Dist. 40, Art. 1, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/1/d/40/q/bon-sent-I-d40-a1-q1
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### Article I.
#### *On predestination as regards its entity.*

### Question I.
#### *Whether predestination is something eternal or temporal.*

That predestination is something eternal seems [to be the case]:

1. Because what is before the foundation of the world is something eternal; predestination is of this sort, since predestination is election, [as] in *Ephesians* 1: *"He chose us before the foundation of the world"*: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, "*predestination is the foreknowledge of [God's] benefits*"; but whatever God foreknows, he foreknows from eternity: therefore since all foreknowledge is eternal, and all predestination is foreknowledge, all predestination is eternal.

3. Likewise, "*predestination is the purpose of having mercy*"; but a purpose is something of the one purposing, preceding the things which are proposed: therefore since it is the purpose of God, and God purposes from eternity, it is plain etc.

4. Likewise, by the *ratio* of its name, *predestination* says a precession or antecedence — but only of the predestiner to the predestined; but the predestiner is eternal: therefore it says an order and antecedence of the eternal to the temporal. But that antecedence is eternal: therefore etc.

**On the contrary:**

1. Predestination involves a relation to the predestined; but every relation places a true respect either in both extremes, or at least in one; but predestination cannot place a true respect in the predestiner: therefore it places a true respect in the predestined. But a true respect is founded only on something created: therefore predestination says something created and temporal.

2. Likewise, predestination involves an action, and to every action a passion corresponds: therefore since action and passion are not in the same [subject] — for the predestiner and the predestined are not the same — it is necessary that [the passion] be in another. But "another" is nothing but something temporal and created: therefore predestination involves something temporal and created: therefore it is not eternal.

3. Likewise, predestination involves an order of the predestiner to the predestined, either then according to the being which it has in God, or according to the being which it has in its proper genus. Not according to the being which it has in God, since thus it is God and does not follow God: therefore according to the being which it has in its proper genus. But the being which it has in its proper genus is something temporal and created: therefore predestination [is] likewise: and so etc.

4. Likewise, every divine act which is not bent back upon the essence or person passes outward, and every act passing outward is said of God from time: therefore since predestination does not pass into the person or essence, but outward, therefore it is temporal.

5. Likewise, predestination is preparation; but nothing is said to be prepared before something begins to come-to-be according to intrinsic principles — for an artisan is not said to prepare a house by mere thought before the wood and stones — therefore it is necessary that it be placed in the thing.

### Conclusion.

> *Predestination is eternal, by reason of [its] principal significate and of [its] antecedence to its connotatum.*

**I respond:** It must be said that in predestination there are only two [things], namely the principal significate and the connotatum. The principal significate is the divine essence; the connotatum, however, is the creature, namely grace and glory and the person to-be-saved. And these two [things] predestination involves, with the order of antecedence of one to the other by reason of [its] preposition.

Since therefore the principal significate is eternal, so predestination is something eternal. Again, since it involves an antecedence of the significate to the connotatum, and that antecedence is from eternity: therefore predestination is something eternal and from eternity. And the reasonings to this effect are to be granted.

**To the arguments to the contrary:**

*To 1.* To that which is objected concerning relation, it must be said that a thing or relation can be signified in God in two ways: either with respect to one existing in act, or with respect to one existing in potency, [as] one to be at some time in act; and when [it is signified] with respect to one existing in act, then it is necessary that there correspond a true respect in act; but when [it is signified] with respect to one existing in potency, it suffices that [a respect] correspond in potency, and such [a respect] is founded upon being-in-potency; and therefore in act it places nothing but God.

*To 2.* To that which is objected concerning action, it must be said that there is action *according to thing* (*secundum rem*), and there is action *according to mode* (*secundum modum*). To action *secundum rem*, which is the principle efficient of something, there corresponds a passion differing *secundum rem*, as to the action of creating [there corresponds] the passion of being-created. But to action *secundum modum* there corresponds only a passion differing *secundum modum*, as to the action of God's own knowing there corresponds the very being-known; and this is not really another [thing], but [is so only] *secundum modum*. Since therefore predestination does not involve anything except foreknowledge — whether actively or passively — therefore it is something eternal and is not other than God.

*To 3.* To that which is objected concerning order, it must be said that there is order according to nobility and [order] according to duration; and order according to nobility places its extremes [as] simultaneous, but order according to duration, by the very fact that it is order, places [its] extremes [as] not-simultaneous; and according to the *ratio* of antecedence, order is simultaneous with the antecedent, that is, with the preceding [term]; likewise according to the *ratio* of subsequence it is simultaneous with the subsequent [term]. Since therefore predestination involves an order according to the *ratio* of preceding, therefore it is eternal — although it [is] with respect to a temporal [term]; since it is not simultaneous with that [temporal term], but precedes [it].

*To 4.* To that which is objected, that predestination passes outward; it must be said that to-pass-outward is twofold: either into something which is outside, or into something which is within, but will be outside. And in the first mode it connotes something in act and says something temporal, as *to create* and *to conserve*; in the second mode not so, as *to predestine*.

*To 5.* To that which is objected concerning preparation, that it is reckoned according to intrinsic principles, not according to efficient cause; it must be said that there is a certain efficient cause which operates according to a pre-lying matter; and this indeed, since it has need of another, is not said to *prepare* when it only wills and disposes within, but [only] when it fits the matter outwardly. There is [also] a certain efficient cause which has need of nothing for operating, but as soon as it wills, it operates; and in such a one *to prepare* is nothing other than to dispose and propose; and such is God, since he has need of no other beside himself for operating.