Dist. 44, Art. 1, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/1/d/44/q/bon-sent-I-d44-a1-q1
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### Article I. *On the possibility of a better world.*
### Question I. *Whether God could have made the world better as to the substance of its integral parts.*

That he could have made the world better as to the substance of its integral parts is shown thus.

1. The parts that integrate the world are of finite goodness, both intensively and extensively; but for every finite thing something greater and better can be thought of; but God can do more than man can understand: therefore, etc. If you say that the world could not have received more, this does not solve it, because God makes the capacity: therefore he could have given a greater capacity, since his power is infinite.

2. Likewise, the highest creature in the universe is finite, therefore it is distant from God to infinity; but within an infinite distance one must posit infinite degrees: therefore beyond the goodness of the [existing] creatures one can think of creatures possessing degrees of goodness, and from these the world could have been made whole: therefore, etc.

3. Likewise, it is plain that God could have made the world out of parts greater in mass — a wider or broader heaven and a wider earth: therefore if he could make it greater in mass, by the same reasoning [he could make it] greater also in power: and if so, then better, absolutely.

4. Likewise, matter taken as a whole is capable of the most noble form, as is evident: if therefore God could give what the nature of matter could receive, then he could have given to the whole of matter and to all its parts the perfection of the most noble form, namely of rational nature: therefore he could have made a world that would consist of rational substances alone. And if so, then the world would have all its parts better according to substance: therefore, etc.

**On the contrary:**

1. Augustine in the third book *On Free Will*: « Whatever in true reason occurs to you as better, know that God has made it as the founder of all goods; but that what you think of in true reason should not exist, is impossible. For neither can you think anything better in a creature than has escaped the creator's notice ». Therefore no noble creature can be thought of which is not of the constitution of the world.

2. Likewise, Augustine in the twelfth book of the *Confessions*: « Two things you made, Lord, one near to you, the other near to nothing », namely the angelic creature and primary matter; but no greater span can be thought of than from God's nearness to nothing: therefore there could not have come to be a world that was apt to embrace more natures of things: therefore the world could not have been made better as to capacity. But it is plain that this capacity is not empty as to any degree, otherwise neither would the world be perfect, nor could the universe be called perfect: therefore neither could this [world] hold more, nor could another be made more capacious.

3. Likewise, primary matter has been created in every kind of possibility and in perfect obedience with respect to the Creator: therefore if the capacity of matter itself is considered according to its possibility and obedience, which it had toward God, and it is created in supreme possibility and in supreme obedience, then the world as to capacity could not have been made better. If therefore God gave to each thing as much as it was capable of, then in no way could it have been made better.

4. Likewise, however good a creature is made, it must of necessity be finite: therefore a stopping-point must at some time be set, such that a creature can in no way be made better, without derogating in any way from divine power; but on the same ground on which one stops at any species of creature, one stops at the supreme species of spiritual creature: no creature or species therefore can be made nobler than that. And « if the best in a genus is better than the best in another, then absolutely this is better than that »; therefore, if the best in the universe is the best of every creature

that can be a creature, then absolutely this [world] is so good that nothing better can come to be than it.

### Conclusion.

> **Conclusion.** God could have made another world better as to the substance of its parts, but this [present] world only better and greater according to accidentals.

**I respond:** It must be said that an excess of substantial goodness in things can be considered in two ways: as to the nobility and grades of essences — and in this way it is said that the species of man is better and nobler than the species of an ass; or as to being, insofar as it concerns addition or augmentation, as it is said that a mark of gold is better than an ounce — not because it has a nobler form or essence, but because it has more of the substance of gold and thereby more of its goodness and value.

When therefore it is asked whether God could have made the world better as to the substance of its parts, if you understand it of an excess in the first mode, [namely] that the world would consist of better and nobler essences, *I say that this world* which now is could not have been made better, because it would not be this [world] but another; just as, if this one who has been made a man had been made an ass, he would not be the one who is. Yet since his power is not narrowed nor limited, I do not see why he could not have made the world better by this kind of betterment.

If however you understand it as to the second mode, then I say that not only another but also this very [world] he could have made better, just as also greater. And if he had done so, it would not be another; just as he could make this child to be as great as a giant, having more of substance and power, and yet not be other than he is.

I therefore concede the arguments proving that God could absolutely have made another world better as to the substance of its parts, and also have made this very [world] greater as to magnitude of parts and as to power, though not as to the nobility of essences. And this is what Augustine wishes to say in the aforementioned authority *On Free Will*, that no nobler essence can rationally be thought of as in this world which is not there. For if you think the parts to be better, this is either according to the whole or according to a part: if according to the whole, then you no longer think of this world but of another; if according to a part, then you destroy the order and perfection of this world: as if you think that God had made the moon as bright as the sun, or earth like heaven, you do not think rationally, because you destroy the universe. « For all things would not be, if they were equal ». And this is what Augustine says *On Free Will*: « It is not true reason, but envious infirmity, when, having thought that something ought to have been made better, you then want nothing else more lowly to be made, just as if, the heaven being perfect, you should be unwilling for the earth to have been made — in which case you would altogether be thinking unjustly ».

And thus it is clear that the last objection to the first part is sophistical, on the ground that this did not belong to the universe, that matter taken as a whole should be perfected by the most noble form.

**Replies to the contrary arguments:**

*Ad 1.* To that which is objected on the contrary side from the authority of Augustine *On Free Will*, the response is already clear, because he understands it of this world, and of betterment according to essence, as is plain from the text.

*Ad 2.* To that which is objected, that there is the greatest distance in the universe; it must be said that *near to God* can be understood in two ways, namely as to

immediate reception and conversion into God, or as to supreme imitation and assimilation. In the first way the angelic nature is near to God, absolutely speaking; but in the second way only by *comparison*, because it is more unlike than like, and falls short more than it expresses — indeed it is distant by infinite grades; and therefore a greater nearness is thinkable by us and possible for God, although it is not at present.

*Ad 3.* To that which is objected, that matter is created in every possibility; it must be said that no creature does God fully complete as to the possibility of obedience, because that belongs to the all-encompassing dominion of the Creator, but he completes its capacity and possibility, as it is disposed by certain dispositions. And thus God completes matter, because he has limited its capacity by due dispositions, and to those [dispositions] he has joined completive and perfective forms, so that he has left nothing incomplete. Yet who would dare to say that God could not dispose more nobly and perfect by nobler forms, according to the infinity of his wisdom and power? When therefore it is said: *he gave to each* as much goodness as it was capable of — this is understood of the capacity, not as it expresses remote possibility and obedience with respect to the Creator, but as together with this it expresses disposition and exigency; and this disposition God could certainly have made greater.

*Ad 4.* To that which is objected, that in creatures there must be a stopping-point; it must be said that, just as a coin always has a stopping-point in act, yet there is never given any stopping-point beyond which the divine power could not extend itself; so it must be understood in magnitude of mass and of goodness — that, however much it be in a creature, there is always a stopping-point, because it is finite; and God acts well thus far, so that he does not act further — but that he could not act further, this is never to be granted, as I believe. And therefore, if he had made another world better than this one, it would still remain further to ask why he did not make a still better one, since he can; and so on indefinitely; and therefore such a question is irrational, and no solution can be given except this: that he willed, and he himself knows the reason. Yet even if he did not make it, no one can argue [against him], because this whole that he made was grace; nor was there any exigency by reason of which envy could be supposed to have been in him.