Dist. 41, Art. 1, Q. 2
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/1/d/41/q/bon-sent-I-d41-a1-q2
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### Question II.
#### *Whether predestination and reprobation have in God a motive ground.*

Secondly it is asked whether predestination and reprobation have in God a motive ground (*ratio motiva*). And that they do, seems [to be the case]:

1. By the canon of Genesis 18: *The Lord said: Can I hide from Abraham what I am about to do, since he is to become a great nation, and is to charge his household to keep my covenant?* Therefore the Lord wished to reveal [it] to Abraham himself on account of consideration of future goods: therefore, since he foresees those things from eternity, by parallel reasoning he predestines from the foreknowledge of future goods.

2. Likewise, Ambrose on the ninth [chapter] of the Epistle to the Romans: «*I will give grace to him whom I shall know to be about to return to me with all his heart after error*»; he speaks in the person of the Lord: therefore the reason why the Lord proposes to give grace is that he has foreseen some future [thing] in the man.

3. Likewise, it is shown by reason, because every will, by the very fact that it is a will, is rational: therefore if it belongs to perfection in a will that it be from reason, this is found most of all in the divine will: therefore since predestination states the divine proposal, it will be from reason.

4. Likewise, every one who chooses wisely chooses as his servants those in whom he sees better past character, and likewise those whom he has known to be more faithful; and if he could know future things, much more would he choose and reject on account of foreknowledge of future goods and evils than of past ones. If therefore God is most wisely choosing, therefore he takes the ground of choosing or reprobating from foresight or foreknowledge.

5. Likewise, no one choosing wisely pre-elects things that are altogether non-distant (*indistantia*), especially if he can take all things as equally fitting; but God prefers one to another in election: therefore etc.

6. Likewise, if the divine proposal or predestination had as its ground only God's will, and no other [ground], then there seems to be miserliness in the divine

will — for if he willed to save all, all would be saved, and there is no other ground except that he does not will [it] — therefore his will is not most liberal nor best.

7. Likewise, if there were no other ground than will, then since God in reprobating proposes to damn, if without any ground he willed by sheer will to damn someone, then he seems most cruel, and [it seems] that he made men for punishment.

8. Likewise, if he predestines and reprobates by sheer will, without any pre-known ground, then it seems according to this that he is a respecter of persons; which is contrary to what is said in Acts 10: *In truth I have found that God is no respecter of persons.*

**On the contrary:**

1. Exodus 33: *I will have mercy on whom I have mercy, and I will be gracious to whomever it shall please me*: therefore the first and most powerful ground of the divine mercy and predestination is God's good-pleasure and will.

2. Likewise, Matthew 11, the Son says: *Thou hast revealed these things to little ones, and hast hidden them from the wise; so, Father, because thus it was pleasing before thee*: therefore if the Son gives this as the best ground, the divine good-pleasure alone is the ground.

3. Likewise, the Apostle, in Romans 9, on this question says: *Has not the potter power, from the same lump, to make some vessels indeed unto honor, and others unto contumely?* For if it were asked of a craftsman why from one part of the lump he makes beautiful vessels, and from another mean ones, when the whole lump is equally good, there is no other ground than that it pleases [him]: for he would do equally well if he did the opposite: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, Augustine, *On the Predestination of the Saints*: «*Not because he foreknew that we would be such did he choose [us], but [chose us] that we might be such*».

5. Likewise, it seems by reason, because God's will is the cause of causes, therefore there is a stopping-point (*status*) there; but where there is a stopping-point, one is not to seek a ground further: therefore etc.

### Conclusion.

> *Predestination and reprobation, as regards the ordering of the willed to the divine will, although they do not have a meritorious cause, nevertheless have a ground both in general and in particular, but in particular [they have] only grounds of fittingness, [and grounds] unknown to us.*

**I respond:** It must be said that when it is asked whether God's eternal proposal, that is, [his] election or reprobation, has a ground, this is not understood as regards the divine will or its act, which is God [himself], but as regards the ordering of the willed to his will. And if a causal or meritorious ground is asked for, the answer is that there is none.

But if a ground of fittingness and seemliness is asked for, some respond that God's will is itself its own ground, and there is no other ground why he has chosen this one rather than that, except that it pleases [him]; and this [ground] is sufficient in every way, because [his will] is the cause of causes and the ground of grounds; and by the very fact that it pleases [him] it is therefore right on account of the supreme rectitude of his will, since [his will] is not only right but is even the rule. — But it must be guarded against that, while we wish to magnify God's will, we rather derogate from his will. For if there were no other ground why God chose this one and not that, except that it pleases [him], certainly the divine judgments would no longer be called hidden but manifest, since anyone whatever could grasp this ground; nor would they be called marvelous, but rather voluntary.

