Dist. 43, Art. 1, Q. 2
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/1/d/43/q/bon-sent-I-d43-a1-q2
----------------------------------------
### Question II

*Whether the divine essence is infinite.*

Secondly, the question is asked, whether the divine essence is infinite, or whether the divine power is infinite as to *being*. And that it is so, seems thus:

**1.** Because no power is nobler than its substance; but the divine power is infinite: therefore, since the substance is not less noble nor smaller, it is necessary that the substance be infinite.

**2.** Likewise, if any two things — let it be permitted to speak so — are altogether the same, if one is infinite, so is the other; but the *divine essence* and *power* are the same, as also *being* and *being able*: therefore, since the divine *being able* itself is infinite, so is the *being*, and thus the *essence*.

**3.** Likewise, whenever any two stand in such relation that there is nothing to which the one extends to which the other does not equally extend, if one is infinite, so is the other; but there is nothing whatever to which the power extends to which the essence does not extend — God can never make so many things but that His substance can be in so many, according to what is said in 3 Kings 8: *If heaven, and the heaven of heavens* etc. — therefore etc.

**4.** Likewise, beyond every finite thing something greater can be thought, namely the infinite itself; but the divine essence is so good and great that nothing greater nor better can be thought, otherwise He is not God: therefore etc.

**5.** Likewise, every finite good is better with another good than by itself alone, because a finite added to a finite makes a greater: therefore, if the divine essence is finite, something with another will be greater than it by itself alone: therefore it is not most perfect nor best — which it is altogether unlawful to say.

**6.** Likewise, every finite good can sometimes be matched and made equal through doubling the finite, as is clear in the line — and I say this if that which is doubled makes a greater [thing]; I say this on account of the point — therefore if the divine essence is finite according to nobility and goodness, if the goodness of a creature be doubled, ascending one would eventually arrive at a goodness equal to the divine goodness; but this is false and impossible, that a creature should be proportional to the Creator, and this Augustine says in *On the Trinity* VIII: therefore also that from which it follows, namely that the divine essence be finite.

**On the contrary:**

**1.** «The finite and the infinite, as the Philosopher says, are proper affections of quantity itself»; but the essence as essence has not quantity of mass: therefore, if it be considered as in the abstraction of strength as essence, the divine essence is neither finite nor infinite.

**2.** Likewise, every power which can [do] one thing only, such that not another, is a finite power: therefore by parity of reason, every essence which is one thing only, such that nothing else, is a finite essence; but the divine essence is God and nothing else: therefore etc.

**3.** Likewise, everything that is finite to the supreme truth is simply finite — and this is plain, because the first truth judges of each thing as it is; it is plain also in a similar case, just as this is white and black and good to God, therefore simply good — but the divine essence is finite to the divine truth of cognition, because God comprehends it and knows it perfectly, and «what is known, as Augustine says, is bounded by the comprehension of the knower»: therefore etc.

**4.** Likewise, no infinite delimits another, because nothing gives to another what it does not have: therefore if the divine essence is infinite, then it delimits nothing, therefore it is the end (*finis*) of nothing; and if so: therefore nothing is good.

**5.** Likewise, no infinite is comprehended by a finite; but God is comprehended by the Blessed, because otherwise they would not be blessed unless they knew God perfectly — for the appetite would always be carried toward more and they would not rest, and so they would not be blessed — if therefore He is comprehended, He is not infinite.

**6.** Likewise, no privation is more noble than a habit: therefore, since the infinite expresses a privation, and the finite a habit, and every more-noble thing must be attributed to God, it is plain etc.

### Conclusion

> *The divine essence is altogether infinite in act.*

**I respond:** To this some have wished to say that the divine essence under the aspect of essence is finite, under the aspect of power is infinite. For the essence names God as He is in Himself, and so He is finite, because perfect; finite also, because He is comprehended by a finite, as by the Blessed; and they said this on account of the simplicity of the essence, which they said is seen as a whole. Insofar, however, as He is considered under the aspect of power, so He bespeaks a respect to effects. And because there is no terminus there, since there is always something further to be received, they said that under the aspect of power He was infinite. — But that position was manifestly erroneous. For these two are incompossible, that the power be infinite while the substance is altogether finite, both because they are wholly the same, and because the substance is prior according to the order of understanding, and because to whatever the power extends under the aspect of power so also the essence, as has been shown.

