Dist. 41
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/1/d/41/q/bon-sent-I-d41-littera
----------------------------------------
### DISTINCTION XLI.

### Chap. I. *Whether there is any merit of hardening or of mercy.*

If however we inquire about the merit of hardening and of mercy, we find a merit of hardening, but we do not find a merit of mercy, because there is no merit of mercy, lest grace be made void if it is not freely given but rendered for merits. He has mercy therefore according to grace, which is given freely; but he hardens according to judgment, which is rendered for merits. « Hence it is given to understand that, just as God's reprobation is *not to will to have mercy*, so God's hardening is *not to have mercy*, in such a way that nothing is inflicted by him by which a man might be made worse, but only that by which he might be made better is not bestowed ». From these things it is plainly shown what the Apostle understood by mercy and what by hardening, and that mercy invokes no merit, but hardening is not without merit, but has [as its merit] the *not willing to have mercy*. And by the word *mercy* here is taken predestination, and especially the effect of predestination; but by *hardening* is taken not God's eternal reprobation itself, since of that there is no merit, but the privation or subtraction of grace, which in a certain manner is the effect of reprobation. Yet sometimes reprobation is taken for hardening, just as predestination is taken for its own effect, which is grace applied. For the grace which is applied is the effect of predestination. — Since therefore for the grace which is applied to a man unto justification there are no merits; much less also for predestination itself, by which from eternity God chose those whom he willed, can any merits exist; nor for reprobation, by which from eternity he foreknew certain ones as future evil men and as those to be damned: just as he chose Jacob, and reprobated Esau, which was not on account of their merits which they then might have had, because they had none, since they did not yet exist; nor on account of future merits which he might foresee, did he either choose this one, or reprobate that one.

### Chap. II. *On the various opinions of carnal men on this matter.*

Yet certain ones have held the opinion that God therefore chose Jacob because he foreknew him as such a future man as would believe in him and serve him. Which Augustine says he himself sometimes held, in [his] book *Retractationes*, where he plainly shows that, if [Jacob] had been chosen on account of future merits, then the election would no longer be from grace. Therefore he is not chosen by God because he was going to be such, but he was made such by election, [Augustine] thus saying: «Disputing what God chose in the not-yet-born one, to whom he said that the elder would serve [the younger], and what in the same elder, likewise not yet born, he reprobated, I carried the reasoning to this point, that I said: Therefore God did not choose the works of anyone in foreknowledge, [works] which he himself was to give, but he chose faith in foreknowledge; and whom he foreknew as one going to believe in him, that one he chose, to whom he would give the Holy Spirit, that by performing good works he might also obtain eternal life». — Behold, here he plainly says that he did not choose him on account of works, but on account of the faith by which he foreknew him as one going to believe. But because there is merit also in faith, just as in works, he retracted this, saying: « I had not yet more diligently inquired, nor had I yet found out, of what sort is the *election of grace*, of which the Apostle says: *The remnants shall be saved by the election of grace*; which is not at all grace, if it proceeds from merits, so that now what is given is rendered not according to grace but according to debt — rather to merits than bestowed [as a gift]. Accordingly, what I went on to say: For the same Apostle says: *The same God who works all things in all*. But it is nowhere said: *God believes all things in all*. And then I subjoined: What therefore we believe is ours; but the fact that we work good is His, who gives the Holy Spirit to those who believe. Surely I would not say [this], if I knew already, that faith itself also is found among the gifts of God, which are given in the same Spirit.

Therefore each is ours through the choice of the will, and each has been given through the spirit of faith and charity. — And what I said a little after: For ours it is to believe and to will, but His to give to those believing and willing the capacity of working well through the Holy Spirit, through whom *charity is poured out in our hearts*, is indeed true, but the same rule [applies] and each is His, because He himself prepares the will, and each is ours, because [it] does not come about unless we are willing ». Therefore even the merit of faith comes from God's mercy. Therefore not on account of faith nor on account of any merits did God choose certain ones from eternity, nor [did he] apply the grace of justification in time, but by his gratuitous goodness he chose [them], that they might be good. Whence Augustine in [his] book *On the Predestination of the Saints*: « Not because he foreknew us as going to be such, did he therefore choose [us], but [he chose us] that we might be such, through that very election of his grace by which *he has made us pleasing in his beloved Son*».

To these things, however, seems to be opposed what Augustine says on the prophet Malachi, where it is written: *Jacob I have loved, but Esau I have hated*: « *On whom* *he wills*, he says, *he has mercy, and whom he wills he hardens*. But this will of God cannot be unjust. For it comes from most hidden merits, since even the sinners themselves, although on account of the general [original] sin they have made one mass, yet there is not no diversity among them. Something therefore precedes in [some] sinners, by which, although they are not yet justified, they are made worthy of justification. And likewise something precedes in other sinners, by which they are worthy of being made dull». — Behold, here Augustine seems to say that even God's very will, by which he elects some from merits and reprobates others, does not arise [from open merits], but from most hidden ones — that is, [he means] that on account of [hidden] merits he willed to elect some, [and] to reprobate others, and that on account of [hidden] merits to some the grace of justification is applied, to others not, whence they are made dull. But what he wished to understand is unknown, unless perchance he be said to have understood this, which we said above that he retracted. For there too he goes on at once to subjoin certain other things which in [his] book *Retractationes* he plainly retracts; both of which will be plain to the reader. Whence it is likely that in the foregoing he retracted this also.