And therefore it must be said that that eternal proposal, as Augustine says and as it stands in the [Master's] text, is also a will [that is] most rational and has a ground; and as it has been from eternity, so from eternity it has had a ground — not a different ground on account of the essence, but on account of the connoted [object]. What that [ground] is, however, in the election or reprobation of men, is not entirely known to us, nor entirely unknown.

Hence it should be noted that some are works which proceed from the divine will together with another [thing] ordained to this in an order of necessity, whether we take necessity in the causing, or in the meriting or disposing — such as raining and rewarding, or damning and saving; and with respect to such things, the divine will has a ground in general and in particular. Hence if it is asked: why does God will to rain? the answer is: on account of our utility. Similarly if it is asked: why does he will to reward some? the answer is: on account of his own glory. — Similarly it has a ground in particular, e.g. if it is asked: why does God will to rain in winter and not in summer? then the answer is: because watery vapors are more abundant in winter than in summer. Similarly if it is asked: why does he will to save Peter rather than Judas? the answer is: because the one had good merits, and the other [had] bad. — And there are other works that come from the divine will together with another [thing] ordained to this in an order of *fittingness*, as is our gratification or justification, which is from the divine will together with the cooperation and preparation of free choice; and this, because *«whoever created thee without thee, will not justify thee without thee**»*. And this is said according to fittingness; *for we are God's coadjutors*. Nevertheless God justifies without preparation and cooperation, as is plain from those sanctified in the womb, and as they say of Paul. And with respect to such works the will has a ground in general, and has [one] in particular, but in general [a ground that is] certain, in particular [one that is] hidden.

For if it is asked: why does God will to justify? the answer is: for the manifestation of his mercy. And if it is asked: why does he not will to justify all men by the will of [his] good-pleasure? it must be said that this is on account of the manifestation of his justice. Whence Augustine in *On the City of God*, book 21: «*If all remained in punishment, the grace of him who redeems with mercy would nowhere appear. Again, if all were transferred from darkness to light, the severity of vengeance would nowhere appear, in which [punishment] there are for that reason more than [there are] in [glory], so that thereby may appear what was owed to all*». — If it is asked in particular: why does he will to justify one rather than another, when two similar [persons] are presented? — because there can be many grounds of fittingness, therefore there is no certainty on the side of the thing [itself]. And therefore since our cognition depends on certainty of the thing, no one can find a certain ground unless he has [it] through the revelation of him to whom doubtful things are certain. And because that cognition was not expedient for our salvation, but concealment was necessary on account of humility; therefore God was unwilling to reveal [it], and the Apostle did not dare to inquire, but [rather] indicated the defect of our intelligence when he exclaimed in Romans 11: *O the depth of the riches of the wisdom and knowledge of God; how incomprehensible are his judgments, and how unsearchable his ways!*

1. To that, then, which is asked, whether predestination has a ground; it must be said that it does have [one] in general and likewise in particular; and this ground is known to divine foreknowledge, [but] not to us, by the reason aforesaid.

2–3. To that which is objected from Sacred Scripture, that it assigns good-pleasure as the ground; it must be said that, although it assigns [this] as the ground and does not express another,

it is not to be concluded that there is no other, because not all things are written, but [only] those useful to us. But it was useful to know that the divine good-pleasure is the cause and the ground, so that we may learn to fear him and to attribute none of our merits to ourselves.

4–5. To that which is objected, that he did not choose [them] because he foresaw [them as] such; it must be said that Augustine denies [it] in so far as the word *because* states the *cause*, [but] not in so far as it states a *ground*; for although the divine will can have a ground (from which it is said to operate fittingly), nevertheless it does not have a cause or causal ground, since it is the cause of causes, and especially with respect to a willed [object], which indeed is from the sheer liberality of God — for instance, the grace that justifies the impious. And through this is plain what follows regarding the *stopping-point* (*status*).

6. To that which is asked: on account of the foresight of which [goods]? — it must be said that it can be on account of the foresight of goods, inasmuch as in some way they are from free choice; though on account of the foresight of which [goods] determinately, I do not know, nor do I will to ask, nor is there a ground other than that of fittingness. Hence another [ground] also can be [in play] than this.

7. To that which is objected concerning the creation of the world, it must be said that it is not similar, because the creation of the world is from the divine will and good-pleasure as from a whole cause. And again, nothing is presupposed for creation.

The reasons on the opposite side prove that the divine will acts rationally, and that it has a ground of fittingness by reason of the willed [object]. And since this is true, therefore they are to be conceded. Although some of them can be open to objection (*calumniam*), nevertheless the principal conclusion is not open to objection. For Augustine says this in the book of *Retractationes* after all his retractations: that «*he proposes and elects and reprobates by a truth most certain and most remote from our senses*». And since it is most remote from our senses, therefore no one ought to inquire into it, since in this life we cannot attain [to it]. And therefore in the inadequacy of our intelligence the discourse on predestination must be closed off, *that every mouth may be stopped, and the whole world may become subject to God*, whose judgments are not searchable, but to be revered with awe-filled silence.