Dist. 43
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/1/d/43/q/bon-sent-I-d43-littera
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## DISTINCTION XLIII.

### Chapter I.

#### *An invective against those who say that God can do nothing except what he wills and does.*

That, however, certain men, glorying in their own sense, have tried to constrict God's power within a measure. For when they say: *"Up to this point God can [act] and no further,"* what else is this than to confine and restrict to a measure his power, which is infinite? For they say: *"God cannot do anything other than what he does; nor can he do better that which he does; nor can he omit anything from those things which he does."* And this their first opinion they strive to fortify with probable arguments and contrived reasons, and likewise with the testimonies of the sacred authorities, saying: *"God cannot do [anything] except what is good and just to be done. But it is not just and good to be done by him except what he does. For if some other thing is just and good for him to do than he does, then he does not do everything which is just and good for him to do. But who would dare to say this?"*

They add also: *"He cannot do [anything] except what his justice requires; but his justice does not require him to do anything except what he does: therefore he cannot do [anything] except what he does. And the same justice requires that he not do that which he does not do; nor can he do anything against his justice: therefore he cannot do any of those things which he omits."*

To these we reply, opening up a twofold understanding of the words and unrolling from them the things wrapped up, thus: *"God cannot do [anything] except what is good and just,"* that is, he cannot do [anything] except that which, if he did it, would be good and just — [this] is true; but he can do many things which are not good nor just, because they neither are nor will be, neither are well done nor will be done, because they will never be done.

Likewise, what was proposed in the second [argument]: *"He cannot do [anything] except what his justice requires; and he cannot do that*  *which his justice requires, so that it not be done;"* we say that the word *"requires"* is not properly nor congruously said of God. And in those expressions there is a twofold sense. For if you understand: *"he cannot do [anything] except what his justice requires,"* that is, except what his just will wills, you say what is false. For the justice of God is taken to be his own most equitable will, in the way that Augustine takes it when, expounding those words of the Lord in Genesis spoken to Lot, *"I cannot do anything until you enter there"* [Gen. 19:22], he says: «*"Not to be able,"* he says, *"he said of himself — what without doubt he could do by power, but could not do by justice"»;* as if he meant: he could indeed, but he did not will, and that will was just. But if through these words you understand [it to mean] that he cannot do anything except that which, if it were done, would befit his justice, you speak truly. Similarly distinguish that: *"He cannot do what his justice requires, so that he not do it,"* that is, he cannot do that which he himself, who is supreme justice, does not will to do — this is false. But if by these words you understand that he cannot do what cannot befit his justice, you speak truly.

They add also other [things] saying: *"God cannot do [anything] except what he ought; but he ought not to do [anything] except what he does. For if he ought to do other [things], then he does not do everything which he ought; but if he does everything which he ought, then he cannot do [anything] except what he ought: therefore he cannot do [anything] except what he does."* — *"Likewise, either he ought to omit what he omits, so that he not do it, or he ought not. If he ought not, he does not rightly omit it; but if he ought to omit it, then he ought not to do it. But if he ought not, then it is neither becoming nor fitting for him to do it; and if it is neither becoming nor fitting for him to do it, then he cannot do it: therefore he cannot do [anything] except what he does. Nor can he omit that which he does, without doing it, because he ought to do it; and what he ought to do, he cannot omit."* — But as it seems to me, this word *"ought"* has venom. For it contains a manifold and convoluted understanding; nor does it properly belong to God, who is debtor to no one, unless perhaps by promise; whereas we are debtors by commission. But that the venom may be drained, distinguish the senses of the word: *"God cannot do [anything] except what he ought,"* that is, except what he wills — this is false; for thus he can himself be said *"to owe"* something, because he wills it. But if it is said: *"He cannot [do anything] except what he ought,"* that is, he cannot [do anything] except that which, if he did it, would well befit him — this is true.

Likewise they adjoin another [thing] saying: *"He neither does nor omits anything except by an optimal and rational cause, although it be hidden from us, according to which it is fitting for him to do or omit those things which he does or omits. For the ground is in him, by which he does these things and omits those; and this ground is eternal and ever-abiding, beyond which he cannot do or omit anything. With that [ground], therefore, remaining, he cannot omit what he does, nor do what he omits, and so he cannot do [anything] except what he does."* — And to this we reply, opening up the ambiguity. For *"cause"* is called *"ground,"* and in this mode it is more fitting to say that God by an optimal cause does what he does, and omits what he omits; it is indeed true, because in him there is a most equitable will, by which he does and omits what he wills. He cannot [act] otherwise, nor act apart from that [will], nor omit those things which he does, nor do those which he omits; but with the same ground remaining, he can do and omit other things. Although therefore the ground is in him, by which he does some things, omits others, nevertheless according to that same ground he can both omit what he does, and do what he omits.