Yet certain ones take it in this sense, that what was said was [meant] not that anyone is predestined on account of merits or merits the grace of justification, but that some are not so evil as to merit that grace not be imparted to them. For no one can merit God's grace, by which he is justified; but he can yet merit that it not be applied, that it be utterly cast away. And indeed some have come into so great a depth of iniquity that they merit this, that they are worthy of this; but others so live that, even if they do not merit the grace of justification, yet they do not merit to be altogether driven away and to have grace withdrawn from them. And therefore he said that in certain sinners something precedes by which they are worthy of justification, and in others by which they are worthy of being made dull. — But this is frivolous.

« But many, seeking to render a reason of this depth, and striving according to the conjectures of their own heart to think out the inscrutable height of God's judgments, have departed into fables of vanity, saying that the souls aloft in heaven sin and according to their sins are directed to bodies for [their] merits, and are enclosed in worthy [bodies] as in prisons. These such men have gone after their own thoughts, and willing to dispute about God's depth, have been turned into the depth, saying that souls have lived in heaven before [embodiment] and there have done some good or evil and on account of [their] merits have been thrust down into earthly bodies. But the catholic faith refuses this, on account of the plain saying of the Apostle, by which he says: *When they were not yet born, nor had done any good or evil*» etc. Better therefore is faithful ignorance than rash knowledge. « He chose therefore those whom he willed by gratuitous mercy, not because they were going to be faithful, but that they might be faithful; and he gave them grace, not because they were faithful, but that they might become [so]. For the Apostle says: *I have obtained mercy, that I might be faithful*; he does not say, *because I was faithful*. It is given indeed also to one [already] faithful, but it has also been given previously, that he might be faithful». So also he reprobated those whom he willed, not on account of future merits which he might foresee, yet by a most upright truth and one remote from our senses.

But it is asked whether, just as he is said to have chosen some so that they might become good and faithful, so also it must be conceded that he reprobated some so that they might be evil and unfaithful, and to harden [them] so that they might sin; which it in no way behooves to concede. For reprobation is not the cause of evil in the way predestination is the cause of good; nor does hardening make a man evil in the way mercy makes [him] good.

### Chap. III. *Whether those things which God once knows or foreknows, he always knows and foreknows, and always has known and foreknown.*

Furthermore it must be considered whether all those things which God once knows or foreknows, he always knows and has known, and foreknows and has foreknown; or whether he once knew or foreknew what he does not now know or foreknow. — Concerning foreknowledge, we first respond by saying that he has foreknown many things which he does not now foreknow. For since his foreknowledge is only of future things, from the moment those things which were future become present or pass by, they cease to be under God's foreknowledge, but they are always under [his] knowledge.

Therefore God foreknew all things from eternity that were future, nor does he cease to foreknow, unless when [things] cease to be future. Nor when he ceases to foreknow certain things, which he previously foreknew, does he know them less than he was knowing them before. For it is not said from a defect of his knowledge that he sometimes foreknew certain things, which he does not now foreknow, but from the meaning of the word, which is *foreknowledge*. For to foreknow is to know before something comes to be. And therefore God cannot be said to foreknow except those things which are future.

But concerning [his] knowledge we say otherwise. For God always knows all those things which he ever knows. For every knowledge which he ever has, he always has had and has and will have. — To this, however, it is objected thus: he once knew that this man would be born, who is [now] born; he does not now know that he is going to be born: therefore he knew something which he does not now know. Likewise he knew that the world was to be created; he does not now know that it is to be created: therefore he knew something which he does not now know; and other infinite things of this sort could be adduced. — But to this we say that he now knows the same about the birth of this man and the creation of the world as he was knowing before they came to be, although then and now this knowledge of his must be expressed by different words. For what was then future is now past; and therefore the words must be exchanged to designate the same thing: just as, speaking at different times, we designate the same day now by the adverb *tomorrow*, while it is still future; now by *today*, while it is present; now by *yesterday*, while it is past. So before the world was created, God was knowing that it was to be created; after it has been created, he knows it as created. Nor is this to know diverse things, but altogether the same thing concerning the creation of the world: just as the ancient fathers believed that Christ was going to be born and to die, but we believe that he is now born and dead; nor yet do we and they believe diverse things, but the same things. « For times, as Augustine says, have been varied; and therefore the words have been changed, not the faith ». Without doubt therefore let us hold that God always knows all things which he ever knows.

---