Dist. 41, Art. 1, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/1/d/41/q/bon-sent-I-d41-a1-q1
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### Article I.
#### *On the causality of divine predestination.*

### Question I.
#### *Whether predestination or reprobation have in us a meritorious cause.*

That they have in us a meritorious cause, is shown thus.

1. *First, concerning reprobation.* In *Romans* 9, on the text: *"Esau have I hated"*, the Gloss [reads]: "*Esau, with grace withdrawn, has been reprobated by justice*"; but justice regards merits: therefore reprobation is from merits.

2. Likewise, by reprobation are denoted nothing except these three, namely eternal hatred, temporal hardening, and final damnation; but all of these have their meritorious cause in us, since God hates no one except on account of demerits, and neither hardens nor damns [except so]: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, by an antecedent will God wills all men to be saved: if therefore he reprobates someone, this is by a consequent will, for he creates no one of himself for punishment; but the consequent will is a concession [arising] from our cause; but it is not from any cause other than [that of] merit: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, concerning predestination it is shown similarly. Gregory says, and Augustine [also], that predestination is aided by the prayers of the saints; but to each one his own faith is worth more than another's faith: therefore by his own and by another's merit one can obtain that he be predestined.

5. Likewise, no one is predestined except [the one] finally persevering in grace, and conversely: therefore they are convertible [terms]; but someone can merit final perseverance: therefore he can merit that he be predestined.

6. Likewise, [he] who can [reach] the greater, can [reach] the lesser or the equal by parity of reason; but a man can merit to have God, which is the greatest of all things; he can also merit salvation, which is equal to that which is to-be-predestined: therefore etc.

**On the contrary:**

1. Every merit precedes that of which it is the merit, because it disposes to it; but predestination and reprobation precede our being: therefore they do not fall under our merit.

2. Likewise, every merit is in some way a cause of that which is merited; but predestination and reprobation are eternal, but merits are temporal: therefore the temporal is the cause of the eternal; which is impossible.

3. Likewise, especially concerning predestination it seems [so] from *Titus* 3: *"Not by the works of justice which we have done, but according to his mercy he has saved us."*

4. Likewise, grace is the effect of predestination; but the first grace precedes every merit and is the cause of every merit: therefore it does not fall under merit, and by this very fact is grace, that it is given without merits: therefore neither [does] predestination [fall under merit].

### Conclusion.

> *Neither predestination nor reprobation, as regards the eternal purpose, fall under merit; but as regards the connotatum, reprobation falls under merit simpliciter, but predestination secundum quid.*

**I respond:** For the understanding of this it must be noted that in predestination three [things] are understood: the first is the eternal purpose; the second is temporal justification-by-grace (*gratificatio*); the third is eternal glorification. Likewise in reprobation three [things] are understood, namely the eternal purpose, and temporal hardening, and eternal damnation. — As to the first and the last [it must be] judged simpliciter: for the last [things], namely punishment and glory, simpliciter fall under merit; but the first, namely the eternal purpose, by the very fact that it is eternal, cannot have a merit. As to the middle [things], which are justification-by-grace and hardening, it is to be judged differently. For hardening simpliciter falls under demerit, that is, under evil merit; but justification-by-grace falls neither simpliciter under merit nor simpliciter outside [merit]. — For there is the merit *of congruity* (*congrui*), *of worthiness* (*digni*), and *of full-condignity* (*condigni*). The merit *of congruity* is when the sinner does what is in him and for himself. The merit *of worthiness*, when the just [man] acts for another. The merit *of full-condignity*, when the just [man] works for himself, since grace is ordered to this from condignity; but to a grace to be merited for another, not entirely from condignity, since the sinner is unworthy of every good, nor [is it] only from congruity, since the just [man] is worthy to be heard. — Justification-by-grace, therefore, can fall under the merit *of congruity* as regards the one to be justified, under the merit *of worthiness* as regards another holy man, under the merit *of full-condignity* as regards neither; and this, properly speaking, is merit.

It must therefore be responded to the question — when it is asked, whether predestination and reprobation fall under merit — that, simpliciter speaking, as to the principal significate, neither falls under merit; but as to the connotatum, reprobation falls under merit simpliciter, but predestination secundum quid.

**To the arguments to the contrary:**

The reasonings proving that predestination does not fall under merit are therefore to be granted; likewise, that neither does reprobation.

*To 1.* To that which is objected first, from the Gloss, that Esau was reprobated by justice; it must be said that there *reprobation* is taken for the connotatum, which is hardening.

*To 2.* To that which is objected, that the eternal hatred falls under merit; it must be said that the eternal hatred says two [things]: both the principal significate and the connotatum, since God hates no one as regards [his] affect, but only as regards [his] effect. And the first [is] not from merits, but the second [is]; which is plain, if it be resolved [thus]: hatred is the purpose of punishing; but no one merits a purpose, but rather a punishment.

*To 3.* To that which is objected, that he reprobates no one except by a consequent will; it must be said that it is called *consequent will* not because it follows our merits by reason of the will, but only by reason of the [thing] willed — for God wills something which we have merited — therefore, since it is [a thing] willed and connotatum, it is clear etc.

*To 4.* To that which is objected concerning predestination, that it is aided by the prayers of the saints; it must be said that this is understood by reason of the connotatum, which is grace, which holy men can obtain for others by their prayers; nor however does it follow, that a man can obtain [it] for himself, since for the obtaining of it it is necessary that he be worthy to merit, and this is not [so] except through grace.

*To 5.* To that which is objected, that to-be-predestined and to-finally-persevere-in-grace are the same; it must be said that they are not the same, but *convertible*. But it does not follow, that if someone can merit one of two convertible [terms], that he can [merit] the other; just as it does not follow, if something is the cause of one of two convertible [terms], that it is the cause of the other; this is manifest.

*To 6.* To that which is objected: that he who can [reach] the greater can [reach] the lesser; it must be said that this is true, if [the agent] is equally ordered to both. For if it has ordination to the greater, and does not have ordination to the lesser — although it can [reach] the greater, it does not however follow that [it can reach] the lesser; likewise in the [present] case. For grace is ordered to meriting God as glorifying, not as predestining; likewise to glory, not to the first grace.