Dist. 40, Dubia
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/1/d/40/q/bon-sent-I-d40-dubia
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### DOUBTS CONCERNING THE TEXT OF THE MASTER.

#### DOUBT I.

In this part there are doubts concerning the text, and first concerning this term that is set down, namely *predestination is of saving goods*. It is asked therefore what is to be understood by *saving goods*. If you say, grace and glory: then, just as a man is called *predestined*, so grace ought to be called *predestined*.

**I respond:** It must be said that predestination is *preordering*. Now in ordering three things concur: *what* is ordered, and *by what*, and *to what*. The first is the man, the second is grace, the third is glory. And since only that one is to be called *predestined* who is ordered by predestination, it is therefore plain that grace and glory ought not be called *predestined*, but only the man, who is predestined to salvation.

#### DOUBT II.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says: *And concerning men to be saved*. For he seems to speak insufficiently: because, since predestination is the preparation of grace and of glory, it is therefore not only of men, but also of Angels.

**I respond:** It must be said that predestination in one mode states the preparation of a good, and in this way it suits men and Angels and even Christ; in another mode it states the preparation of a good and the freeing from an evil, and in this way predestination is called *the purpose of having mercy*, and in this way it is properly of men, and in this way the Master here takes it.

#### DOUBT III.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says, that *predestination cannot exist without foreknowledge*. For he seems to speak ill, because foreknowledge is of evils, whence the foreknown are called evil; but predestination [is] of goods: therefore predestination can exist without foreknowledge, just as conversely [foreknowledge can exist without predestination]. If you say to me, that predestination is special, but foreknowledge is both common and special: then I ask, why foreknowledge is more appropriated to reprobation than to predestination.

To this there is one mode of responding, that because predestination *adds* [something], it therefore had a proper name; reprobation, however, [does] not, [and] therefore it retained the common name. — But how does that hold true, since reprobation is the foreknowledge of punishment, of which God is the cause?

And therefore it must be said that it does not [merely] add as much as that it [should] thus draw aside. For predestination gives one to understand *good-pleasure*, which draws it into the genus of *practical knowledge* simply, in that the good-pleasure is simple and absolute with respect to the whole connoted [term]. But it is not so concerning reprobation, because the will is not [directed] to the evil of fault, and with respect to punishment is *consequent*, not *antecedent*, and as it were drawn [along]. And on this account, because it draws aside less from the account of *knowledge*, it retained for itself the name of *foreknowledge*.

#### DOUBT IV.

Likewise it is asked concerning this response of the Master: *To which we reply, it has been said by that account* etc.

For it seems that he does not solve [it] by his distinction with respect to the question concerning increase, since once someone to be damned has been demonstrated, it is true to say: *this man can be saved*, therefore he can be predestined: therefore more can be predestined than there are: therefore the number of the predestined can be increased.

**I respond:** It must be said that the Master in this first response principally responds to the first question, whether it is possible for one predestined to be damned; and well, namely *by composition and division*. And by this solution the response to that [question] concerning increase appears in some way, but not fully; therefore he annexes the following solution, which is an explication of this [one], in which it is said that someone cannot *begin to be predestined*, although he can *be predestined*, because this is to say, that from eternity he could [be]. And since increase states a greater number than before with the presupposition of the prior and a new addition, it is therefore plain that from its own account it states distinction and succession in [its] parts. Hence if someone, the very moment he is, were as great as he is going to be, he would not be said to be increased, although he could have been greater; so it is to be understood in the matter at hand. — Or otherwise it can be solved by *composition and division*, just as the Master solves [it]; for there can be more than there are: therefore the number can be increased.

#### DOUBT V.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says, *that the understanding of the implied condition makes truth in the saying and impossibility in the [thing-as-]true*, how that is intelligible. For if the same is not the cause of opposites, and the implied condition makes truth, how does it make impossibility?

**I respond:** It must be said that the Master wishes to say that this is false, when someone has been demonstrated: *for this man to be damned* or *to be saved* is impossible; but if the condition of predestination is added and implied, it makes truth in the saying and impossibility in the [thing-as-]true, that is, it makes that saying with a mode of impossibility be true, as if it should be said: *for this man to be damned and to be predestined at once*, is impossible; or: *for this man to be saved and not to be predestined*, is impossible. — Or otherwise it can be said that a false saying about someone, by the implication of a condition, becomes true: as, with a reprobate having been demonstrated, *for this man to be saved* is false; add the condition of predestination, and it will become true: *for this man to be saved, if he is predestined*, is true. Likewise, with the same having been demonstrated, *for this man to be damned* is true; add the condition of predestination, and it will become impossible: *for this man to be damned, if he is predestined*, is impossible, taking [it] in a conjoined sense.

