Dist. 40, Art. 2, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/1/d/40/q/bon-sent-I-d40-a2-q1
----------------------------------------
### Article II. *On predestination as regards necessity.*

Secondly, with respect to this first article, inquiry is made concerning the necessity of predestination. And about this two things are asked. First it is asked whether it imposes the necessity of salvation on free choice. Secondly, whether it imposes certainty in the outcome.

### Question I.
#### *Whether predestination imposes the necessity of salvation.*

That it does impose necessity is shown thus.

1. *Every* cause which is necessary in itself and necessarily posits its effect imposes necessity simply on the effect; but predestination with respect to salvation is of this kind: therefore etc. The minor is plain. For predestination, since it is God in himself, denotes something necessary; and again, it necessarily imposes its effect, since it necessarily follows: *if he is predestined, he will be saved*: therefore etc.

2. *Likewise*, every cause which can in no way be voided posits necessity in the production of its effect — for a cause is said to be voided when it posits no effect — but predestination can in no way be voided: therefore predestination posits necessity.

3. *Likewise*, whenever two causes concur to some effect, which it is impossible for them to be at variance, if one is immutable, it is necessary that the other be immutable, and the effect consequently. This is plain in itself: for if the other be mutable, while the remaining one is immutable, it is possible for them to be at variance. But it is impossible that predestination and free choice be at variance: therefore since predestination is an immutable cause, it is necessary that free choice be immutable; and if this, since the whole is immutable, it remains then that predestination imposes necessity on free choice and on salvation.

4. *Likewise*, it appears that the predestined can in no way be damned, and if this, then he is necessarily saved; and it is shown by this reasoning: these two are convertible, *to be foreknown* and *to be damned*, *to be predestined* and *to be saved*; but the predestined cannot be foreknown: therefore he cannot be damned. Proof of the middle. When any two are so related that it is impossible for one to succeed the other, nor can they inhere together, if one inheres, it is impossible for the remaining one to inhere; but *to be predestined* and *to be foreknown* are so related, that it is impossible for them to inhere together in the same; it is impossible also for one to succeed the other, namely that a man should first be predestined and afterwards foreknown: therefore since he is predestined, he can in no way be foreknown: therefore etc.

5. *Likewise*, of every thing which is eternal, when it is not, it is impossible that it be, since it is impossible that what is not be eternal; but if a man is foreknown, he is eternally foreknown: therefore him who is not foreknown, it is impossible to be foreknown. But the predestined is not foreknown: therefore etc.

6. *Likewise*, of that which is not, it is the same to say, that *this can be*, and that *it can begin to be*; but *foreknown* is something not-being with respect to the predestined: therefore it is the same to say, *the predestined can be foreknown*, as *he can begin to be foreknown or damned*. But he cannot begin to be foreknown, therefore etc.

**On the contrary:**

1. The divine predestination causes no one to be saved unworthily: therefore since dignity in being saved looks to merit, and merit to free choice, therefore predestination does not take away the freedom of choice, in respect of which it is free choice: therefore neither does it impose necessity.

2. *Likewise*, predestination takes nothing away from free choice, but only places grace in it; but grace imposes no necessity on free choice, neither therefore does predestination: if it imposes no necessity on it, then since salvation depends on free choice, it is plain etc.

3. *Likewise*, if predestination imposes necessity, then since, every contingent case being granted, it is necessary that he who is predestined be saved, therefore in vain does anyone labour to do well; since, whether he do good or ill, it is necessary that he be saved.

4. *Likewise*, no one is praised for that which is of necessity, nor blamed: if therefore it is necessary that the predestined be saved and the foreknown be damned, then neither is the predestined to be praised, if he is saved, nor the foreknown to be blamed, if he is damned; which is contrary to the state of glory and of punishment.

### Conclusion.

> *Predestination, neither by reason of causality nor by reason of foreknowledge, imposes necessity, whether with respect to salvation or with respect to free choice.*

**I respond:** It must be said that predestination neither imposes necessity on salvation, nor imposes necessity on free choice, since predestination is not the cause of salvation save by including merits, and so by saving free choice.

