Dist. 41, Art. 2, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/1/d/41/q/bon-sent-I-d41-a2-q1
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### Article II.
#### *On the everlastingness of the divine cognition.*

Consequently, as to the second article, it is asked secondly concerning the *interminability* of the divine cognition. And on this two [things] are asked. First, since a doubt arises by comparison with [things] complex, it is asked, whether God knows things by the mode of complexion. Secondly it is asked, whether *enuntiabilia* or *complexa*, which God once knows, he always knows.

### Question I.
#### *Whether God knows things by the mode of complexion.*

That God does know by the mode of complexion is shown thus.

1. The same thing which the sense knows, the intellect also knows; but the sense [knows it] by the mode of *incomplexion*, the intellect however by the mode of *complexion*; but the intellect is more powerful in knowing than the sense; therefore to know by the mode of complexion is [a mark] of power. But every such [perfection] is to be attributed to God: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, a thing is differently signified by an *incomplex* utterance and by a *complexion*, since by an incomplex utterance [it is signified] as to being *simpliciter*, but by a statement or complexion as to such-and-such a being; but God knows things not only as to being *simpliciter*, but also as to such-and-such a being: therefore he knows them according to *complexion*.

3. Likewise, the order of one thing to another, to which it is joined in reality, produces composition in cognition or *complexion* in speech; but God not only understands the thing itself in itself, but also in relation to another thing, to which it is united: therefore [he understands it] not only by the *simple* mode, but [by the mode] of composition.

4. Likewise, God understands our understanding and our speaking; but we speak and understand the thing by the mode of complexion: therefore God in this mode understands [it].

**On the contrary:**

1. Dionysius, *On the Divine Names*: "*God knows all things — material things immaterially, divided things undividedly, many things uniformly, mutable things immutably*". If, therefore, he knows divided things undividedly, then composite things by the simple mode; but the mode of simplicity and the [mode] of complexion are opposed: therefore he does not know by the mode of complexion.

2. Likewise, since the intellect knows by the mode of complexion, either that mode is in the thing, or in the intellect. Not in the thing, because, since the sense apprehends the same thing, it would apprehend it by the mode of complexion: therefore [the mode of complexion] is in the intellect. But every such intellect, in which there is complexion, is really complex and composite; but the divine intellect is not of this sort: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, if he knows things by the mode of complexion, since the mode of divine cognition is coeternal with him, from eternity he has known by the mode of complexion: therefore complexion was from eternity. But he has understood many things, therefore many complexions are from eternity; therefore [they are] either true or false; if true: therefore many things are true from eternity; if false: therefore many things are false from eternity.

4. Likewise, if he knows by the mode of complexion, since the same thing now is truly signified under the *ratio* of future-being, now under the *ratio* of past-being, now under the *ratio* of present-being: therefore in all these modes God knows [it]. But on the contrary: he knows all things as present; whence in *Second Peter*, at the end, it is said: *"One day with God [is] as a thousand years"* etc.: therefore he does not know in all these modes.

### Conclusio.

> *The divine cognition of things is not by the mode of complexion, insofar as complexion is taken with respect to the divine intellect; but [it is] insofar as it falls with respect to things, both considered in themselves and as expressed by our intellect.*

**I respond:** It must be said that *to know things by the mode of complexion* can be understood in three ways. For either the mode of complexion falls with respect to *the thing*; and thus the sense is: God knows that things exist or have themselves by the mode of complexion or composition; and this is true, for he knows the things to be, just as they are. In another way, [it is taken] so that the mode of complexion falls with respect to the thing, as it is expressed by our intellect; and then the sense is, that God knows things not only as they are, but also as the intellect expresses [them] — for he knows both the things and the utterances or intellections signifying them — and this is true. In the third way it can be understood [in such a way] that the mode of complexion falls with respect to *the divine intellect*; and in this mode it is false. For this regards the intellect, which understands many [things] and [understands them] through many [acts], which it must combine; but God understands many [things] by one and so simple a mode, and his intellect is not more simple in understanding one [thing] than [in understanding] many. Hence to understand many [things] by the mode of complexion is neither wholly [a mark] of power, nor wholly [a mark] of imperfection; and therefore it is set neither in the lowest cognition, as the sensitive [is], nor in the highest cognition, as the divine [is], and perhaps it is also not in the supreme cognition of the soul itself, which is called intellective insofar as it is at its summit: for it knows by the mode of *simple regard*.

**To the arguments to the contrary:**

*To 1.* The reasonings proving that God knows by the mode of complexion proceed according to the first and the second way; therefore they truly conclude — except for the first [argument], to which it has now been resolved.

*To 2.* To that which is objected, that complexion does not come from the intellect; it must be said that complexion can be compared to the intellect in two ways: either as to a cause, or as to a subject. If as to a subject, in which and which it informs and denominates, thus it is compared to the human intellect, from which the complexion [comes], which also combines [things]. If as to a cause, thus it is compared to the divine intellect. For the divine intellect knows the complexion not regarding itself, but regarding our understanding; since complexion is not from our intellect, except with the divine [intellect] cooperating in understanding.

*To 3.* To that which is objected, that if he knows things by the mode of complexion, then the complexions are eternal; it must be said that from the first or the second sense it does not follow, that the complexions are eternal, since there is no complexion regarding God; but it does well follow, that the truth signified by some complexion is eternal, just as the truth of this [proposition], *"the world is going to be"*; nevertheless the proposition and complexion is from our intellect understanding that eternal truth. Hence just as a temporal utterance signifies an eternal thing, as this name *God*, yet it does not follow that it is eternal; so many *enuntiabilia* signify an eternal truth, yet they are not eternal.

*To 4.* To that which is objected, that then he knows things under the *ratio* of future-being and past-being: it must be said, as has been touched upon, that the mode of divine cognition can be taken *in itself*, or *on the side of the [thing] known*. If *on the side of the [thing] known*; then it must be said that he wholly knows the thing to be just as it is, and so [knows it] to be *mutably*, and so to be in a composite mode, just as it is, and so concerning all [things]: and thus he knows a past thing to be past, and a future [thing] to be future, and a non-past [thing] to be present. It can again be taken *on the side of himself*; and thus, since the cognition of God is wholly simple [and] wholly present, he knows all things by the mode of *simplicity* and by the mode of *presentiality*. Hence, what is said: *"all things are present to God"*, this is said as to the cognition, in which no succession falls, [and] therefore [there is] neither new nor old, neither past nor future. But in the constricted [scope] of the angelic and human cognition succession falls, and therefore [also] past and future. And for this reason all things are not so called *present* to the cognizing soul, as to God. And this is manifest, since the *now of eternity*, which is always present, embraces all temporal [things]; and therefore it is clear how [the saying] is to be understood.