Dist. 42, Art. 1, Q. 4
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/1/d/42/q/bon-sent-I-d42-a1-q4
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### Article unique.
#### *On power in comparison to the possibles, [those things] which it can [do].*

### Question IV.
#### *Whether something is said to be possible without qualification according to higher causes, or to lower.*

Fourthly and lastly it is asked whether *something possible without qualification* (*possibile simpliciter*) is said [to be such] according to higher causes, or according to lower causes — that is, according to divine power or according to created power. And that [it is said to be such] according to created power, or according to lower causes, [thus] appears.

1. For from the same [source] is *power* (*potestas*) in things, from which is necessity and contingency without qualification; but necessity and contingency are observed in things not only according to higher causes, but rather according to lower, proximate, and particular causes: therefore [so is] *power* (*potestas*) also.

2. Likewise, just as a thing is called *able-to-act* (*potens*) from *active power*, so it is called *possible* from *passive power*: but passive power is first in that in which there is first *potency to coming-to-be* (*potentia ad fieri*), and [is in others] through that: therefore since this [potency] is a material principle and a created cause, *possibile simpliciter* is said [to be such] according to lower causes.

3. Likewise, if *possibile simpliciter* were said [to be such] according to higher causes only, then, since *with God no word is impossible*, nothing would be judged to be impossible.

4. Likewise, if [it is said to be such] according to higher causes, then since God can make a blind man receive sight, it is possible for the blind to see; but if it were possible to see, [he] could see, and if he could, he would have a visual power: but this is false: therefore etc.

**On the contrary:**

1. *Possibile* is said denominatively from *potentia*; therefore *possibile simpliciter* [is said] from *potentia simpliciter*; but the power which is supremely and without qualification power is the divine power, which is said [to be] according to higher causes: therefore *possibile simpliciter* is said [to be such] according to higher causes.

2. Likewise, *that the world be created*, and *that the soul of antichrist be created or be*, and like things, are said to be possible without qualification; and they are possible only according to higher causes: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, this is shown thus: because if something follows upon something, if the antecedent is possible, [so is] the consequent; but, having demonstrated some impossible [thing], such as *that a tree-stump come to be from a calf*, it follows: *that God do this is possible*: therefore this, namely *that a tree-stump come to be from a calf*, is possible without qualification.

4. Likewise, every true [thing] is possible, and every [thing] which was true can be true, and every [thing] which can be true is possible without qualification; and it is possible only according to higher causes: therefore etc.

### Conclusion.

> ***Simpliciter possibile* is sometimes said by prescinding from its causes, sometimes is said according to causes both lower and higher in comparison to *active power*, to which it is referred, sometimes also to *passive [power]*, provided that it is not [merely] *obediential power*.*

**I respond:** It must be said that there have been different ways of speaking on this point.

For *some* said that *possibile simpliciter* is taken according to both [kinds of] causes; and they ground themselves on that [text] of the *First [letter] to the Corinthians*, chapter one: *God hath made foolish the wisdom* etc., Gloss: «He hath made foolish the possible *by declaring* that [that wisdom] itself judges [it] impossible», because *possibile* signifies what is common to both. — However, this does not seem to be able to stand suitably, since it is not granted that it be possible *without qualification* that of a blind man there come to be a seeing man, but rather it is said to be impossible: therefore it would be simultaneously possible and impossible, which is incongruous. Yet this is possible according to higher causes. And the foundation of their position is not suitable, since the Gloss does not only say *by declaring*, but also says [it] *by making* possible: therefore beforehand it was not possible. And again it says: *foolish has it been made*, because worldly wisdom was judging [as] so impossible that it was possible to none, and God declared it to be possible to himself.

And therefore there is another position, that as the sciences descend, so also [do] the names of the sciences: and so in natural philosophy *possibile simpliciter* is to be judged according to lower causes, but in theology according to higher causes. — Yet still the position does not appear to be suitable, since *Anselm* himself, and as a theologian, says that *it is impossible* that of a tree-stump there come to be a calf, and that *things impossible without qualification are possible to God*.