For the understanding of the objections it is to be noted that predestination implies two things: both the character of foreknowledge and the character of cause. Insofar as it denotes the character of cause, it does not necessarily posit its effect, since it is not a cause by necessity, but by will: and again, it is not the whole cause, but together with another contingent cause, namely with free choice. And the rule is, that whenever an effect depends on a necessary and a variable cause — on the necessary as on a universal, on the variable as on a particular — it is denominated from the variable, since denomination is from the particular cause; and the effect, which depends on a contingent cause, is contingent. — Besides the character of cause, it implies the character of foreknowledge; and foreknowledge indeed includes the whole within cognition, since it includes free choice and its cooperation and changeability, and the whole. And besides, it is not save of the true, and even of the contingent true it is infallible, as has been shown above in the question on foreknowledge. Therefore predestination imposes salvation, and cannot be voided nor be at variance with free choice. And since foreknowledge imposes no necessity of the consequent, but only of the consequence, neither does predestination.

*To 1, 2, 3.* From this are plain the first three objections concerning the necessity of imposing, the impossibility of being voided, and the impossibility of being at variance. For all these speak of necessity of consequence only, since they belong to predestination not by reason of causality, but of pre-cognition, which is concordant, certain, and infallible. Concordant, because foreknowledge, or pre-cognition, is true: for he who knows truly knows that the present thing is, just as it is, and that the future will so come about, just as it will come about. For *truth is the adequation of thing and intellect*. It is again certain, because independent, since it depends in no way on the foreknown. For it does not know according to its requirement, but according to the requirement of the eternal light and clarity, in which there falls no doubt, but the highest certitude; and therefore it is equally certain about all things. It is again infallible, since it is wholly encompassing the *posse* of the foreknown; and therefore in nothing can it be deceived nor circumvented. — And there is the example of Boethius in book five *of the Consolation*, that if someone should look from a lofty place at the surrounding region, where there is a multitude of paths, he would see them all together at one glance; one walking through that place, although he can go by diverse paths, could nevertheless not escape his sight, for the reason that he could go by no path which that one would not see. If therefore one sight be understood, which could foresee all the paths and the whole *posse* of the goer, in no way could anyone forestalling him escape him. And such is the gaze of divine foreknowledge, since from eternity it knew everything that we could think or will; and at the same time with this it saw to which side our will and operation would be inclined. And since it embraces the whole *posse* and willing and acting, therefore it cannot be deceived. And since predestination encloses foreknowledge, hence it is, that it is concordant with free choice, and cannot be at variance and cannot be voided; and it necessarily imposes salvation, but does not necessarily effect it.

*To 4.* To that which is asked, whether the predestined can be damned; it must be said that he can, without distinction, since although this can be distinguished as to the thing or the *dictum*: *the predestined to be damned is possible*, just as this: *the white is possibly to be black*; this however is not to be distinguished by the rules of art: *the predestined can be damned*, just as neither this: *the white man can be black*. For it cannot be of the *dictum*, since it is not a *dictum*.

On account of which it must be understood, that this proposition has three causes of truth: *the predestined can be damned*, just as this: *the predestined can be foreknown*: either because the form of the predicate can inhere in the subject with the form implied, or after the form implied, or without the form implied. For in whatever way the predicate can inhere, the locution is to be judged simply true; and I say, that in the third sense the locution is true: *the predestined can be foreknown*. For the predestined can not be predestined, and it is necessary that every man be either predestined, or foreknown; and therefore it follows, that he can be foreknown. And this indeed is necessary to be posited. For faith says and reason that it follows: *if he is predestined, he will be saved*. Again, faith says and reason, that for him to be saved is contingent; and he who would say and assert the contrary, would have to be rejected, by the certain judgment of all. And again, art says, that if the consequent is contingent, it is impossible that the antecedent be necessary, and this has been proved above by three rules; and he who would say the contrary of this, would destroy the whole syllogistic art, whose force of inference is, that the opposite of the consequent cannot stand with the antecedent. But it is certain, that the opposite of a contingent stands with the necessary. Therefore that this man be predestined is not necessary. And it is necessary, or contingent, or impossible; and it is not impossible nor necessary: therefore it is contingent; and a contingent can not be: therefore this man who is predestined can not be predestined.

