Dist. 44, Art. 1, Q. 2
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/1/d/44/q/bon-sent-I-d44-a1-q2
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### Question II. *Whether the world could have been made better as to the properties of its integral parts.*

Secondly, it is asked whether the world could have been made better as to the properties of its integral parts. And that it could, is shown as follows.

1. Isaiah 30: *The light of the moon shall be as the light of the sun, and the light of the sun shall be as the light of seven days*; this also the Master adduces along with this authority: « God could,

he says, have made such a man who would neither will nor be able to sin; and if he had made such a one, who doubts that he would have been better »: therefore, etc.

2. Likewise, Augustine *On Genesis according to the Letter*, and the Master adduces this authority: it will be; therefore it can be; therefore God could establish [it], and so of other bodies: and if this is so, things would surely be better: therefore, etc.

3. Likewise, the property of incorruptibility and rest is better than that of corruption and motion; but everything that God made, he made either corruptible or in some way mobile: therefore he could have made all things better.

4. Likewise, if creatures could not have been made better, this was either because God could not give more, or because creatures could not receive more. If because God could not give more, then the divine power is limited; if because creatures could not receive more — on the contrary: we see all day long creatures being made better and worse, while their substance and capacity remain: therefore, etc.

**On the contrary:**

1. « It belongs to the best to bring forth the best things », as Dionysius says; but nothing can be better than the best: therefore if God, since he is the best, brought forth things in the best way, the matter is clear, etc.

2. Likewise, Plato adds the reason: « Moreover, because he is best, and from the best all envy was banished »; and therefore he gave to each creature as much goodness as it was able to receive. If you say that Plato's word is not valid, because envy is not with respect to one's inferior; on the contrary: Augustine *On Genesis according to the Letter*: « If he could not have made good things, there would be no power; if he could, but would not, there would be great envy »: therefore by parallel reasoning, if he could have made better things and would not, he would be envious.

3. Likewise, it appears from reason: because every agent acting from its whole substance makes a thing in the best mode in which it can be made, if nothing impedes its power; but God is an agent [acting] from his whole power in every action, and his power has no deficiency or resistance: therefore whatever he makes, he makes so good that it can in no way be made better.

4. Likewise, this is true *per se*: « good is diffusive of itself »; therefore the more good, the more diffusive, and the supremely good, supremely diffusive; but God is an agent of supreme goodness, therefore he diffuses himself supremely: therefore it seems that he makes each thing in the best way both as to substance and as to properties.

### Conclusion.

> **Conclusion.** The transient parts of this world could have been made better as to their properties; likewise the permanent parts, if considered absolutely, but not in relation to the end.

**I respond:** It must be said that when one asks about the betterment of the parts of the universe, one can ask about two kinds of parts: either as to the permanent parts, such as intellectual, rational, celestial, and elemental nature; or as to the transient parts, such as this man and this horse.

If as to the transient parts, then without distinction I concede that they can in most cases be made better as to their properties, since they do not belong to the substance of the universe, nor are they from God alone, but from God acting together with a particular agent, which is impeded and defective. But if we understand it of those parts which are of the constitution and integrity of the world and are immediately from God — when it is asked whether they could have been made better as to their properties, a distinction must be drawn: because either you speak of them absolutely, or of them in relation to the end. If of them absolutely, it is clear that they could have had better conditions; if of them in relation to one another or to the end, they had the best properties: which is clear because, as Augustine says: « God judged men to be better, if they should serve him freely ». Likewise it was better that all men should be from one, and so that they should have an animal body; and according to its exigency it was necessary that other corporeal creatures be disposed in motion and corruptibility.

From these things the reasons brought forward to the first part are clear; for they proceed from the properties of things considered in themselves.

**Replies to the contrary arguments:**

*Ad 1.* To that which is objected on the contrary side concerning Dionysius, it must be said that this is to be understood according to order, as will soon appear.

*Ad 2.* To that which is objected concerning Plato, it must be said that it does not have truth unless it is understood with the order of the universe preserved, and this as to essential goodness, the disposition in matter being considered. Nor is his reasoning necessary, but only a persuasion by likeness: just as in the case of a man, who can do good to another and

does not, [in which case] this is judged envy, and he often refrains on account of envy, and one who lacks envy does the opposite; so God, lacking envy, made [things]; and so is Augustine's word to be understood.

*Ad 3.* To that which is objected, that an agent [acting] from its whole power produces in the best way: it must be said that an agent [acting] from its whole power acts in one of two ways: some act according to impulse, some according to art and wisdom. And he who acts according to impulse makes [a thing] as good as he can; he who acts according to art and wisdom acts as much as he wills and as much as is fitting, with order preserved, since « it belongs to the wise man to set things in order ». Therefore he makes some things good, some better, some best. And thus it is clear that this does not follow.

*Ad 4.* To that which is objected, that the supreme good supremely diffuses itself: it must be said that this is true of natural diffusion; of voluntary or purposeful [diffusion] it is not true. In the first mode the diffusion is in the production of [the divine] persons; in the second mode, in the production of creatures.