For this reason it must be said *otherwise* that *possibile simpliciter* can signify the order of a *substance* toward that with respect to which it is — an order, I say, which either is or is to be, that is, a power present or future. If it signify [a power] future, then the sense is: *it is possible for a man to run* — that is, *to have* power to run. If it signify a power present, then the sense is: *it is possible for a man to run* — that is, *the man has* power to run; and this twofold way of speaking is taken from the Philosopher, who expounds it in a twofold way: «Every B happens to be A, that is, every [thing] that is B, or every [thing] that can be B, happens to be A».

Now insofar as it signifies a power *of the future*, in this way *possibile* can be taken according to any causes whatsoever, whether higher or lower. And this is plain, because nothing else is then said except that [the thing] *will have* power to this: and from whomever it have it, whether from God or from an Angel or from itself, it is true that it will have the power. And so it must be said that it is possible that this man see, having designated a blind man being illuminated, and that a virgin give birth, and other such things, since to such [things] power can be given.

In *another* mode, that which is *possibile* signifies *actually* a power in the thing, which [power] is signified to be ordered to another: and so the general rule is, that if the conclusion in the thing to which *possibile simpliciter* is attributed is power without qualification, then it is said *possibile simpliciter*; but if [it is] a power [only] *in a certain respect* (*secundum quid*), then it is said *possibile secundum quid*. For since *possibile* signifies the order of power to act, or of something to something else by means of a power; therefore the ground of [its] being said in the *possibile* itself is taken from the *power*.

Now the *name of power* is said in two ways, namely of *active power*, which is the principle of *transmuting another*, and of *passive power*, which is the principle of *being transmuted by another*. And active power is found both in God and in a creature, and either is power *simpliciter complete* with respect to its own act. For active power, by the very fact that it is active, signifies a complete ordering to act, as far as is from itself. But passive power is found only in a creature. And this power can be *proximate to act*, and *remote from act*; therefore passive power is said [to be such] *simpliciter*, and *secundum quid*. For a certain power is born to be reduced to act from a lower power *cooperating with a higher* — as when it is in a *proximate disposition*, such as the power that is in wood toward *ignition*. A certain [power] is born to be reduced from a higher power, [the lower power] being in some way consonant [with the higher], such as the power of an unrighteous man unto justification; and either is said [to be] *proximate*. A certain [power] is so distant from act that, if it be reduced, it can be reduced only by a higher power, and this indeed with the lower active power wholly failing or in no way consonant — such as that of the dead there be made a living [thing], and of a tree-stump a calf: and this is power *secundum quid*.

From which it is plain that *passive power simpliciter* is observed according to higher and lower causes. And because insofar as it signifies a power having the character of obediential [potency] [?], passive power, which is taken by relation to a transmuting agent, [and] active power, insofar as it regards the act, insofar as it is referred to the recipient, or insofar as it regards the act elicited, [?] inasmuch as on the part of the recipient: it is also said that that which regards the moving cause; or [thus]: a cause is transferred [?]. And of this [power], moving outward, regards it [?]; it is said *of the future*; it does not signify anything in it [?], except that it will have power, if it signify [a power] of the present, or of the future, thus *possibile* can be taken according to whatever causes, whether higher or lower; the active power failing or not being consonant, it is a power *called*[?] *the power of obedience*. Or of this [power], which[?] thus is, [as] of what was the rib, would be able [to be], indeed it would be able, whence it could come to be, namely [obediential] power [?]. *Possibile* therefore, that which is said from a power, is not said univocally nor is it said wholly equivocally, but *analogically*, like *sanum* (*healthy*): and therefore the acceptation of it is determined by what is adjoined.

> *Editorial note:* the preceding paragraph (in the Latin column) is the page-top of p. 758 and is heavily garbled in the OCR underlay. The five `[?]` flags mark spots where the OCR strings have collapsed multiple columns or marginal scholia into the running text and the 600 dpi PDF render is also worn in the inner gutter; the resolution is logged in `manual-review/d41-d50-polish-resolution-log.md`.

[*Reset to clean reading from here:*]

Therefore that which is *possibile* can signify the order of *substance to acting*; and from this it signifies *active* power, and this is determined by what is adjoined. For if it signify the order of an uncreated substance to act, it signifies an uncreated active power, as *to illuminate the blind man*. If however it signify the order of a created substance, it signifies a created active power, as if it is said: *it is possible for antichrist to run*, or *it is possible for the blind man to see* — a power in the blind man is signified; therefore [the second] is false without qualification.

