Dist. 42, Art. 1, Q. 2
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/1/d/42/q/bon-sent-I-d42-a1-q2
----------------------------------------
### Article unique.
#### *On power (potentia) in comparison to the possibles, [those things] which it can [do].*

### Question II.
#### *Whether God can [do] everything that a created agent can [do].*

Secondly it is asked whether God can [do] everything else, in [respect of] which every created agent can [act]. And that this is so, it appears [thus].

1. For he who says *all* excepts nothing; but we say and believe God to be not only powerful, but omnipotent: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, since God is omniscient, therefore he knows all [things] whatsoever any other knower knows; for if anyone knew something which God did not know, God would not be called omniscient: therefore by parity of reason he would not be called omnipotent, unless he could [do] everything which every other can [do].

3. Likewise, God is not called omnipotent because he does not will all [the things] which others will: therefore by parity of reason, if he could not [do] all [the things] which others can [do], he would not be omnipotent.

4. Likewise, every *being* (*esse*) is from the first *being*, therefore every *being-able* (*posse*) is from the first *being-able*: therefore every power can whatever it can on account of the divine power; but «on account of which each thing [is such], that [thing itself is] also more so»: therefore etc.

**On the contrary:**

1. Some creature can receive all [things] corporeally, as matter [does]; some [creature] can receive all [things] spiritually; but God cannot receive anything: therefore he cannot [do] everything which something other than himself can [do]. If you say that this [belongs] not to power but to impotence; on the contrary: no impotence is from God or from the divine power: therefore on this account the power of matter or of soul would not be from God.

2. Likewise, a man can suffer misery or endure punishment; God cannot suffer: therefore etc. If you say that that [belongs] to impotence; on the contrary: no work of virtue is of impotence; but to endure is a work of fortitude, which is most properly a virtue: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, a man can sin, but God cannot: therefore etc. But if [God] can sin, he can be evil; which is unfitting. If you say that this *being-able* does not [belong] to power; on the contrary: Augustine, *On the City of God*: «Better is the nature which can sin than [the nature] which cannot sin»: therefore *being-able-to-sin* pertains to the nobility and perfection of nature, therefore it does not bespeak impotence.

4. Likewise, a man can run and eat; God cannot [do] this: therefore etc. If you say that this [belongs] to impotence; on the contrary: every [thing] which bespeaks position [a positive state] is from power, which is truly a power; but to run and to eat do not bespeak privative acts, but positive [ones]: therefore they are from power, insofar as it is powerful, not insofar as it is impotent: therefore it is manifest etc.

### Conclusion.

> *God can [do] everything that a created agent can [do], provided that the being-able does not bespeak impotence, in such a way, however, that through himself and in himself he can [do] that which [belongs] to perfect power, but in another [he can do] that which [belongs] to imperfect power, and in no wise that which [belongs] to total impotence.*

**I respond:** It must be said that, as the Philosopher says in *first philosophy*: There are certain [things] which bespeak *power* with respect to the mode of speaking, yet bespeak *impotence* on the side of the thing, as to-be-able-to-die, to-be-able-to-be-corrupted. On account of this it must be understood that there are certain [things] whose *being-able* belongs to power simply and perfectly, as to-be-able-to-understand, to-love and to-operate. There are certain [things] whose *being-able* belongs to power, yet imperfectly, as to-run and to-walk; for these acts bespeak together action and passion or a defect in the agent. There are certain [things] whose *being-able* simply [belongs] to impotence, as privations, as to-be-able-to-sin, to-be-able-to-fail, speaking of these by reason of privation.

According to this it must be understood that, since the power of God is the most perfect power, God can [do] *through himself* and *in himself* those [things] which [belong] to power simply, as to-understand and to-operate. But those [things] which [belong] to imperfect power, [God] can [do] indeed not *in himself*, but *through himself*: he can *through himself* on account of that which is there of perfection and power; *in himself* he cannot, on account of that which is there of imperfection and impotence, which do not fall in him. But those [things] which [belong] simply to impotence, he can neither *in himself* nor can he *through himself*. *In himself* he cannot, because imperfection does not fall in him; *through himself* he cannot, because nothing is from God which is not from God through himself and immediately; but this [thing] which is a defect, cannot be in God nor from God, since God does not fail in being or in acting.

If therefore it be asked whether God can [do] everything that another agent can [do]; the answer is, not simply, but with determination, [namely] that he can [do] everything whose *being-able* belongs to power; and *in himself* he can [do] everything which [belongs] to power simply; *in another* he can [do] that which [belongs] to imperfect power; neither *in himself* nor *in another* [can he do] that which [belongs] to total impotence: and by this very thing he is called omnipotent, since his power suffices for all [things] and fails in none.

**To the arguments to the contrary:**

*To 1, 2, 4.* To that which is objected, that he cannot receive things nor the likenesses of things; it must be said to this and to all [the things] of which [the opponent] objects, that that *being-able* does not [belong] to perfect power. According to this it must be understood that there is *power wholly sufficient and active*, as the power of producing things; and there is *purely passive power*, as the power of receiving; and there is *defective power*, as the power of sinning; and there is *power partly active, partly passive*, as the power of walking; and there is *power partly active and partly defective*, as the power of undergoing punishment; and *power partly passive and partly defective*, as the power of dying. — It must therefore be said that none of these can God [do] *in himself*; for although they are powers of some [thing], yet they derogate from the perfection of power. Nor is the case similar with knowledge, since *the known* does not diminish from the account (*ratio*) of knowledge, as *the possible* [does] from the account of power, because *the known* is not caused by knowledge, as *the possible* [is] by power.

*To 3.* To that, however, which is said of the power of sinning, it must be understood that if *to sin* bespeaks an effect with deformity, or an act, then it bespeaks not only a defective power but [a power] active by reason of the substrate act, and thus it bespeaks nobility; if [it bespeaks the act] by reason of the deformity, then it bespeaks simply a defect. In whatever mode, however, it be said, since it always involves a defect, it in no way befits God.