Dist. 44, Art. 1, Q. 3
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/1/d/44/q/bon-sent-I-d44-a1-q3
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### Question III. *Whether God could have made the world better as to the order of its parts.*

Thirdly, it is asked whether God could have made the world better as to the order of its parts. And that he could not, seems first from authority.

1. Genesis 1: *God saw all things that he had made, and they were very good*; Augustine's Gloss: "Each thing good in itself, but in the whole most good." But than the most good nothing is better: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, Augustine says, "that although another mode of our liberation was possible for God, none was more congruent for healing our miserable state in need of salvation." But just as God was the wisest redeemer, so also the wisest founder: therefore if he redeemed in the most ordered way, such that no mode could have been better or more congruent, then likewise he did so in making things: and thus the matter is clear, etc.

3. Likewise, if we consider the order of the elements in the world, it is clear that they have been most well ordered. Hence it cannot be conceived that those four bodies should be ordered better, whether according to qualities, or according to noble forms, or according to numerical proportions, as eight and twenty-seven are bound together — which are the first two solid square numbers — they are bound together by two intermediates, namely twelve and eighteen: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, "it belongs to the wise man to order": therefore to the highest wise man it belongs to order in the highest or best way: therefore God so well ordered things that in no way could he have ordered better.

**On the contrary:**

1. That order is of finite goodness: therefore if the wisdom of God is infinite, and the infinite exceeds the finite, then God knew how to order better. But whatever he knew, he could do: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, an order in which no disorder falls is better and nobler than one in which disorder does fall; but in the universe many disorders and deformities fall: therefore another order could have been made better.

3. Likewise, that which is nearer to the end is better ordered: therefore if all things are most well ordered, all things are equally conjoined to the end: therefore all things share in beatitude; which is absurd.

4. Likewise, the goodness of order depends on the goodness of the parts, as the relative on the absolute; but things according to absolute being are not optimal: therefore neither in order.

> **Conclusion.** As to the order of parts in the universe, the first and substantial parts are most well ordered; the corruptible parts, taken absolutely, could indeed have been ordered better, but not in relation to the end. As to the order to the end, things, saving the order of the universe, are most well ordered.

**I respond:** It must be said that there is an order of parts *in the whole*, and an order of parts *to the end*. The first order respects wisdom, the second respects goodness. And these two orders are so conjoined that the one conforms to the other, and the order of parts *in the universe* exists for the sake of the ordering *to the end*.

If, then, we speak of the order of parts in the universe, this is either as to the first substantial parts; and these without distinction are most well ordered, so that they could not have been ordered better, because in them consists the *substantial order* and the *unchanging beauty of the universe*. Or as to the corruptible and remote parts, and this in two ways: either absolutely and as of now; and so they could have been ordered better, and at some time will be ordered better; or simply and in relation to the end; and so things are most well ordered in the universe, insofar as it accords with the ordering to the end.

Likewise, things are most well ordered to the end, saving the order of the universe, because the universe is like a most beautiful song which proceeds according to the best consonances, with some parts succeeding others, until things are perfectly ordered to the end. Hence, just as in the production of things power is manifested, but in the comparison or in the order to non-being is shown highest power, creating from nothing: so the order of things in the universe in itself shows wisdom, and the order to the end shows goodness; but in the comparison of the one to the other is shown highest wisdom and highest goodness, because nothing can disorder this order, as will appear better below.

The arguments proving that things are most well ordered are therefore to be conceded, because they regard each order.

1. To what is objected, that wisdom is infinite; it must be said that although wisdom is infinite, yet things are not capable of more than a finite order; and the highest wisdom itself gives the highest order which they are able to have.

2. To what is objected, that disorder falls; it must be said that, if we consider these orders, namely to the end and in the universe, they so embrace each other mutually that there cannot be any disorder there.

3. To what is objected concerning nearness, it must be said that this is true according to *proper ordering*, but according to *the course of the universe* it is necessary that the thing first be far from the end, and afterward draw near.

4. To what is objected, that order depends on the parts; it must be said that just as certain contingent things have in themselves *absolute contingent being*

but a necessary order: so also in the matter at hand it must be understood that although something is not optimum in itself, yet it is most well ordered. And an example of this appears in the parts of the body and in an artificial thing, in which there is consonance and harmony, as in a harp. For although the place of the eye is nobler than that of the foot, yet if we consider each according to its office, both the eye and the foot are most well situated in the whole, so that neither is the eye better than the foot, nor conversely. And so Augustine says on John, that just as the angel is most well in heaven, so the little worm is most well in the lowest, as on earth. And likewise it appears in the harp: for all the strings can be so proportioned that if any one were tightened in order to give it a better sound, the consonance would not remain. Likewise, words can be ordered for making a verse, in such a way that from those words it is impossible that a better-ordered verse should come to be: so in the matter at hand it must be understood.