Again it can signify the order of something to *coming-to-be* (*fieri*), and this can be twofold: either in comparison to some [terminus] *from which*, or without [such] comparison. If in comparison to something *from which* — as when it is said *it is possible for fire to come to be from air* — then it imports passive power according to the thing. And if it be passive power *simpliciter*, such as that which is according to higher and lower causes, it is said *possibile simpliciter*. But if it be passive power reducible only according to higher causes, it is only *possibile secundum quid*; as if it is said: *of a tree-stump it is possible that a calf come to be*, it must be denied without qualification, unless there be added a contracting determination, as if it is said *possible by the power of obedience*, or *possible to God*. — But if it signify the order of something to *coming-to-be* without comparison to a principle *from which*, then it imports passive power according to mode, but active [power] according to the thing; as if it is said: *it is possible that the soul of antichrist be created*, or *it is possible that a calf come to be*, this is to say *someone can make [it]*; and therefore without [further] determination it is *possibile*, whether according to higher causes or according to lower causes, since by reason of the active power [the sense] is preserved on either side without qualification.

It can also, thirdly, signify the order or comparison of *nothing* to being, as when it is said: *this can be whatsoever has been designated*; and in this mode it signifies determinately neither active power nor passive power, neither according to higher causes nor according to lower causes; whence simpliciter is said whichever of these modes it be.

Only therefore in *one* case is *possibile secundum quid* said [to be such] according to higher causes, namely when it signifies passive power according to mode and thing, as when it is said: *of the blind man there can come to be a seeing man*, and *of a tree-stump there can come to be a calf*, and *of an ass it is possible that a man come to be*.

From these things all the objections to either side are plain: for the objections to the first part proceed from *passive possibile*, and such [things] are not true unless they are reducible through a *non-obediential* power, either to a higher cause by reason of completion, or to a lower [cause].

**To the arguments:**

*To 1.* To that which is objected on the opposite [side], that *possibile* is said denominatively from *potentia*; it must be said that *possibile* can be said denominatively from active or passive power; and because in God there is properly active power, therefore *possibile simpliciter* is said [to be such] according to that from which it is denominated, not according to that from passive [power].

*To 2.* To that which is objected concerning this, that *the world is created*; it must be said that, although it signifies power *by mode of passion*, nevertheless according to the thing it signifies nothing but active power, since before the creation of the world there is nothing except active power; and therefore it is said *simpliciter* according to higher causes.

*To 3.* To that which is objected, that it follows: *if God can make [it], that the thing can come to be*; it must be said that it is true insofar as *potest* signifies the same power *by mode of passion*, and this it signifies when it is said *simpliciter*. But if it truly signify *passive* power, it does not follow, because that which is *possibile* is varied, as is plain, if it is said: *God can make of a blind man a seeing man*: therefore *the blind man can be a seeing man*, or *of the blind man there can come to be a seeing man*. For at first it was signifying active power *simpliciter* and afterwards passive [power]; and therefore it does not follow. Therefore when it is said: *if the antecedent is possible, [so is] the consequent*, it is to be understood with the same possibility.

*To 4.* To that therefore which is objected last, that *every true [thing] can be true, before it is*: it must be said that it is true, and, having designated a blind man becoming seeing, [that] this saying be true is possible, since *possibile* is taken there with respect to the true; and *[the thing] said to be possible*, when it signifies an order toward being or toward being true, signifies power in common with respect to both active and passive, higher and lower. But then it does not follow regarding the thing: therefore this man can see; since it signifies a created active power, namely a visual power. Nor does it follow: therefore of the blind man there will be able to come to be a seeing man, insofar as *potest* posits a power *in act* in that [man]; since it signifies a passive power *disposed*, indeed there is here a fallacy of the consequent; since when *possibile* is taken in its generality, it has three grounds of truth: either because in the blind man there is power to see, or [the] power to receive, or because in another there is power to give; by reason of this it has been said *possibile*, and it will some time become true, as is plain; and so the other objections are plain.