Dist. 40, Art. 2, Q. 2
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/1/d/40/q/bon-sent-I-d40-a2-q2
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### Question II.
#### *Whether predestination posits certainty in the outcome.*

Secondly, granted that predestination does not impose necessity on free choice such that things cannot be otherwise, it is asked whether it posits certainty in the outcome — namely, that things never happen otherwise than as God has foredefined. And that it does is shown thus:

1. *First*, by the authority of John 13: *I know whom I have chosen*; and 2 Timothy 2: *God knows who are his*: therefore if the divine cognition is certain and infallible, and would be deceived if those whom he knows certainly to be his own were not saved, then it is true that things happen just as God foredefined, and thus etc.

2. Likewise, 1 John 2: *They went out from us, but they were not of us*. He posits this then for a sign: that this is the sign that a man was not elect, when he did not persevere finally in the good. If therefore that sign is correct, it is certain that all the predestined and they alone finally persevere in grace; and if this is certain, that they alone are saved and all of them: therefore there is certainty in the outcome.

3. Likewise, Augustine in the book *On the Gift of Perseverance*: «*Predestination is the foreknowledge of God's benefits by which whoever are delivered are most certainly delivered*». If therefore they are delivered most certainly, it is plain that the certainty of salvation is with respect to persons, and so etc.

4. Likewise, Augustine in the book *On Correction and Grace*: «*Certain is the number of the elect, which can neither be diminished nor increased*»: therefore it appears that there is certainty in the determinate number.

5. Likewise, this seems also by reason, since *in the Father's house there are many mansions*, as is said in John 14: either, then, God foresaw who ought to dwell there, or not. It is plain that he foresaw who ought to be there: therefore if any of them be missing, some mansion will remain empty. But this is unfitting and unbecoming in the heavenly city: therefore it is certain that every predestined one will have his place.

6. Likewise, the number of the elect foredefined by God is by the most fitting reason and proportion — for if he made all things in the most ordered way, much more so the heavenly city — but the best proportion is marred and lost by addition and diminution: therefore if there cannot be any defect of fitting order and proportion there, with certainty just so many will be saved, and not more nor fewer than God foresaw.

**On the contrary:**

1. That there is no certainty of outcome with regard to persons appears thus: Apocalypse 3: *Hold what thou hast, that no one take thy crown*; Gregory thereon: «*While one falls, another is brought in into his place*»: therefore if one claims for himself another's place, things do not happen as God ordained, but rather there is exchange all day long.

2. Likewise, on that text of Job 34: *He shall break in pieces many*, Gregory in the same place: «*The place of life, when some fall, others obtain by lot*».

3. Likewise, that there is no certainty as to number, appears from Luke 5: *The net was breaking*; Gloss: «*Not so many of the Jews enter as are predestined*»: therefore fewer are saved than are predestined.

4. Likewise, Deuteronomy 1: *May God add unto this number many thousands*; Gloss: «*Unto this number predefined in God's foreknowledge, who knows who are his*»: therefore if God adds to the predefined number, there is no certainty as to the number of those to be saved.

5. Likewise, that there is no certainty as to either, appears thus. Let us understand *ABC* to be the number of the predestined, *DEF* the number of the foreknown: then I ask: *A* can just as well be damned as *D*, and conversely *D* be saved as *A*: therefore there is no certainty as to persons. Again, *A* can be damned, and then only two remain, and *D* be saved, and then there will be four: therefore there is no certainty as to number.

6. Likewise, this same is shown by reduction to absurdity. For if it is certain who and how many will be saved, in such a way that it will so happen and not otherwise, although it could be otherwise: therefore no predestined one will be damned in any case or event, and no foreknown one will be saved: therefore no one need care whether he act well or ill, since if he is foreknown, whatever he does, in the end he will be damned; if predestined, whatever he does, in the end he will be saved; foolish therefore is he who *does not eat and rejoice, and have his goods in his life*.

