Dist. 41, Dubia
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/1/d/41/q/bon-sent-I-d41-dubia
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### DOUBTS CONCERNING THE TEXT OF THE MASTER.

#### DOUBT I.

In this part there are doubts concerning the text, and first concerning what the Master says: *"Some however have held that God chose Jacob for the reason that he foreknew him to be such,"* etc. It seems that this position is not [merely] an opinion, but a manifest heresy, because whoever lays this down lays down that grace is given to man by God not gratis, but from merits: and this is the worst error, namely the error of Pelagius.

**I respond:** It must be said that for that reason one can call [it] either a meritorious cause or a *ground of congruity*. If he calls [it] a meritorious cause, then, although at first glance he does not state an error, yet an error follows upon it. If, however, he calls [it] a ground of *congruity*, then he does not state an error; yet he has a certain temerity, because he strives to render a reason from the hidden depth of God; and therefore in either mode it was worthy of retraction.

#### DOUBT II.

Likewise it is asked concerning that word of the Apostle, which Augustine quotes: *"The remnant by the election of grace shall be saved"*; in what relation that genitive is to be construed, because grace seems neither to *choose* nor to be *chosen*; and again, grace is only in time: therefore [so is] the election.

**I respond:** It must be said that if it is understood of *temporal* election, then it is called *election of grace*, because it comes about through grace; if however [it is understood] of *eternal* [election], it is in this way called *election of grace*, not so that grace state a habit, but so that it be construed like a genitive [taken] from the *force of declaration of essence*; whence it is called *election of grace*, that is *gratuitous*, [an election] which does not consider merits. And if it is objected that one genitive is not construed [taken] from that force; it must be said that this is true, unless it has the power of two [genitives]. Hence it is well said *vir sanguinis* ("man of blood") and *homo auctoritatis* ("man of authority"); similarly *election of grace* is said, that is *of gratuitous goodness*.

#### DOUBT III.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says: *"Something precedes in sinners by which they are made worthy of justification."* For it seems false to say [this], because a sinner before justification remains in sin, and as long as he is in sin, he is unworthy of the bread by which he is fed, as the authority says, and even of life itself, as for example, [being] God's enemy: therefore etc.

**I respond:** It must be said that either that saying of Augustine has been retracted, and is understood to have been retracted in the aforesaid retraction, which is set down in the preceding chapter; or [else] *dignity* there has only as much force as *congruity* alone: and there can be many congruities in sinners towards gratum-making grace through manifold grace freely given.

#### DOUBT IV.

Likewise it is asked concerning what the Master says, that *"God ceases to foreknow future things when the future things cease to be."* For it seems false to say [this], because foreknowledge states something eternal; but nothing eternal ceases to be: therefore neither does the one foreknowing cease to foreknow. — Likewise, Richard says that, since there are four combinations — namely *that [there is] something which has beginning and end, something which lacks beginning and end, something which has beginning and not end (as the soul); the fourth, namely [something] which has end and not beginning, is impossible* — [for] that which lacks a beginning does not have its being from elsewhere: but what is such, is by itself: therefore it is altogether immutable, therefore it cannot cease. If therefore foreknowing lacks a beginning, it is necessary that it lack an end.

**I respond:** It must be said that without doubt the Master speaks well in saying that God ceases to foreknow certain things when they become present. For if they were foreknown because they were future, and now cease to be future, it is clear that they cease to be *foreknown*, not by reason of that which is *knowing*, but by reason of the *prefix*.

To that which is objected concerning the eternal, it must be said that one [kind of] name imports the purely eternal, and another [kind of] name imports the eternal with the connotation of the temporal. This name *God* imports the purely eternal, but this word *to-foreknow* states the eternal with the connotation of the temporal. — According to this it must be noted that certain things connote the temporal as a being-in-act. And because such a temporal [thing] can both be and cease to be, therefore such acts about God are said to have a beginning and a term: as for example, if it is said: *"God preserves this thing,"* "to preserve" states the essence with the connotation of the effect; therefore it begins and ceases to preserve. Certain things connote the temporal as a non-being in act, [yet] a being in potency or future. And since the temporal cannot *begin* to be non-being or to be future, before it is, but can *cease* to be non-being when it begins to be a being, [and] *cease* to be future when it begins to be present: hence it is that the foreknowledge of God with respect to the created is said *to cease*, but never *to begin*; and it ceases by reason of the temporal not ceasing, but [rather] beginning.

And from this is clear that [point] of Richard, because when God ceases to foreknow, it is not signified that some *being* ceases, but only that something *begins*; and so it is clear.

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