And this indeed I believe must be posited, this however is difficult to understand. It can however be grasped thus, if we presuppose four true things. The first is, that the present of the divine eternity embraces all time, the same and uniform; and this Anselm says in his book *On the Concordance of foreknowledge and of free choice*, that « *just as the present time embraces every place, and everything that is in place, so the present of eternity embraces all time* ». And this is necessary to be posited, although we cannot fully understand this. For we see its opposite to be false and impossible: since if this were not so, then the present of the divine eternity would be changed. — The second is that, that God by one and the same knows all things, so that there is one cognition of God, by which he knows this and by which he knows its opposite. And this has been proved above by authority and by reason, not only as to that by which it is known, but also as to the act of divine cognition. — The third is, that when we say, that the divine cognition or will is ordered to this knowable and to that, no order or relation is posited in God in act, but only on the side of the created or known thing; and this indeed, as has been foreseen, is not posited in act, but in habit, nor as of the present but as of the future. — The fourth is, that the future under the character of the future, which is once posited as being true, is posited as having always been true, and that which is once posited as being false, is posited as having always been false; and therefore when it is posited as being able to be, it is posited neither to be changed nor to begin.

These things being presupposed it is easy to understand, that the predestined can be foreknown, and that God could have predestined him whom he foreknew. For it is constant, that the salvation of him who is foreknown could from eternity have been foreseen, since it can be or come about in time; and if it could from eternity have been ordered to the divine cognition and will, it can also now. For since the present is whole, and nothing has passed into the past, and nothing has been done, that it is necessary to have been done; hence it is, that just as it can be thought, that he could truly also have not predestined from eternity, so also, that he could now, that is, in his *now of eternity*, not have predestined. And this the Master says in the letter. Yet the eternal act of the divine cognition cannot be thought not to have been, but rather that this contingent future was not ordered to it; and if this is posited, no change is posited in the eternal present, since no succession is posited; nor is a change posited in the cognition, since no other cognition is posited in God, nor in the order on the side of the knower, since no other order is posited in God, nor in the order on the side of the known, since on that side nothing is posited save the future: and that, when it is not, can be thought to be, and can be future without change.

And this whole is more clearly opened up, if we come to the signification of these words *foreknown* and *predestined*. For *predestined* and *foreknown* are two words, and as to the principal signification they import the divine essence, as to the connotation they import future contingents. As to the principal signification therefore they are the same; but as to the connotation, since they are contingents, which do not inhere of necessity, one can be the other. But since the connoted are not only contingents, but also of the future, which posit nothing in act, they can not inhere and can inhere without change. For when they are posited as inhering truly of the future, they are posited as having always been so, and when they are posited as not being, they are posited as never having been so, as is plain; and Anselm says, if it be said that something is future contingently, it is established that it is possible that it be not future; and if it is future, it has always been true, that itself is future. And therefore this is true without change and without beginning: *the predestined can be foreknown*. For there is no repugnance either on the side of the signified or on the side of the connoted, and this is plain, if they be resolved. For the sense is: *this man is predestined*, that is, this man is foreknown by God and will be saved by God's grace. Likewise: *this man is foreknown*, the sense is: this man is foreknown and will be damned through his own fault. For it is established, that in the divine cognition there is no difference in itself, but only in what is connoted. Since therefore one to be saved can be damned, the predestined can be foreknown without any change.

*To 5, 6.* From this are plain the other three objections: for the first and the last are understood in forms which posit something in act around the subject; the second on the other hand of that which is so eternal, that it connotes nothing temporal. But such are not *to be foreknown* and *to be predestined*. And so all are plain.