Dist. 44, Art. 1, Q. 4
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/1/d/44/q/bon-sent-I-d44-a1-q4
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### Question IV.
#### *Whether God could have made the world older.*

In the fourth place it is asked whether [God] could have made the world older. And that he could, it seems.

1. Second [Letter] of Peter, last [chapter]: *A thousand years before God are as one day*. And in the Psalm: *A thousand years before thy eyes are as yesterday's day, which is past;* by parallel reasoning, a hundred thousand years also: therefore if God could make the world before yesterday, he could [make it] a hundred thousand years before. And if this, it would be older: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, divine power and operation does not depend either on matter or on time: therefore by whatever reason [he can act] in one instant, [he can act] in another; but by whatever reason in a later [instant], by the same reason in an earlier; and if this, the world could have been made older: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, the divine essence and power existed before the beginning of time; therefore either it was able to produce before, or not. If not, then it was impotent; if so, then it could have made the world before he made it.

4. Likewise, I ask whether he could have made [it] later. If so, but there is no greater reason about "later" than about "earlier": therefore by parallel reasoning he could have made [it] earlier. Or if he could not [make it] later, neither earlier, and so it was necessary that [it be] then: therefore it seems that he made the world then under compulsion and not voluntarily.

**On the contrary:**

1. Before the beginning of time there was nothing except eternity: therefore if he could have made the world before the beginning of time, he could have made [it] also in eternity; but what has being in eternity lacks a beginning, and no such [thing] can be created out of nothing: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, if he could have made [it] before; let it be posited. Similarly therefore I ask, whether before [that]? and so on to infinity; but the infinite on the prior side is eternal: therefore if he could have made [it] infinitely before, he could also [have made it] from eternity. If therefore he could not make the world eternal, since it would not be made, neither [could he have made it] older.

3. Likewise, it is necessary that the world have a finite duration on the prior side; but in everything finite it is necessary to stop somewhere, beyond which no progress can be made; but by whatever reason a halt is made at some finite instant, [a halt] is made at that [instant] in which the world was founded: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, than the beginning of all antiquity nothing can be made or thought more ancient: but time or aevum, which began with the world, is the beginning of all antiquity: therefore than it nothing could be more ancient.

### Conclusion.

> *God could not so make the world older that it be from eternity, nor so that it be without time; he could nevertheless well have made time before this [time] and in it have made the world.*

**I respond:** That when it is asked whether God could have made the world older, [the question] can be understood in two ways: either that he created it from eternity, while producing it [in fact] from time, and then it would be older; or so that the world endured for a longer time, yet finite.

The first I believe to be impossible without qualification, since it implies a contradiction in itself. For from this, that [the world] is posited to be made, it is posited to have a beginning. But from this, that it is posited to be eternal, it is posited not to have a beginning. Hence it is the same to ask whether God could have made [the world] before the world, [as to ask] whether the world, having a beginning, would not have a beginning: and this includes both parts of a contradiction.

Similarly, as to the second sense, it seems impossible to some, because it implies in itself an opposition, since priority or antiquity begins together with time. For in eternity there is no before and after; and time begins of necessity together with the world, just as situation begins together with place, and place [together] with the first sphere. Hence just as, if it were asked whether the first sphere could be made higher, there would be no question at all, indeed it would imply a contradiction, namely that outside every place there be a place — and this comes from a false imagination, because one imagines the whole world to be in local space, just as we imagine the earth to be surrounded by water — likewise it must be understood in the present case, that it is an implication of contradiction and comes from a false imagination, because we imagine a duration of time to have existed before the beginning of the world, in which the world could have been made before. Hence just as, if it be asked whether the whole world could be made outside the whole world, or above, or below, [it is asked], the question is foolish and implies opposites and comes from a bad imagination: in this way they respond, if it be asked whether the world could be made before or older. Hence they say that, if something had preceded, measuring beforehand temporally, [the world] could indeed have been made before; similarly, if there were a place outside, [the world] could have been made higher. — But the reason for this bad imagination is: for when we imagine eternity to have existed for an infinity before time, we understand it as a kind of extended duration, in which there are diverse "nows", in any one of which time could have been made. But this is altogether nothing, because eternity is a most simple "now", in which no diversity at all falls. — Therefore it must be granted, as the reasons adduced to this [conclusion] prove, that just as he could not make the world in another place, since [the world] is not in a place, so neither before, since there is no antiquity except in [the world]. — To that which is objected, that with God there is no force in any amount of time, and that his power does not depend etc.; they say to all [these objections] by a single response, that although the divine power is bound to nothing, nevertheless

a thing having a beginning cannot be made without a beginning, and a temporal [thing] not without time, and the first temporal [thing] cannot be made except in the beginning of time, and the beginning of time only in the beginning of time. For the opposite does not state a power, but rather a contradiction and a repugnance. Yet it is not bound to make in this way [only], because it could entirely not make. Hence just as the question is foolish if it be asked whether he could have made the beginning of time before the beginning of time; similarly also the aforesaid.

