Dist. 42, Dubia
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/1/d/42/q/bon-sent-I-d42-dubia
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### DOUBTS CONCERNING THE TEXT OF THE MASTER.

#### DOUBT I.

In this part there are doubts concerning the text, and first concerning that saying of Augustine: *"God does not do anything except what befits his truth and justice."* For it seems false, because in the Psalm it is said: *"The mercies of the Lord are over all his works"*: therefore he ought rather to say that God does nothing except what befits his mercy. And again, what is the difference between truth and justice?

**I respond:** It must be said that *justice*, in one mode, is the same as the *exigency of merits*, and in this way it is divided against mercy; in another mode it states the *befittingness of [God's] goodness*, and in this mode it comprehends [both] mercy and justice properly so called. And so Augustine takes it in the foregoing saying, and in this mode it differs from *truth* according to the manner of speaking, although in reality it is the same. For *truth* regards each thing in itself; but *justice* regards one thing as compared to another, insofar as by due laws one is bound together with another.

#### DOUBT II.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says: *"God was able to make all things at once, but reason prohibited [it]."* For it seems wrong to say [this], because *being-able-to-be-prohibited* belongs to impotence: therefore if the divine power can be prohibited, it is impotent. — Likewise, that "reason" is either something created or uncreated. If created: then something other than God prohibited the divine power, [and] therefore something can resist God. If uncreated: how can it prohibit, since it is altogether the same [as God]? — Furthermore, this does not seem to be something prohibited, because in Ecclesiasticus 18 it is said: *"He who lives in eternity created all things at once."*

**I respond:** It must be said that *reason* is here called the rational will, and *rationality* in the will, which, although it does not state anything other than the principal signified [thing] from the divine essence, yet connotes something other, namely *a certain congruity in the willed [thing]*, which indeed is not found in its opposite. Which is plain. If all things were produced at once as to their singular being, no creature would do anything, and there would be no course of things in the universe, which there is. Therefore the rational will required this — that God should not make all things at once, although he could; whence *prohibition* is not here taken for repugnance, but for the *restraining of power* as to *act*, not as to *being-able*. And this is the determination of indifference to this work, not to its opposite; and so the objections are clear. For Ecclesiasticus understands [it] as to the principal or prior parts, but Augustine speaks as to individuals.

#### DOUBT III.

Likewise it is asked concerning the difference of those four things which Augustine removes from God, namely *dying*, *being-deceived*, *being-wretched*, and *being-overcome*.

**I respond:** It must be said that these state defects of the man himself, or of the soul in the body. Now there is a fourfold act and a fourfold power. The first is *vivifying*, and its act is *to live*, and against this is the defect of *dying*. The second is *cognitive*, whose act is *to know*, and against this is *being-deceived*. The third is *affective*, and its act is *to will*, that is, to love and to delight, and against this is *being-wretched*. The fourth is *operative*, and its act is *to act*, and against this is *being-overcome* and *being-vanquished*. — And note that, from what is said, four kinds of acts are removed from God, namely *bodily* or instrumental [acts], such as *running*; *culpable* acts, such as sinning, lying; *passive* acts, such as being-overcome and being-vanquished; *defective* acts, such as dying and being-deceived, because they have power conjoined with defect. And from this the Master draws the perfect account of power, [namely] *that it can do all things and suffer nothing*.

#### DOUBT IV.

Likewise it is asked concerning what Augustine says, that *"he received all things so amply that he included even evils."* For it seems false to say [this], because evil is included either by reason of the *substrate*, or by reason of the *deformity*. By reason of the *substrate* it is included even properly, because an evil action by reason of the substrate of the action is from divine power. If by reason of the *deformity*, since that is simply non-being, it does not seem possible to be included.

**I respond:** It must be said that evil is taken by reason of *deformity*; and since *all things* there distributes [the term] for *possibles*, and *possible* can be taken generally, [as proceeding] both from an active and from a defective power, in this way it is taken amply and comprehends evil; and so Augustine understands [it]. In another mode, *possible* is said [to come] from a power which according to reality and mode is a power, and then it is taken *properly*, and then evil is not con-tained there, and in this way it is taken in common use, when we say *God-omnipotent*. And so it is plain that, although [evil] is not contained under *being*, [it is] not similar concerning power.

#### DOUBT V.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says, that *man or an Angel has a gratuitous power*, by which he is powerful. For it seems wrong to say [this], because *generation is a natural act*, since one generates [something] like in nature, therefore it is a natural power; but [it is] not [a power] of God, because God does not naturally produce man: therefore it is of the man, [and] therefore the man has a natural power.

**I respond:** It must be said that *natural* is said in two ways. In one way, that is called natural which is had from nature and according to the consonance of nature; and in this way many creatures have natural powers. In the other way, that power is called natural which is in someone through his *own nature*, in such wise that [it is] not through another nature, neither [a nature] giving nor preserving [it]; and in this mode the divine power alone is natural, but every other [power], [being] from God, is given freely, and is freely preserved and assisted, that it may act, and therefore is called *gratuitous*.

#### DOUBT VI.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says, that *truly and properly the Trinity is called God-omnipotent*. For it seems not true to say [this], because [the Trinity] is not called *properly omniscient*: therefore neither *omnipotent*. — Likewise, in the last [chapter] of Matthew: *"All power is given to me in heaven and on earth."* And concerning others it likewise seems [so], because in Mark 9: *"If thou canst believe, all things are possible to him that believeth."*

**I respond:** It must be said that *omnipotence belongs to God alone properly*, because it states an infinite power, which can be in no creature, neither in Christ nor in any other according to human nature. And this will appear better elsewhere. Hence if *omnipotence* is said of Christ, this is to be understood according to *the communication of idioms*. If however it is said of believers, the *distribution* is *accommodated* only to miracles. And so that [text] is plain.

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