They themselves moreover adjoin: *"It is the ground that he does what he does and not other things; and he cannot do [anything] except what it is a ground for him to do: and so he cannot do [anything] except what he does. Likewise, it is a ground that he omits what he omits; and he cannot not-omit what it is a ground for him to omit: and so he cannot not-omit what he omits."* — And to this we say that the expressions are ambiguous, and therefore must be determined. For if, when it is said: *"He cannot do [anything] except what it is a ground for him to do,"* you understand that he cannot do [anything] except those things which are rational, and those which, if they were done, would be rational — the sense is true. But if you understand that he cannot do other rational and good things, except those which he wills and does — the understanding is false.

Likewise they adjoin another, saying: *"If God can do anything other than he does, then he can do what he did not foreknow; and if he can do what he did not foreknow, he can act without foreknowledge, since everything which he foreknew himself to be about to do, he does, nor does he do anything which he did not foreknow. But if it is impossible for anything to come into being apart from his foreknowledge, then everything which is foreknown must necessarily come into being: therefore that another thing should come into being than what comes into being is by no reason possible: therefore nothing can be done by God except what is done."* — But this question concerning foreknowledge can easily be determined by the things which were said above, when we treated of foreknowledge.

To these moreover those searchers, *"who have failed in searching out the scrutiny,"* attach the testimonies of the Saints. For Augustine says in the book *On the Symbol*: «This alone God cannot [do], namely, what he does not will.» By which it seems that he cannot do anything except what he wills; but he wills only what he does: and so it seems he cannot [do anything] except what he does. — But this must be understood thus: This alone God cannot [do], namely, what he does not will — namely, that he himself be able. — The same in the seventh book of the *Confessions*, speaking to God says: «Nor are you forced unwilling to anything, because your will is not greater than your power; but it would be greater, if you yourself were greater than yourself». From this it seems that God cannot [do] more than he wills, just as he does not will more than he can. For just as the will is not greater than the power, so  neither is the power greater than the will. And therefore, as he does not will more than he can, so [they say] that he cannot [do] more than he wills. — But to this we say that neither is the will greater than the power, nor the power than the will, because the power and the will are one and the same reality, namely, God himself, who would be greater than himself if his will were greater than his power, or his power than his will. Nor is it denied by this authority that God can [do] more than he wills, since more things are subjects of his power than of his will.

Let us therefore confess that God can do many things which he does not will, and can omit those which he does. And that this may be the more certainly and firmly held, let us bring forward testimonies of Scripture, [showing] that God can do more than he does. Truth himself according to Matthew says: *"Do you think that I cannot ask my Father, and he will furnish me at once more than twelve legions of Angels?"* From which words it is patently signified that the Son could have asked what he was not asking, and the Father exhibit what he was not exhibiting. Each, therefore, was able to do what he was not doing. Augustine also in the *Enchiridion* says: *"The will of the Omnipotent can do many things which it neither wills nor does: for he could have made twelve legions of Angels fight against those who seized Christ."* Likewise in the same work: «Why have miracles not been done among certain men, which, if they had been done, would have brought those men to repentance; and have been done among those who were not to be believers? Then will not lie hidden what now lies hidden. Nor did God unjustly will not [those] to be saved who could have been saved, if he had willed [it]. Then in the most brilliant light of Wisdom will be seen what now the faith of the godly holds, before it is seen by manifest cognition — how certain and immutable and most efficacious is the will of God, who is able to do many things and does not will, but wills nothing which he cannot». The same in the book *On Nature and Grace*: «The Lord raised Lazarus in body. Is it to be said that he could not raise Judas in mind? He could indeed, but he did not will».

By these authorities and many others it is openly taught that God can do many things which he does not will. Which can also be proved by reason. For God does not will to justify all men, and yet who doubts that he can? God therefore can do other than he does, and yet, if he were to do otherwise, he himself would not be other. And he can will other than he wills, and yet his will can in no way be other or new or mutable. For even if he can will what he never willed, nevertheless [he can will it] not newly nor by a new will, but only by an eternal will. For he can will what from eternity he was able to have willed. For he has the power of willing both now and from eternity, that which nevertheless he neither now wills nor from eternity has willed.

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