### Conclusion.

> *Predestination, on the side of the thing happening, does not have certainty in the outcome; on the side of God foreknowing and disposing, it has the certainty both of infallibility and of immutability.*

**I respond:** It must be said that one must speak of certainty on the side of the thing happening, and on the side of God who pre-ordains. If we speak of certainty on the side of the thing, since this is said against contingency, I say thus, that there is no greater certainty in the number of the elect than there is in the number of other future contingents, since the outcome of our salvation and damnation depends on the freedom of our choice. But if we speak of certainty on the side of God foreknowing, then the outcome of salvation is certain with the certainty of infallibility, since the divine foreknowledge is not deceived, and therefore it always happens just as he foreknew. It is also certain with the certainty of immutability, since the divine disposition and ordination is not varied, so that he should now choose one and now another, but he who has once been chosen, always was and will be, and not another.

**To the arguments:** The reasons adduced for the first part proceed concerning certainty of outcome, not as to necessity, but as to the infallibility of the eternal foreknowledge, and as to the invariability of the eternal pre-ordination.

*To 1, 2.* To that which is objected, that one receives another's place and crown; it must be said that the place of the eternal mansion and the crown of retribution is owed to one according to the reckoning of justice, to another according to the predefinition of foreknowledge. And it happens that one place is owed to someone according to present justice, in that, when he has fallen, another enters, to whom it is owed according to the eternal predefinition. But when a place is owed to someone according to the eternal predefinition, he can indeed fall and lose the place, and another, who is not predestined, can acquire it; yet this never will happen. Since therefore the foreknown just man often loses the place of the eternal mansion, which another of equal merit acquires; and no one knows whether he is foreknown or predestined: therefore, although he know himself to be just, he ought to fear lest he lose the place. And to this fear blessed John exhorts in the aforesaid authority of the Apocalypse. And this fear is good for all, both the foreknown and the predestined, since it humbles and stirs to vigilance. On the contrary, certainty about election lifts up into swelling and presses down into torpor; therefore by a most ordered dispensation it has been so done, that to no one is it revealed whether he is predestined, unless he be confirmed by God in the good, so that he cannot be lifted up by pride or grow torpid through negligence. It is plain therefore that that authority does not signify a change being made in the foreknowledge, or things happening otherwise than God foreknew, but that he who is actually just can lose the place of which he is worthy by losing justice, and that he who is a sinner can acquire a place not owed to him by acquiring justice; and this happens all day long. — There is a manifest example in the Old Testament of Saul and David in the kingdom, namely, where to Saul it could rightly be said: *Hold what thou hast*, that is humility and justice, *that no one take thy crown*, that is, owed to thee according to the present state, yet owed to another according to the eternal disposition. There is also an example in the crowns of the forty Martyrs.

*To 3, 4.* To what is objected concerning diminution and increase, it must be said that all that is to be referred to the state of present justice. For that Gloss: «*Not so many enter*» is to be understood as of the time of the primitive Church, since many will enter in the time of the final Church. Likewise what is said, that *God adds unto this number*, is to be understood as justifying more and calling them to faith.

*To 5.* To what is objected, that there can be more and fewer and others than the foreknown, therefore there is no certainty there; it must be said that there is not certainty of necessity, but there is certainty of infallibility. For although there could be others and more, yet there never will be; and if there were, then they would have been predestined from eternity: therefore no change can fall there.

*To 6.* To what is objected, that if it so happens, then the foreknown and the predestined labour in vain; it must be said that this is the argument of fools, which leads them into torpor and into the excuse of impiety. And therefore first it must be shown that they argue foolishly, by inferring from the like, saying thus: God has pre-ordained whether you are to live tomorrow or not; to what end then do you eat and drink? He who would so argue and assent to such reasoning would be charged with madness; likewise in the matter at hand. — Secondly, the answer is given by counter-arguing: you say that God predestines, and I say that God as a just judge justly rewards. «*No good then unrewarded, no evil unpunished*»: therefore no one labours without fruit, no one grows torpid without damage. — And on this account it must be said that the foregoing argumentation is defective: for it proceeds as if God predestined and foreknew with regard to every event; but he does not predestine man to salvation save through merits, nor does he reprobate so that one comes into damnation without demerits. And so our salvation is not only on the side of God, but also on our side; and since he wills *all to be saved* and to impart grace to all, only from our malice or negligence does the defect of our salvation come.