinguished or to be another as a thing; on the contrary: upon

a consequence as a mode follows a consecution as a thing; whence if this is true: *if a man exists, an animal exists*, upon "man" follows "animal." And besides, it is established that the distinction of generation is not only on the side of the one understanding, but truly also on the side of the thing: therefore to that distinction as exercised there corresponds a real distinction.

2. Likewise, the affirmative is false: *God generated is God generating*; therefore the negative is true: *God generated is not God generating.* But just as the affirmative signifies identity, so the negative [signifies] diversity: therefore just as God generating and [God] generated happen to be compared with one another by means of negation, so by means of otherness: therefore this is true: *God generated another God.*

3. Likewise, the Father or God generated another; this is true, it is established: therefore either another God, or another non-God; but not another non-God: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, *alius* is a term of masculine gender; but a term of masculine gender stands for a person in partitive terms: therefore *alius* signifies personal otherness; but this is true: *God generated another God in person*; therefore this is simply true: *God generated another God.*

### Conclusion.

> In the strict sense of the words the expression is false: *God generated another God.*

**I respond:** It must be said that this is customarily distinguished: *God generated another God*, because *alius* can be taken *adjectivally*; and thus it places otherness around the form of this term *Deus*, and so the expression is false; it can also be taken *substantivally*, so that it be substantivized; and then it is an appositive construction, as in *animal homo* (animal-man), and the sense is in this way: *God generated another God*, that is, *he generated another who is God*; and in this sense the expression is true.

But although this distinction has place in theological expressions on account of a certain proper mode of speaking, nevertheless as far as concerns the strict force of the discourse, it should not be distinguished; because an adjective adjoined to a substantive, as *homo albus* (white man), is not said to be substantivized, nor is an appositive construction said to be there, especially since that [appositive construction] is less common with respect to the more common. Whence since this name *alius* is an adjective having a substantive joined [to it], in the aforesaid expression it places otherness around it by reason of the supposit and of the form.

And therefore, if we wish to proceed artificially [i.e., strictly by the rules of the arts], such an expression must be judged false. On account of this, for the understanding of the said expression, a common rule must be noted: distinction has no place where there is not union from diverse causes — for example, the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are united in this name *Deus*, not from diverse causes or by reason of diverse [things], but by reason of one deity or essence. Union from diverse causes is, as in [the case of] man, Peter and John are united by reason of diverse humanities, because Peter's humanity is one, and John's another.

And alongside this rule, from opposites, another rule must be received: complete union has no place where there is, together with union, distinction, as the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are united in one deity or essence, but they have distinction by reason of the plurality of persons.

According to this it must be attended to, that in divine matters certain words import distinction only, certain ones complete union, certain ones a middle mode. Therefore, since God generating and God generated, although they are personally distinct, nevertheless in the deity are united from the same cause, because by one deity: therefore names importing distinction simply are not received. Therefore this is not admitted: *God is distinguished from God*, similarly: *God generated another God.* Likewise, by reason of distinction words importing complete union in supposit and form are not received: whence this is not received: *God generated himself.* But those which hold themselves in a middle mode are received, of which sort is this verb *generates*, because it states distinction in person with unity of essence. Similarly this is conceded: *the Father generates another self.* Whence Augustine, *to Maximinus*: "The Father generated another self"; and similarly on John: "The Father, sending the Son, sent another self." And from this it is, that there does not follow upon the word [taken] simply [a] distinction; and so the first [argument] is plain.

2. To that which is objected secondly concerning negation, I well concede that there is otherness; but nevertheless it does not follow that otherness can be said in essence or in the form of deity. Whence it does not follow: *the generated is other than the one generating*, therefore *another God*, because the supposition of this term *Deus* is changed.

3. To that which is objected thirdly: *either another God, or another non-God*; I say that it does not divide sufficiently; because there is no contradiction unless the negation is taken with respect to the whole. For in this [proposition]: *he generated another God*, two things are said, namely that *God generated God*, and that *another in deity*: and therefore for this, that a contradiction be taken, it is necessary that it be borne over the whole. Whence just as it does not hold, when a black-clad monk who is white by nature has been pointed out: *he is either a white monk, or a white non-monk*, since both are false; similarly it must be understood in the proposed [case]. Nor does it hold: *he is God and he is another: therefore he is another God*, rather there is an accident there, just as here: *he is good and he is a citharist: therefore he is a good citharist*.

4. To that which is objected last, it must be said, that *alius*, although it is of masculine gender, nevertheless because it places the thing around a substantive, draws its supposition from it; and therefore is not taken personally, except insofar as it is substantivized, just as also this name *unus* (one); whence just as if one were to say *unus Deus* (one God), *unus* signifies substantial unity, so if one were to say *alius Deus*, *alius* signifies substantial otherness. And the reason for this comes not only because [*alius*] is an adjective, but because [it is] general, which is specified through what is adjoined.