Dist. 41, Part 1, Divisio Textus
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/1/d/41/q/bon-sent-I-d41-p1-divisio
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## Commentary on Distinction XLI.

#### *On the passive causality, or on the meritorious cause of predestination and reprobation.*

> *"If however we ask after the merit of hardening and of mercy, etc."*

### Division of the text.

Above the Master treated of the active causality of predestination and reprobation. In this part he inquires concerning the passive causality, namely whether predestination and reprobation have in us a meritorious cause; and this indeed is what he principally intends in this distinction, which has two parts. In the first the Master investigates the principal proposition; in the second he raises a certain question which arises from what precedes, namely whether God ceases to know or foreknow anything. Through the unfolding of which he manifests the unboundedness of the divine knowledge, there: *"Furthermore it must be considered."*

The first part has four parts. In the first the Master determines the truth by showing that reprobation has a meritorious cause as to its connoted [object], which is hardening; not so predestination as to its connoted [object], which is justification by grace. In the second the Master removes a certain opinion which could lead a man into error, there: *"Yet some have held."* In the third he removes its defense, there: *"To these things, however, it seems to be opposed,"* etc. In the fourth he removes a presumptuous inquiry into this question, showing that certain men, wishing to render a reason concerning this depth of the divine predestination, have fallen into the depth of error, there: *"But many, seeking concerning this depth to render a reason,"* etc.

*"Furthermore it must be considered whether all those things which he once knows, etc."* This is the second part, in which the Master determines the question whether God ceases to know or foreknow anything; and there is likewise the question whether he ceases to predestine anyone; and this part has two [parts]. In the first he determines concerning foreknowledge, that it can happen that something cease to be foreknown. In the second he determines concerning knowledge, there: *"But concerning knowledge we say otherwise,"* where he says that God ceases to know nothing; and in each part he first raises the question, second determines [it].

### Treatment of the questions.

For the understanding of the present distinction, two [matters] are principally asked.

First, [the question] is asked concerning the causality of predestination.

Second, concerning the eternity or unboundedness of the divine knowledge.

As to the first, two [questions] are asked.

First it is asked, whether predestination or reprobation have in us a meritorious cause.

Second, whether they have in God a motive ground.

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