#### DOUBT VI.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says: *Once something has been done or said, they do not concede that it can not be* etc. For it seems false: because Christ said that Peter would sin: therefore after he said [it], it was necessary that he had said [it], and it follows necessarily: if Christ said [it], this will be; because grant the opposite, and then it will follow that Christ has lied, which is impossible: therefore it seems, since the antecedent is necessary, that it was necessary that Peter [should] deny [him].

**I respond:** It must be said that in Christ's saying there are two things, namely the *uttering of the word* and the *assertion*. And the uttering of the word is simply past and necessary, and from it the consequent does not follow. For it does not follow: Christ said this, therefore it will be; for he uttered this word: *I shall be like to you a liar*. There is again the *assertion*, and that follows the illumination of divine foreknowledge. Therefore just as divine foreknowledge is certain and infallible, beneath which falsehood cannot lie, and yet looks at the future and connotes around it truth, and therefore it is not necessary that God foreknew what he foreknew, although it is certain and infallible: so it is to be understood concerning Christ's assertion, that it has its certitude and infallibility from divine foreknowledge; but yet it is not necessary that Christ asserted this; and therefore, if it is posited that this not happen, it is also posited that Christ did not assert [it]. And so this and similar [cases] are clear. For in Christ's assertion there are two [things], namely the *act of mind*, and the *relation* to the contingent future, or the ordering. And although one is necessary, the other is contingent.

#### DOUBT VII.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says: *Just as the effect of predestination is that grace by which we are justified in the present* etc. From this it is shown that predestination is the cause of grace. It is asked therefore: in what genus of cause? For since it is knowledge, it would seem to state an exemplary cause. And again, this does not seem to suffice, because an exemplar does not necessarily entail what is exemplified, but foreknowledge does posit [it]. And again, if it is a cause, [it is] either universal or particular: not universal, because then it would need another particular [cause] helping; not particular, because then it would be determined to one effect only. And again, [it is] either necessary or contingent: not necessary, since it operates through the will; not contingent, since this [latter] is fallible and uncertain.

**I respond:** It must be said that predestination is the cause of grace, as he says, and the whole cause; but not the cause of salvation, that the cooperating and disposing [causes] may be excluded. For *we are helpers of Christ*, and no one is saved unwillingly. — As for the question, in what genus of cause it is; it must be said that predestination encloses in itself knowledge and the good-pleasure of the will and the disposition of the will, by which it pleased God to save us, which is the highest goodness to be manifested. By reason of the first it states a cause in the genus of *form*, by reason of the second in the genus of *efficient* [cause], by reason of the third in the genus of *end*.

As for the question, whether *necessary* or *contingent*, *universal* or *particular*; it must be said that of all these modes of causing it has what is of perfection, not what is of imperfection. For from the property of the universal it has extension to many; from the property of the particular, sufficiency for individuals; from the property of the necessary cause, immutability; from the property of the contingent it has freedom of choice, because it can act and not act. But it does not have the conditions of imperfection, because it neither has insufficiency, like a universal cause; nor limitation, like a particular cause; nor inevitability, like a necessary cause; nor vertibility, like a contingent cause.

#### DOUBT VIII.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says, that *the effect of predestination is the bestowal of grace*. For he seems to speak ill, because cause and effect are correlative; therefore since relatives are simultaneous in nature, whenever there is predestination there is the bestowal of grace: therefore no one is predestined except one who has grace. But against this is [the fact] that predestination is of non-existents, as Augustine says in the book *On Faith to Peter*.

**I respond:** It must be said that predestination is not always a cause in act, but in habit; and therefore it is not necessary that the effect respond in act, but in habit.

Hence from this it is plain [as to] what was wont to be asked, whether predestination posits something in the predestined; for it must be said that it does not necessarily posit something of the present or in act, since many are predestined who are not evil, and many [are] who are evil; but it does posit something according to *habit*, or as to the future, by reason of which a man can rejoice, namely because *his name is written in heaven*. And when that has been laid down, it will be a great good; and that will be a reason for persisting in the good and arriving at the great and highest good; and therefore this habitual good is to be set before grace, which is according to *present justice*.

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