And on this account some have said that He is infinite simply and infinite for us: and they wished to say that both essence and power are finite according to truth, because [they are] finite to God, who is truth; but nevertheless each is infinite for us, because He exceeds us disproportionately. Whence «God is called infinite, because He is comprehended neither by place nor by time nor by comprehension», as Damascene says. — But again this position cannot stand, since, as has been proved above concerning the power, that it has no terminus in its capacity, and again, it is wholly in act, and therefore is rightly held to be truly infinite; so also can be proved concerning the essence.

It is necessary therefore that it be altogether infinite in act. And this is to be conceded and held as true, because it is more consonant with the faith, which calls God *immense*, and more consonant with the authorities of the Saints, who all call Him infinite, whence Damascene says that God is «a certain infinite sea of substance»; more consonant also with the judgements of the masters, more consonant also with reason.

For the understanding therefore of the objections on the opposite side, it is to be noted that the infinite is said by abnegation of an end. The infinite then can be said in two ways, namely on the side of the negation, and likewise on the side of the end. On the side of the end: for *end* is said in two ways, in one way as that which is *complement*; and so the infinite is said by privation of complement, and in this way

the infinite is said in matter and in the genus of substance and in the other genera; and in this way it does not fall in God, because He is most perfect. In another way *end* is said *terminus*, as the boundary of a field, and so the infinite is said to be that which lacks terminus and stopping-point. — And this can be in two ways according to negation, because it can be understood *privatively* and *negatively*: *privatively*, because it has no terminus, but is nevertheless of a nature to have one, on account of the fact that it has a limited being, and in this way it bespeaks incompletion, and is not in God. In the other way *negatively*, in that it has no terminus and is not of a nature to have [one]: and in this way it is placed in God on account of His supreme immensity.

**1.** To the objection therefore that the infinite is an affection of quantity, it can be said that just as the name *quantity* is extended to *quantity of strength*, so likewise the name *infinite*. Quantity of strength, however, is considered not only as to the work, but also as to the nobility of value; and this is plain because, as Augustine says, «in spiritual things the greater is the same as the better».

**2.** To the objection that He is one in such a way that He is not another; it must be said that something can be compared to many in two ways: either according to the comparison of causality, or according to the comparison of identity. To be compared to many under the aspect of causality belongs to the infinite, because [He is] infinite: but according to the aspect of identity, no. Whence, because [He is] infinite, therefore He extends to many, but it does not follow that He is many. Whence if the essence or the power be compared according to the aspect of identity to things, neither is of many: whence neither is the divine power some other powers, nor the essence some other essences; if according to the aspect of causality, so it belongs both to the power and to the essence. For just as it belongs to the power to make many, so to the essence to be in many.

**3.** To the objection that it is finite to the supreme truth; it must be said that this is twofold: for either it is finite to the supreme truth because the [supreme] mind judges that it is finite, or because it does not exceed His comprehension. In the first way God is not finite to Himself, but infinite; for He truly knows Himself to be infinite. In the second way He is finite, because He does not exceed Himself, since He is infinite; and so the argument is not valid, and there is the fallacy *of qualified and simple*: if it does not exceed the infinite, then it is simply finite.

**4.** To the objection that the infinite does not delimit; it must be said that *the infinite by privation* of perfection does not delimit; but *the infinite by negation* of limitation has the character of delimiting, because, since He is supreme, in Him is every stopping-place: for in this case infinity is not repugnant to simplicity nor to complement.

**5.** To the objection that He is comprehended; it must be said that He is not comprehended by inclusion, but is comprehended by perfect vision, love, and holding, and this on the side of the one comprehending and not of the one comprehended; and therefore, because [the comprehender] is perfected, he rests, although he does not reach beyond.

**6.** What was lastly objected has been answered; for it objects concerning the infinite according as it is said privatively; but as it is said of God, it does not bespeak a privation according to reality, but only as to the mode of signifying; and the supreme position answers to it. For nothing is called immense, except what has the supreme and most perfect actuality and constricts and determines nothing. Whence, even though it may seem to be said privatively, yet according to truth it excludes every privation.