Dist. 42, Art. 1, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/1/d/42/q/bon-sent-I-d42-a1-q1
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### Article unique.
#### *On power (potentia) in comparison to the possibles, [those things] which it can [do].*

### Question I.
#### *Whether God can [do/produce] anything other than himself.*

That God cannot [produce] anything other than himself is shown thus.

1. Every power which acts on something other than the substance in which it is or whose [power] it is, goes out from that substance; for a power does not operate except where it is. If therefore the divine substance operates through its power upon something other than itself, its power begins to be or come-to-be in another: therefore it goes out from the substance. But every power that goes out is removed from the substance, and every such [power] stands at a distance from the substance; and every power standing at a distance from the substance is repugnant to simplicity: since therefore this is impossible in God, it appears that God does not act on anything other than himself.

2. Likewise, every power whose work is in another has a dependence on it. *Proof:* for a work which passes into an underlying matter depends in some way on it; but the power depends on the same [thing] on which the act depends, since it is perfected through the act: therefore if the divine power is [directed] into another, it has a dependence.

3. Likewise, every power which is [directed] toward something that is not always conjoined to its act has neediness — for it is not perfect except when it acts, and it does not act except when the object is present — therefore when [the object] is not always present, [the power] is incomplete; but this is repugnant to the divine power: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, in God to-be-able (*posse*) and to-be (*esse*) are the same; but God is not other than himself: therefore he cannot [extend] to anything other than himself. If you say that *potentia* connotes [an other] but not *essentia*; on the contrary: God can do something which neither is nor was nor will be: therefore [the term *potentia*] connotes nothing. If you say that it connotes that which is in potency; but the power of God is nothing other than God and what is in God: therefore it connotes nothing other either.

**On the contrary:**

1. The good is diffusive of itself; but diffusion, as such, is into another: therefore the good, as good, can [extend] into another: either therefore by its own power, or by another's. If by another's: therefore it is not perfectly good, since it does not have a good act through itself; if by its own power: therefore the good, as good, can [extend] into another; but God is supremely good: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, every perfection of a creature consists in this, that it can produce something other than itself; if therefore everything that belongs to perfection must be attributed to God, the power of producing another is to be attributed to God.

3. Likewise, if [God] cannot [produce] anything other than himself, therefore he is preeminent over none other than himself, therefore nothing is subject to God either: therefore he is to be venerated by none, to be adored by none, and nothing at all is to be sought from him; which is the highest inconvenience, according to all.

4. Likewise, if [God] cannot [produce] anything other [than himself], then there is nothing [ordered] to him nor on account of him; but goodness is in things and [there is] an order through their relation to the highest good, from which is every good: therefore on this account no thing in the universe is good or ordered; but this is the highest inconvenience: therefore it is necessary to posit that he can [extend] into another than himself. The first consequence is manifest; for the ultimate resolution in returning stands solely to that [point] in which the first origin in going-out is, as is manifest.

### Conclusion.

> *God can [produce] another, or [act] upon another than himself, but without any imperfection of distance, dependence, or neediness.*

**I respond:** For the understanding of this it must be noted that to-be-able [to produce] another, or [to act] upon another than oneself, is twofold: either [to act] upon another as upon something distinct according to essence and remote according to distance, as one contrary acts upon another, since it is impossible that two contraries be in the same subject; and in this mode to-be-able [to act] upon another is by the going-out of the power from the substance, and therefore there is here a removal and a distance. And because it is removed from its substance, therefore it depends upon the substance upon which it acts, and therefore there is here a dependence; and because [there is] distance and dependence, therefore [there is] imperfection and neediness. — In this mode to-be-able [to act] upon another does not belong to God on account of the three aforementioned conditions, as has been shown, because they are repugnant to the divine power, namely distance, dependence, and neediness.

In another mode to-be-able [to act] upon another is said as upon something divided [from oneself] according to form and essence, but not however as upon something remote according to any distance, since the divine essence, while it operates, is intimately in [that other]. And in this mode it posits neither distance nor dependence nor neediness. For since the divine essence is perfect with every perfection, and its power is undivided with every kind of indivision, it depends on nothing else, it stands in need of nothing else: this then is the mode in which it must be posited that God can [act] upon another than himself, or [produce] another than himself.

**To the arguments to the contrary:**

*To 1.* From these [things] the first objection is plain. For as to what it first objects: that a power which is [directed] toward another goes out from the agent into the patient; it must be said that this is true where the agent is not in that other according to truth; but where it is, there is no necessity at all of going out.

*To 2.* To that which is objected, that a power which is [directed] toward another depends on it; it must be said that this is true of that [power] whose action is upon another as upon something sustaining [it]; but the divine power does not stand in need of another sustaining [it], which is plain, since it does not need an underlying matter, but makes from nothing. And the reason for this is that, since power is wholly indifferent both from essence and from act, just as essence does not need [anything] sustaining [it], so neither does power.

*To 3.* To that which is objected, that a power which is [directed] toward another has the neediness of perfection; it must be said that a power acting upon another is twofold: a certain [power] which is its [own] act, and such a [power] has nothing more when it acts upon another than when it does not act, and this [power] in no way stands in need; and such is the divine power on account of its supreme simplicity. Another is a power acting upon another through an act differing from itself; and such a [power] has more when it acts than when it does not act, and such is [the power] which has neediness in some mode, as the created power. It is not so with the divine power; and therefore, although it is [directed] toward another which is not always present, on account of this nevertheless it is neither needy nor incomplete.

*To 4.* To the last [it must be] said that *potentia* connotes *possibile*, and the *possibile* extends both to being and to non-being; and just as the *possibile* extends, so also the diversity of the connoted. And therefore it is not said only to-be-able [to act] upon another because it can [act] upon another which is, but because it can [act] upon another which can be; but God cannot of himself be another. Hence the [point] is clear.