But since it seems harsh to say that God could not make the world older, and that he could have made another world, but only this one; therefore others say that, just as God could make the world larger, so also he could make it older without any distinction. — Yet this is not entirely similar, because God could make heaven larger and more distant from the earth, the nature of each being preserved; but if God be understood to have made it so that this *now* be further removed from the beginning of time, that *now* is understood to be another, because even if the world be understood to have been made before, still it would not be older with respect to this *now*, since it would be just as distant as it is from the beginning; and so it would not be older.

And therefore [the question] is neither to be denied absolutely nor granted absolutely, just as neither this: that God could make the world higher. For if you understand [this] of *this* [world] absolutely, it is false, as the first opinion says, and unintelligible, and an implication of contradiction. But if you understand [it] by way of the concomitance of another place, namely because God could make another world enclosing this one, in which it could have a position more high or [less] low, it is true. The same is to be judged concerning antiquity. — And therefore if it be asked whether God could have made the world before, distinction must be made, just as also concerning this: whether God could have made the world in another place or elsewhere; because an adverbial determination can fall under the *ampliatio* of the verb, or outside [it]. If under the *ampliatio* of the verb, then it is true and the sense is that God could have made another place and in it have set this whole world. For he could have made a hundred such worlds, and yet one [more] enclosing them all, and one in a place higher than another. So also it must be understood in [the matter of] time, that God could have made time before this, and in it have made the world.

In another mode the adverbial determination can fall outside the *ampliatio* of [the word] *potest*, and the sense is that God can make this world in another place which is outside the [actual] world: and this is an implication of falsity, since there is no place except within the world; and likewise [it] must be understood concerning time.

**1.** To that therefore which is objected, that before [there] was nothing except eternity; it must be said that it is true, yet nevertheless God could have made [it so] that before [the world] there be time.

**2.** To that which is objected concerning the infinite on the prior side, it must be said that the infinite on the prior side can be [understood] by adding, either according to act, or according to potency. In the first mode it states eternity; in the second mode by no means, because eternity states an infinite in act.

**3.** To that which is objected, that it is necessary to posit a stopping-point; it must be said that it is true; but stopping-points can be infinite [in number]; and although in potency there is to posit a stopping-point, nevertheless because act does not follow the whole of potency, but is in some [particular] state, therefore [it stops] in a finite state. But why rather in this [state] than in another, the supreme and most powerful reason is the will of the maker.

**4.** To that which is objected, that antiquity began with the world; it must be said that it is true; but God could have made [it so] that it began earlier; therefore that reasoning is not valid. The reasonings to the contrary are to be granted: for they proceed according to the first way.

### Scholion.

**I.** Besides the principal question, another question is briefly resolved, namely whether the world could be created from eternity. If the words *from eternity* are not joined with the verb *could*, but with the terms *the world be created*, that is, as is said here (at 2.), by adding *the infinite on the prior side* not according to *potency*, but according to *act*; then the holy Doctor here and in II *Sent.* d. 1, p. 1, a. 1, q. 2, altogether denies that it is possible for anything to be created from eternity. To him consent Richard of Middleton, Henry of Ghent, and very many others, especially of our age. Others, however, with St. Thomas and Scotus (who however remains in doubt), with Aristotle as guide, judge that the arguments drawn from reason do not sufficiently prove this impossibility.

**II.** As for the question whether the world, which is supposed to be created

*not from eternity*, could have been created *earlier* than it has been created in this order of providence, the first opinion responds negatively; or rather some affirm the question itself to be irrational, inasmuch as the question itself falsely supposes that there was time before the beginning of the world. But that the question can be reasonably posed is clear, if we place the beginning of measuring duration not in *the beginning of our world*, but in *this moment* in which we live, that is, if we ask whether the duration of the world from the present instant up to the beginning of the world could be greater. To this the holy Doctor rightly responds with a distinction. For the *now* of present time, if it were further distant from the beginning of time (and also the *first now*), would not be the *same now*, but *another*; because to the world, which is supposed [to exist] before the course of our time, also *another time* would be ordered, and then there would also be *another world*, which God could have made. But if the *same now* present and the *same beginning* of time is supposed, then the creation of the world would fall *outside time*, if the real world were older; which is impossible.

Explicitly and in the same opinion as the Seraphic [Doctor], the following treat this question: Petrus a Tarantasia, here q. *unica*, a. 4. — Blessed Albert, here a. 1. — Richard of Middleton, here q. 3.

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