Dist. 43, Art. 1, Q. 4
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/1/d/43/q/bon-sent-I-d43-a1-q4
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### Article unique.

### Question IV.
#### *Whether the ground of divine power extends to infinite things.*

Fourthly and lastly there is asked concerning the infinity of divine power as regards the *ground of operating* (*ratio operandi*), and it is asked whether the *ground of operating* extends to infinity. And that it does, [thus] appears:

1. Because whatever God can [do], he can do reasonably; but he can [do] infinite things: therefore he can reasonably [do] infinite things. And if this [is so], then the *ground of operating* of his very power extends to infinite things.

2. Likewise, just as the *ground of knowing* (*ratio sciendi*) stands to knowledge, so the *ground of producing* (*ratio producendi*) [stands] to power; but since the divine knowledge is infinite, it has in itself infinite grounds of knowing: therefore since the divine power is infinite, likewise it has infinite grounds of producing.

3. Likewise, the *ground of operating* in God is nothing other than goodness and wisdom; but wisdom and goodness are infinite: therefore the *ground of operating* also.

4. Likewise, the *ground of operating* in God is nothing other than God or the divine essence, whatever that ground be called; but the divine essence is infinite: therefore the *ground of operating* also [is infinite].

**On the contrary:**

1. Power extends to works according to the demand of [its] ground — for it omits nothing of those things which [its] ground demands — therefore if its ground extends to infinite things, then it appears that the divine power produces infinite things, which is false.

2. Likewise, the *ground of operating* is the very art and disposition; but [a] disposition is only of finite things: therefore the *ground of operating* is only of finite things.

3. Likewise, the *ground of operating* is the very divine justice, since *all the ways of the Lord are mercy and truth*; but justice is only of finite things: therefore it appears that the *ground of operating* [is so] likewise.

4. Likewise, an objection is raised from foreknowledge, which is likewise a *ground of operating* and is of more [things] than power, since [it extends] in respect to evils; and yet it is not in respect to infinite things. If you say that *disposition* or *foreknowledge* or *justice* does not embrace the full ground through which the divine power can operate; *on the contrary*: if it does not embrace the whole [ground], then the divine power can operate reasonably without these: therefore it is possible that God operate apart from disposition, apart from justice, and apart from foreknowledge. But no such [agent] operates wisely or rightly: therefore etc. It remains, therefore, that [the *ratio operandi*] embraces the whole ground.

### Conclusion.

> *The ground of operating in God, in respect to the act which is "to be able" (posse), is taken as a habit and extends to infinite things; in respect to the act which is "to make" (facere), it is taken in act and is finite according to the divine disposition.*

**I respond:** As *the Master says in the text*, some have wished to say that *the ground of divine power is finite*. And from this they wished to limit divine power, both because [God] cannot make [anything] except from the best ground, nor leave it aside, and because he cannot make [anything] except foreknowing, [and] nothing except justly; and therefore, since these [grounds] are of finite things, namely of those which he makes, they said that the divine power cannot [do] other things than those it makes. — But this position is erroneous, as the Master shows in the text, because by limiting it, it derogates from the immensity of the nobility of divine power; and it is said to have belonged to *Master Peter Abelard*. The ground of this foolish position was that they did not know how to distinguish the ground of power from its act. For the act of power is twofold: one through the mode of a habit, namely *to be able* (*posse*), the other through the mode of [an] act, namely *to operate* (*operari*).

When therefore it is asked whether *the ground of divine power is infinite*: it must be said that, just as the act is twofold, so the ground can be taken in two ways. For with respect to the act which is *to be able*, the ground is taken as a habit, namely the divine knowledge and the becomingness of the divine goodness: and this ground extends to infinite things, just as does the power itself with respect to the act which is *to be able*. But with respect to the act which is *to make*, the ground is taken in act, namely the divine disposition or foreknowledge and the demand of merits. For he makes nothing except what he disposes; nor does he repay anything, except according as merits demand, when he repays; he governs no thing nor rules [it] otherwise than its nature or natural justice demands.

And according to this distinction the response to what was first asked and to the arguments introduced is plain; for some proceed by one way, [and] some by another.

*To 3 and 4.* To that which is afterwards objected concerning justice, it must be said that *justice*, insofar as it expresses the becomingness of the divine goodness and power, is in this way a general ground which embraces the whole *to-be-able* (*posse*); but insofar as it connotes a demand on the part of merits, in this way it does not embrace the whole *to-be-able* nor the whole *to-act*; but insofar as it connotes the becomingness of goodness with respect to any time [whatsoever] in act, in this way it embraces *to-act*, but *to-be-able* [it does] not. Likewise *disposition* and *foreknowledge* embrace *to-act*, but not *to-be-able*; but *to-act* is in respect to finite things, just as those [merits] are, but *to-be-able* is in respect to infinite things.

Therefore to what is then objected, that God can operate reasonably without these; it must be said that it is false, nor does it follow from that [premise]. For although God can [do] more things than he wills, nevertheless he cannot operate without willing; since he can do nothing without being able to will, [and] likewise to foreknow and to dispose. For it is necessary that the power in carrying [the work] out be made equal to those, namely to disposition and to will, but it is not required of the power as "able" [in itself]: therefore it does not follow that he could make [anything] without these.